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authorTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>2018-07-04 16:20:06 +0200
committerMatthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>2018-07-16 22:22:20 +0200
commit0c3627bc7dac395c6af8bd1fb747ef3556e95fb4 (patch)
treef3f24ae23cc2d15fcfaa289c942e6d35c908a54b /COPYING
parent28015d91e284ee4b797a6e99ec16d53147c0ddb6 (diff)
Prevent OOB access on illegal server response.
While parsing Xorg responses it is possible to trigger an out of boundary read if the response does not contain enough bytes. In case of IPv4, the padding normally prevents this, but IPv6 addresses can trigger an out of boundary read. It takes a hostile xorg-server to reproduce this issue. If os/access.c is adjusted to always use a length of 1, it is possible to reproduce it and make it visible with an ASAN-compiled xhost. Reading past the memory boundary could reveal sensitive information to external DNS servers, because a lookup will be performed. Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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