diff options
author | Eric Jackson <ericj@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2001-06-25 22:41:27 +0000 |
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committer | Eric Jackson <ericj@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2001-06-25 22:41:27 +0000 |
commit | 82b2a48707d6ab87198c90ae77927fcaf6190bd5 (patch) | |
tree | bfd76148672b6a9ca78934cab27af2bfb83cf775 | |
parent | 85c3856ab5615dfa3e1cc8b1ad4f0bb6a040b156 (diff) |
remove old cruft
-rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/nc/README | 946 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/nc/netcat.blurb | 61 |
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 1007 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/nc/README b/usr.bin/nc/README deleted file mode 100644 index 4235bc41acf..00000000000 --- a/usr.bin/nc/README +++ /dev/null @@ -1,946 +0,0 @@ -Netcat 1.10 -=========== /\_/\ - / 0 0 \ -Netcat is a simple Unix utility which reads and writes data ====v==== -across network connections, using TCP or UDP protocol. \ W / -It is designed to be a reliable "back-end" tool that can | | _ -be used directly or easily driven by other programs and / ___ \ / -scripts. At the same time, it is a feature-rich network / / \ \ | -debugging and exploration tool, since it can create almost (((-----)))-' -any kind of connection you would need and has several / -interesting built-in capabilities. Netcat, or "nc" as the ( ___ -actual program is named, should have been supplied long ago \__.=|___E -as another one of those cryptic but standard Unix tools. / - -In the simplest usage, "nc host port" creates a TCP connection to the given -port on the given target host. Your standard input is then sent to the host, -and anything that comes back across the connection is sent to your standard -output. This continues indefinitely, until the network side of the connection -shuts down. Note that this behavior is different from most other applications -which shut everything down and exit after an end-of-file on the standard input. - -Netcat can also function as a server, by listening for inbound connections -on arbitrary ports and then doing the same reading and writing. With minor -limitations, netcat doesn't really care if it runs in "client" or "server" -mode -- it still shovels data back and forth until there isn't any more left. -In either mode, shutdown can be forced after a configurable time of inactivity -on the network side. - -And it can do this via UDP too, so netcat is possibly the "udp telnet-like" -application you always wanted for testing your UDP-mode servers. UDP, as the -"U" implies, gives less reliable data transmission than TCP connections and -some systems may have trouble sending large amounts of data that way, but it's -still a useful capability to have. - -You may be asking "why not just use telnet to connect to arbitrary ports?" -Valid question, and here are some reasons. Telnet has the "standard input -EOF" problem, so one must introduce calculated delays in driving scripts to -allow network output to finish. This is the main reason netcat stays running -until the *network* side closes. Telnet also will not transfer arbitrary -binary data, because certain characters are interpreted as telnet options and -are thus removed from the data stream. Telnet also emits some of its -diagnostic messages to standard output, where netcat keeps such things -religiously separated from its *output* and will never modify any of the real -data in transit unless you *really* want it to. And of course telnet is -incapable of listening for inbound connections, or using UDP instead. Netcat -doesn't have any of these limitations, is much smaller and faster than telnet, -and has many other advantages. - -Some of netcat's major features are: - - Outbound or inbound connections, TCP or UDP, to or from any ports - Full DNS forward/reverse checking, with appropriate warnings - Ability to use any local source port - Ability to use any locally-configured network source address - Built-in port-scanning capabilities, with randomizer - Built-in loose source-routing capability - Can read command line arguments from standard input - Slow-send mode, one line every N seconds - Hex dump of transmitted and received data - Optional ability to let another program service established connections - Optional telnet-options responder - -Efforts have been made to have netcat "do the right thing" in all its various -modes. If you believe that it is doing the wrong thing under whatever -circumstances, please notify me and tell me how you think it should behave. -If netcat is not able to do some task you think up, minor tweaks to the code -will probably fix that. It provides a basic and easily-modified template for -writing other network applications, and I certainly encourage people to make -custom mods and send in any improvements they make to it. This is the second -release; the overall differences from 1.00 are relatively minor and have mostly -to do with portability and bugfixes. Many people provided greatly appreciated -fixes and comments on the 1.00 release. Continued feedback from the Internet -community is always welcome! - -Netcat is entirely my own creation, although plenty of other code was used as -examples. It is freely given away to the Internet community in the hope that -it will be useful, with no restrictions except giving credit where it is due. -No GPLs, Berkeley copyrights or any of that nonsense. The author assumes NO -responsibility for how anyone uses it. If netcat makes you rich somehow and -you're feeling generous, mail me a check. If you are affiliated in any way -with Microsoft Network, get a life. Always ski in control. Comments, -questions, and patches to hobbit@avian.org. - -Building -======== - -Compiling is fairly straightforward. Examine the Makefile for a SYSTYPE that -matches yours, and do "make <systype>". The executable "nc" should appear. -If there is no relevant SYSTYPE section, try "generic". If you create new -sections for generic.h and Makefile to support another platform, please follow -the given format and mail back the diffs. - -There are a couple of other settable #defines in netcat.c, which you can -include as DFLAGS="-DTHIS -DTHAT" to your "make" invocation without having to -edit the Makefile. See the following discussions for what they are and do. - -If you want to link against the resolver library on SunOS [recommended] and -you have BIND 4.9.x, you may need to change XLIBS=-lresolv in the Makefile to -XLIBS="-lresolv -l44bsd". - -Linux sys/time.h does not really support presetting of FD_SETSIZE; a harmless -warning is issued. - -Some systems may warn about pointer types for signal(). No problem, though. - -Exploration of features -======================= - -Where to begin? Netcat is at the same time so simple and versatile, it's like -trying to describe everything you can do with your Swiss Army knife. This will -go over the basics; you should also read the usage examples and notes later on -which may give you even more ideas about what this sort of tool is good for. - -If no command arguments are given at all, netcat asks for them, reads a line -from standard input, and breaks it up into arguments internally. This can be -useful when driving netcat from certain types of scripts, with the side effect -of hiding your command line arguments from "ps" displays. - -The host argument can be a name or IP address. If -n is specified, netcat -will only accept numeric IP addresses and do no DNS lookups for anything. If --n is not given and -v is turned on, netcat will do a full forward and reverse -name and address lookup for the host, and warn you about the all-too-common -problem of mismatched names in the DNS. This often takes a little longer for -connection setup, but is useful to know about. There are circumstances under -which this can *save* time, such as when you want to know the name for some IP -address and also connect there. Netcat will just tell you all about it, saving -the manual steps of looking up the hostname yourself. Normally mismatch- -checking is case-insensitive per the DNS spec, but you can define ANAL at -compile time to make it case-sensitive -- sometimes useful for uncovering minor -errors in your own DNS files while poking around your networks. - -A port argument is required for outbound connections, and can be numeric or a -name as listed in /etc/services. If -n is specified, only numeric arguments -are valid. Special syntax and/or more than one port argument cause different -behavior -- see details below about port-scanning. - -The -v switch controls the verbosity level of messages sent to standard error. -You will probably want to run netcat most of the time with -v turned on, so you -can see info about the connections it is trying to make. You will probably -also want to give a smallish -w argument, which limits the time spent trying to -make a connection. I usually alias "nc" to "nc -v -w 3", which makes it -function just about the same for things I would otherwise use telnet to do. -The timeout is easily changed by a subsequent -w argument which overrides the -earlier one. Specifying -v more than once makes diagnostic output MORE -verbose. If -v is not specified at all, netcat silently does its work unless -some error happens, whereupon it describes the error and exits with a nonzero -status. Refused network connections are generally NOT considered to be errors, -unless you only asked for a single TCP port and it was refused. - -Note that -w also sets the network inactivity timeout. This does not have any -effect until standard input closes, but then if nothing further arrives from -the network in the next <timeout> seconds, netcat tries to read the net once -more for good measure, and then closes and exits. There are a lot of network -services now that accept a small amount of input and return a large amount of -output, such as Gopher and Web servers, which is the main reason netcat was -written to "block" on the network staying open rather than standard input. -Handling the timeout this way gives uniform behavior with network servers that -*don't* close by themselves until told to. - -UDP connections are opened instead of TCP when -u is specified. These aren't -really "connections" per se since UDP is a connectionless protocol, although -netcat does internally use the "connected UDP socket" mechanism that most -kernels support. Although netcat claims that an outgoing UDP connection is -"open" immediately, no data is sent until something is read from standard -input. Only thereafter is it possible to determine whether there really is a -UDP server on the other end, and often you just can't tell. Most UDP protocols -use timeouts and retries to do their thing and in many cases won't bother -answering at all, so you should specify a timeout and hope for the best. You -will get more out of UDP connections if standard input is fed from a source -of data that looks like various kinds of server requests. - -To obtain a hex dump file of the data sent either way, use "-o logfile". The -dump lines begin with "<" or ">" to respectively indicate "from the net" or -"to the net", and contain the total count per direction, and hex and ascii -representations of the traffic. Capturing a hex dump naturally slows netcat -down a bit, so don't use it where speed is critical. - -Netcat can bind to any local port, subject to privilege restrictions and ports -that are already in use. It is also possible to use a specific local network -source address if it is that of a network interface on your machine. [Note: -this does not work correctly on all platforms.] Use "-p portarg" to grab a -specific local port, and "-s ip-addr" or "-s name" to have that be your source -IP address. This is often referred to as "anchoring the socket". Root users -can grab any unused source port including the "reserved" ones less than 1024. -Absence of -p will bind to whatever unused port the system gives you, just like -any other normal client connection, unless you use -r [see below]. - -Listen mode will cause netcat to wait for an inbound connection, and then the -same data transfer happens. Thus, you can do "nc -l -p 1234 < filename" and -when someone else connects to your port 1234, the file is sent to them whether -they wanted it or not. Listen mode is generally used along with a local port -argument -- this is required for UDP mode, while TCP mode can have the system -assign one and tell you what it is if -v is turned on. If you specify a target -host and optional port in listen mode, netcat will accept an inbound connection -only from that host and if you specify one, only from that foreign source port. -In verbose mode you'll be informed about the inbound connection, including what -address and port it came from, and since listening on "any" applies to several -possibilities, which address it came *to* on your end. If the system supports -IP socket options, netcat will attempt to retrieve any such options from an -inbound connection and print them out in hex. - -If netcat is compiled with -DGAPING_SECURITY_HOLE, the -e argument specifies -a program to exec after making or receiving a successful connection. In the -listening mode, this works similarly to "inetd" but only for a single instance. -Use with GREAT CARE. This piece of the code is normally not enabled; if you -know what you're doing, have fun. This hack also works in UDP mode. Note that -you can only supply -e with the name of the program, but no arguments. If you -want to launch something with an argument list, write a two-line wrapper script -or just use inetd like always. - -If netcat is compiled with -DTELNET, the -t argument enables it to respond -to telnet option negotiation [always in the negative, i.e. DONT or WONT]. -This allows it to connect to a telnetd and get past the initial negotiation -far enough to get a login prompt from the server. Since this feature has -the potential to modify the data stream, it is not enabled by default. You -have to understand why you might need this and turn on the #define yourself. - -Data from the network connection is always delivered to standard output as -efficiently as possible, using large 8K reads and writes. Standard input is -normally sent to the net the same way, but the -i switch specifies an "interval -time" which slows this down considerably. Standard input is still read in -large batches, but netcat then tries to find where line breaks exist and sends -one line every interval time. Note that if standard input is a terminal, data -is already read line by line, so unless you make the -i interval rather long, -what you type will go out at a fairly normal rate. -i is really designed -for use when you want to "measure out" what is read from files or pipes. - -Port-scanning is a popular method for exploring what's out there. Netcat -accepts its commands with options first, then the target host, and everything -thereafter is interpreted as port names or numbers, or ranges of ports in M-N -syntax. CAVEAT: some port names in /etc/services contain hyphens -- netcat -currently will not correctly parse those, so specify ranges using numbers if -you can. If more than one port is thus specified, netcat connects to *all* of -them, sending the same batch of data from standard input [up to 8K worth] to -each one that is successfully connected to. Specifying multiple ports also -suppresses diagnostic messages about refused connections, unless -v is -specified twice for "more verbosity". This way you normally get notified only -about genuinely open connections. Example: "nc -v -w 2 -z target 20-30" will -try connecting to every port between 20 and 30 [inclusive] at the target, and -will likely inform you about an FTP server, telnet server, and mailer along the -way. The -z switch prevents sending any data to a TCP connection and very -limited probe data to a UDP connection, and is thus useful as a fast scanning -mode just to see what ports the target is listening on. To limit scanning -speed if desired, -i will insert a delay between each port probe. There are -some pitfalls with regard to UDP scanning, described later, but in general it -works well. - -For each range of ports specified, scanning is normally done downward within -that range. If the -r switch is used, scanning hops randomly around within -that range and reports open ports as it finds them. [If you want them listed -in order regardless, pipe standard error through "sort"...] In addition, if -random mode is in effect, the local source ports are also randomized. This -prevents netcat from exhibiting any kind of regular pattern in its scanning. -You can exert fairly fine control over your scan by judicious use of -r and -selected port ranges to cover. If you use -r for a single connection, the -source port will have a random value above 8192, rather than the next one the -kernel would have assigned you. Note that selecting a specific local port -with -p overrides any local-port randomization. - -Many people are interested in testing network connectivity using IP source -routing, even if it's only to make sure their own firewalls are blocking -source-routed packets. On systems that support it, the -g switch can be used -multiple times [up to 8] to construct a loose-source-routed path for your -connection, and the -G argument positions the "hop pointer" within the list. -If your network allows source-routed traffic in and out, you can test -connectivity to your own services via remote points in the internet. Note that -although newer BSD-flavor telnets also have source-routing capability, it isn't -clearly documented and the command syntax is somewhat clumsy. Netcat's -handling of "-g" is modeled after "traceroute". - -Netcat tries its best to behave just like "cat". It currently does nothing to -terminal input modes, and does no end-of-line conversion. Standard input from -a terminal is read line by line with normal editing characters in effect. You -can freely suspend out of an interactive connection and resume. ^C or whatever -your interrupt character is will make netcat close the network connection and -exit. A switch to place the terminal in raw mode has been considered, but so -far has not been necessary. You can send raw binary data by reading it out of -a file or piping from another program, so more meaningful effort would be spent -writing an appropriate front-end driver. - -Netcat is not an "arbitrary packet generator", but the ability to talk to raw -sockets and/or nit/bpf/dlpi may appear at some point. Such things are clearly -useful; I refer you to Darren Reed's excellent ip_filter package, which now -includes a tool to construct and send raw packets with any contents you want. - -Example uses -- the light side -============================== - -Again, this is a very partial list of possibilities, but it may get you to -think up more applications for netcat. Driving netcat with simple shell or -expect scripts is an easy and flexible way to do fairly complex tasks, -especially if you're not into coding network tools in C. My coding isn't -particularly strong either [although undoubtedly better after writing this -thing!], so I tend to construct bare-metal tools like this that I can trivially -plug into other applications. Netcat doubles as a teaching tool -- one can -learn a great deal about more complex network protocols by trying to simulate -them through raw connections! - -An example of netcat as a backend for something else is the shell-script -Web browser, which simply asks for the relevant parts of a URL and pipes -"GET /what/ever" into a netcat connection to the server. I used to do this -with telnet, and had to use calculated sleep times and other stupidity to -kludge around telnet's limitations. Netcat guarantees that I get the whole -page, and since it transfers all the data unmodified, I can even pull down -binary image files and display them elsewhere later. Some folks may find the -idea of a shell-script web browser silly and strange, but it starts up and -gets me my info a hell of a lot faster than a GUI browser and doesn't hide -any contents of links and forms and such. This is included, as scripts/web, -along with several other web-related examples. - -Netcat is an obvious replacement for telnet as a tool for talking to daemons. -For example, it is easier to type "nc host 25", talk to someone's mailer, and -just ^C out than having to type ^]c or QUIT as telnet would require you to do. -You can quickly catalog the services on your network by telling netcat to -connect to well-known services and collect greetings, or at least scan for open -ports. You'll probably want to collect netcat's diagnostic messages in your -output files, so be sure to include standard error in the output using -`>& file' in *csh or `> file 2>&1' in bourne shell. - -A scanning example: "echo QUIT | nc -v -w 5 target 20-250 500-600 5990-7000" -will inform you about a target's various well-known TCP servers, including -r-services, X, IRC, and maybe a few you didn't expect. Sending in QUIT and -using the timeout will almost guarantee that you see some kind of greeting or -error from each service, which usually indicates what it is and what version. -[Beware of the "chargen" port, though...] SATAN uses exactly this technique to -collect host information, and indeed some of the ideas herein were taken from -the SATAN backend tools. If you script this up to try every host in your -subnet space and just let it run, you will not only see all the services, -you'll find out about hosts that aren't correctly listed in your DNS. Then you -can compare new snapshots against old snapshots to see changes. For going -after particular services, a more intrusive example is in scripts/probe. - -Netcat can be used as a simple data transfer agent, and it doesn't really -matter which end is the listener and which end is the client -- input at one -side arrives at the other side as output. It is helpful to start the listener -at the receiving side with no timeout specified, and then give the sending side -a small timeout. That way the listener stays listening until you contact it, -and after data stops flowing the client will time out, shut down, and take the -listener with it. Unless the intervening network is fraught with problems, -this should be completely reliable, and you can always increase the timeout. A -typical example of something "rsh" is often used for: on one side, - - nc -l -p 1234 | uncompress -c | tar xvfp - - -and then on the other side - - tar cfp - /some/dir | compress -c | nc -w 3 othermachine 1234 - -will transfer the contents of a directory from one machine to another, without -having to worry about .rhosts files, user accounts, or inetd configurations -at either end. Again, it matters not which is the listener or receiver; the -"tarring" machine could just as easily be running the listener instead. One -could conceivably use a scheme like this for backups, by having cron-jobs fire -up listeners and backup handlers [which can be restricted to specific addresses -and ports between each other] and pipe "dump" or "tar" on one machine to "dd -of=/dev/tapedrive" on another as usual. Since netcat returns a nonzero exit -status for a denied listener connection, scripts to handle such tasks could -easily log and reject connect attempts from third parties, and then retry. - -Another simple data-transfer example: shipping things to a PC that doesn't have -any network applications yet except a TCP stack and a web browser. Point the -browser at an arbitrary port on a Unix server by telling it to download -something like http://unixbox:4444/foo, and have a listener on the Unix side -ready to ship out a file when the connect comes in. The browser may pervert -binary data when told to save the URL, but you can dig the raw data out of -the on-disk cache. - -If you build netcat with GAPING_SECURITY_HOLE defined, you can use it as an -"inetd" substitute to test experimental network servers that would otherwise -run under "inetd". A script or program will have its input and output hooked -to the network the same way, perhaps sans some fancier signal handling. Given -that most network services do not bind to a particular local address, whether -they are under "inetd" or not, it is possible for netcat avoid the "address -already in use" error by binding to a specific address. This lets you [as -root, for low ports] place netcat "in the way" of a standard service, since -inbound connections are generally sent to such specifically-bound listeners -first and fall back to the ones bound to "any". This allows for a one-off -experimental simulation of some service, without having to screw around with -inetd.conf. Running with -v turned on and collecting a connection log from -standard error is recommended. - -Netcat as well can make an outbound connection and then run a program or script -on the originating end, with input and output connected to the same network -port. This "inverse inetd" capability could enhance the backup-server concept -described above or help facilitate things such as a "network dialback" concept. -The possibilities are many and varied here; if such things are intended as -security mechanisms, it may be best to modify netcat specifically for the -purpose instead of wrapping such functions in scripts. - -Speaking of inetd, netcat will function perfectly well *under* inetd as a TCP -connection redirector for inbound services, like a "plug-gw" without the -authentication step. This is very useful for doing stuff like redirecting -traffic through your firewall out to other places like web servers and mail -hubs, while posing no risk to the firewall machine itself. Put netcat behind -inetd and tcp_wrappers, perhaps thusly: - - www stream tcp nowait nobody /etc/tcpd /bin/nc -w 3 realwww 80 - -and you have a simple and effective "application relay" with access control -and logging. Note use of the wait time as a "safety" in case realwww isn't -reachable or the calling user aborts the connection -- otherwise the relay may -hang there forever. - -You can use netcat to generate huge amounts of useless network data for -various performance testing. For example, doing - - yes AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA | nc -v -v -l -p 2222 > /dev/null - -on one side and then hitting it with - - yes BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB | nc othermachine 2222 > /dev/null - -from another host will saturate your wires with A's and B's. The "very -verbose" switch usage will tell you how many of each were sent and received -after you interrupt either side. Using UDP mode produces tremendously MORE -trash per unit time in the form of fragmented 8 Kbyte mobygrams -- enough to -stress-test kernels and network interfaces. Firing random binary data into -various network servers may help expose bugs in their input handling, which -nowadays is a popular thing to explore. A simple example data-generator is -given in data/data.c included in this package, along with a small collection -of canned input files to generate various packet contents. This program is -documented in its beginning comments, but of interest here is using "%r" to -generate random bytes at well-chosen points in a data stream. If you can -crash your daemon, you likely have a security problem. - -The hex dump feature may be useful for debugging odd network protocols, -especially if you don't have any network monitoring equipment handy or aren't -root where you'd need to run "tcpdump" or something. Bind a listening netcat -to a local port, and have it run a script which in turn runs another netcat -to the real service and captures the hex dump to a log file. This sets up a -transparent relay between your local port and wherever the real service is. -Be sure that the script-run netcat does *not* use -v, or the extra info it -sends to standard error may confuse the protocol. Note also that you cannot -have the "listen/exec" netcat do the data capture, since once the connection -arrives it is no longer netcat that is running. - -Binding to an arbitrary local port allows you to simulate things like r-service -clients, if you are root locally. For example, feeding "^@root^@joe^@pwd^@" -[where ^@ is a null, and root/joe could be any other local/remote username -pair] into a "rsh" or "rlogin" server, FROM your port 1023 for example, -duplicates what the server expects to receive. Thus, you can test for insecure -.rhosts files around your network without having to create new user accounts on -your client machine. The program data/rservice.c can aid this process by -constructing the "rcmd" protocol bytes. Doing this also prevents "rshd" from -trying to create that separate standard-error socket and still gives you an -input path, as opposed to the usual action of "rsh -n". Using netcat for -things like this can be really useful sometimes, because rsh and rlogin -generally want a host *name* as an argument and won't accept IP addresses. If -your client-end DNS is hosed, as may be true when you're trying to extract -backup sets on to a dumb client, "netcat -n" wins where normal rsh/rlogin is -useless. - -If you are unsure that a remote syslogger is working, test it with netcat. -Make a UDP connection to port 514 and type in "<0>message", which should -correspond to "kern.emerg" and cause syslogd to scream into every file it has -open [and possibly all over users' terminals]. You can tame this down by -using a different number and use netcat inside routine scripts to send syslog -messages to places that aren't configured in syslog.conf. For example, -"echo '<38>message' | nc -w 1 -u loggerhost 514" should send to auth.notice -on loggerhost. The exact number may vary; check against your syslog.h first. - -Netcat provides several ways for you to test your own packet filters. If you -bind to a port normally protected against outside access and make a connection -to somewhere outside your own network, the return traffic will be coming to -your chosen port from the "outside" and should be blocked. TCP may get through -if your filter passes all "ack syn", but it shouldn't be even doing that to low -ports on your network. Remember to test with UDP traffic as well! If your -filter passes at least outbound source-routed IP packets, bouncing a connection -back to yourself via some gateway outside your network will create "incoming" -traffic with your source address, which should get dropped by a correctly -configured anti-spoofing filter. This is a "non-test" if you're also dropping -source-routing, but it's good to be able to test for that too. Any packet -filter worth its salt will be blocking source-routed packets in both -directions, but you never know what interesting quirks you might turn up by -playing around with source ports and addresses and watching the wires with a -network monitor. - -You can use netcat to protect your own workstation's X server against outside -access. X is stupid enough to listen for connections on "any" and never tell -you when new connections arrive, which is one reason it is so vulnerable. Once -you have all your various X windows up and running you can use netcat to bind -just to your ethernet address and listen to port 6000. Any new connections -from outside the machine will hit netcat instead your X server, and you get a -log of who's trying. You can either tell netcat to drop the connection, or -perhaps run another copy of itself to relay to your actual X server on -"localhost". This may not work for dedicated X terminals, but it may be -possible to authorize your X terminal only for its boot server, and run a relay -netcat over on the server that will in turn talk to your X terminal. Since -netcat only handles one listening connection per run, make sure that whatever -way you rig it causes another one to run and listen on 6000 soon afterward, or -your real X server will be reachable once again. A very minimal script just -to protect yourself could be - - while true ; do - nc -v -l -s <your-addr> -p 6000 localhost 2 - done - -which causes netcat to accept and then close any inbound connection to your -workstation's normal ethernet address, and another copy is immediately run by -the script. Send standard error to a file for a log of connection attempts. -If your system can't do the "specific bind" thing all is not lost; run your -X server on display ":1" or port 6001, and netcat can still function as a probe -alarm by listening on 6000. - -Does your shell-account provider allow personal Web pages, but not CGI scripts? -You can have netcat listen on a particular port to execute a program or script -of your choosing, and then just point to the port with a URL in your homepage. -The listener could even exist on a completely different machine, avoiding the -potential ire of the homepage-host administrators. Since the script will get -the raw browser query as input it won't look like a typical CGI script, and -since it's running under your UID you need to write it carefully. You may want -to write a netcat-based script as a wrapper that reads a query and sets up -environment variables for a regular CGI script. The possibilities for using -netcat and scripts to handle Web stuff are almost endless. Again, see the -examples under scripts/. - -Example uses -- the dark side -============================= - -Equal time is deserved here, since a versatile tool like this can be useful -to any Shade of Hat. I could use my Victorinox to either fix your car or -disassemble it, right? You can clearly use something like netcat to attack -or defend -- I don't try to govern anyone's social outlook, I just build tools. -Regardless of your intentions, you should still be aware of these threats to -your own systems. - -The first obvious thing is scanning someone *else's* network for vulnerable -services. Files containing preconstructed data, be it exploratory or -exploitive, can be fed in as standard input, including command-line arguments -to netcat itself to keep "ps" ignorant of your doings. The more random the -scanning, the less likelihood of detection by humans, scan-detectors, or -dynamic filtering, and with -i you'll wait longer but avoid loading down the -target's network. Some examples for crafting various standard UDP probes are -given in data/*.d. - -Some configurations of packet filters attempt to solve the FTP-data problem by -just allowing such connections from the outside. These come FROM port 20, TO -high TCP ports inside -- if you locally bind to port 20, you may find yourself -able to bypass filtering in some cases. Maybe not to low ports "inside", but -perhaps to TCP NFS servers, X servers, Prospero, ciscos that listen on 200x -and 400x... Similar bypassing may be possible for UDP [and maybe TCP too] if a -connection comes from port 53; a filter may assume it's a nameserver response. - -Using -e in conjunction with binding to a specific address can enable "server -takeover" by getting in ahead of the real ones, whereupon you can snarf data -sent in and feed your own back out. At the very least you can log a hex dump -of someone else's session. If you are root, you can certainly use -s and -e to -run various hacked daemons without having to touch inetd.conf or the real -daemons themselves. You may not always have the root access to deal with low -ports, but what if you are on a machine that also happens to be an NFS server? -You might be able to collect some interesting things from port 2049, including -local file handles. There are several other servers that run on high ports -that are likely candidates for takeover, including many of the RPC services on -some platforms [yppasswdd, anyone?]. Kerberos tickets, X cookies, and IRC -traffic also come to mind. RADIUS-based terminal servers connect incoming -users to shell-account machines on a high port, usually 1642 or thereabouts. -SOCKS servers run on 1080. Do "netstat -a" and get creative. - -There are some daemons that are well-written enough to bind separately to all -the local interfaces, possibly with an eye toward heading off this sort of -problem. Named from recent BIND releases, and NTP, are two that come to mind. -Netstat will show these listening on address.53 instead of *.53. You won't -be able to get in front of these on any of the real interface addresses, which -of course is especially interesting in the case of named, but these servers -sometimes forget about things like "alias" interface addresses or interfaces -that appear later on such as dynamic PPP links. There are some hacked web -servers and versions of "inetd" floating around that specifically bind as well, -based on a configuration file -- these generally *are* bound to alias addresses -to offer several different address-based services from one machine. - -Using -e to start a remote backdoor shell is another obvious sort of thing, -easier than constructing a file for inetd to listen on "ingreslock" or -something, and you can access-control it against other people by specifying a -client host and port. Experience with this truly demonstrates how fragile the -barrier between being "logged in" or not really is, and is further expressed by -scripts/bsh. If you're already behind a firewall, it may be easier to make an -*outbound* connection and then run a shell; a small wrapper script can -periodically try connecting to a known place and port, you can later listen -there until the inbound connection arrives, and there's your shell. Running -a shell via UDP has several interesting features, although be aware that once -"connected", the UDP stub sockets tend to show up in "netstat" just like TCP -connections and may not be quite as subtle as you wanted. Packets may also be -lost, so use TCP if you need reliable connections. But since UDP is -connectionless, a hookup of this sort will stick around almost forever, even if -you ^C out of netcat or do a reboot on your side, and you only need to remember -the ports you used on both ends to reestablish. And outbound UDP-plus-exec -connection creates the connected socket and starts the program immediately. On -a listening UDP connection, the socket is created once a first packet is -received. In either case, though, such a "connection" has the interesting side -effect that only your client-side IP address and [chosen?] source port will -thereafter be able to talk to it. Instant access control! A non-local third -party would have to do ALL of the following to take over such a session: - - forge UDP with your source address [trivial to do; see below] - guess the port numbers of BOTH ends, or sniff the wire for them - arrange to block ICMP or UDP return traffic between it and your real - source, so