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author | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2013-03-09 22:55:23 -0800 |
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committer | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2013-05-23 08:13:26 -0700 |
commit | 322ee3576789380222d4403366e4fd12fb24cb6a (patch) | |
tree | 8c16181dff4ee9f7e5fd85b828978ca23dc2d52d /src/XFreeLst.c | |
parent | b0b13c12a8079a5a0e7f43b2b8983699057b2cec (diff) |
integer overflow in XGetFeedbackControl() [CVE-2013-1984 2/8]
If the number of feedbacks reported by the server is large enough that
it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, or
if the total size of all the feedback structures overflows when added
together, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from
the X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server, so
we don't read out of bounds either
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/XFreeLst.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions