diff options
| author | Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com> | 2021-09-23 16:46:32 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com> | 2021-11-17 12:09:02 -0500 |
| commit | 43fbf03e549bf6da8d1d8522e0ceddc4d49c37c6 (patch) | |
| tree | 8187a58f583140ab0e3a2f3840073d17dce72724 /src | |
| parent | 233d7b7f1f03ef18bf3955eb1f20421e745d22f0 (diff) | |
Fix integer overflows in xcb_in.c
This fixes an integer overflow security vulnerability in xcb_in.c, which
may allow for memory corruption.
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/xcb_in.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/xcb_in.c b/src/xcb_in.c index 4862464..c9a264d 100644 --- a/src/xcb_in.c +++ b/src/xcb_in.c @@ -239,9 +239,15 @@ static int read_packet(xcb_connection_t *c) if(pend && pend->workaround == WORKAROUND_GLX_GET_FB_CONFIGS_BUG) { uint32_t *p = (uint32_t *) c->in.queue; - genrep.length = p[2] * p[3] * 2; + uint64_t new_length = ((uint64_t)p[2]) * ((uint64_t)p[3]); + if(new_length >= (UINT32_MAX / UINT32_C(16))) + { + _xcb_conn_shutdown(c, XCB_CONN_CLOSED_MEM_INSUFFICIENT); + return 0; + } + genrep.length = (uint32_t)(new_length * UINT64_C(2)); } - length += genrep.length * 4; + length += genrep.length * UINT64_C(4); /* XXX a bit of a hack -- we "know" that all FD replys place * the number of fds in the pad0 byte */ @@ -251,7 +257,7 @@ static int read_packet(xcb_connection_t *c) /* XGE events may have sizes > 32 */ if ((genrep.response_type & 0x7f) == XCB_XGE_EVENT) - eventlength = genrep.length * 4; + eventlength = genrep.length * UINT64_C(4); bufsize = length + eventlength + nfd * sizeof(int) + (genrep.response_type == XCB_REPLY ? 0 : sizeof(uint32_t)); |