the session doesn't die with a network write error. - -The companion program data/rservice.c is helpful in scripting up any sort of -r-service username or password guessing attack. The arguments to "rservice" -are simply the strings that get null-terminated and passed over an "rcmd"-style -connection, with the assumption that the client does not need a separate -standard-error port. Brute-force password banging is best done via "rexec" if -it is available since it is less likely to log failed attempts. Thus, doing -"rservice joe joespass pwd | nc target exec" should return joe's home dir if -the password is right, or "Permission denied." Plug in a dictionary and go to -town. If you're attacking rsh/rlogin, remember to be root and bind to a port -between 512 and 1023 on your end, and pipe in "rservice joe joe pwd" and such. - -Netcat can prevent inadvertently sending extra information over a telnet -connection. Use "nc -t" in place of telnet, and daemons that try to ask for -things like USER and TERM environment variables will get no useful answers, as -they otherwise would from a more recent telnet program. Some telnetds actually -try to collect this stuff and then plug the USER variable into "login" so that -the caller is then just asked for a password! This mechanism could cause a -login attempt as YOUR real username to be logged over there if you use a -Borman-based telnet instead of "nc -t". - -Got an unused network interface configured in your kernel [e.g. SLIP], or -support for alias addresses? Ifconfig one to be any address you like, and bind -to it with -s to enable all sorts of shenanigans with bogus source addresses. -The interface probably has to be UP before this works; some SLIP versions -need a far-end address before this is true. Hammering on UDP services is then -a no-brainer. What you can do to an unfiltered syslog daemon should be fairly -obvious; trimming the conf file can help protect against it. Many routers out -there still blindly believe what they receive via RIP and other routing -protocols. Although most UDP echo and chargen servers check if an incoming -packet was sent from *another* "internal" UDP server, there are many that still -do not, any two of which [or many, for that matter] could keep each other -entertained for hours at the expense of bandwidth. And you can always make -someone wonder why she's being probed by nsa.gov. - -Your TCP spoofing possibilities are mostly limited to destinations you can -source-route to while locally bound to your phony address. Many sites block -source-routed packets these days for precisely this reason. If your kernel -does oddball things when sending source-routed packets, try moving the pointer -around with -G. You may also have to fiddle with the routing on your own -machine before you start receiving packets back. Warning: some machines still -send out traffic using the source address of the outbound interface, regardless -of your binding, especially in the case of localhost. Check first. If you can -open a connection but then get no data back from it, the target host is -probably killing the IP options on its end [this is an option inside TCP -wrappers and several other packages], which happens after the 3-way handshake -is completed. If you send some data and observe the "send-q" side of "netstat" -for that connection increasing but never getting sent, that's another symptom. -Beware: if Sendmail 8.7.x detects a source-routed SMTP connection, it extracts -the hop list and sticks it in the Received: header! - -SYN bombing [sometimes called "hosing"] can disable many TCP servers, and if -you hit one often enough, you can keep it unreachable for days. As is true of -many other denial-of-service attacks, there is currently no defense against it -except maybe at the human level. Making kernel SOMAXCONN considerably larger -than the default and the half-open timeout smaller can help, and indeed some -people running large high-performance web servers have *had* to do that just to -handle normal traffic. Taking out mailers and web servers is sociopathic, but -on the other hand it is sometimes useful to be able to, say, disable a site's -identd daemon for a few minutes. If someone realizes what is going on, -backtracing will still be difficult since the packets have a phony source -address, but calls to enough ISP NOCs might eventually pinpoint the source. -It is also trivial for a clueful ISP to watch for or even block outgoing -packets with obviously fake source addresses, but as we know many of them are -not clueful or willing to get involved in such hassles. Besides, outbound -packets with an [otherwise unreachable] source address in one of their net -blocks would look fairly legitimate. - -Notes -===== - -A discussion of various caveats, subtleties, and the design of the innards. - -As of version 1.07 you can construct a single file containing command arguments -and then some data to transfer. Netcat is now smart enough to pick out the -first line and build the argument list, and send any remaining data across the -net to one or multiple ports. The first release of netcat had trouble with -this -- it called fgets() for the command line argument, which behind the -scenes does a large read() from standard input, perhaps 4096 bytes or so, and -feeds that out to the fgets() library routine. By the time netcat 1.00 started -directly read()ing stdin for more data, 4096 bytes of it were gone. It now -uses raw read() everywhere and does the right thing whether reading from files, -pipes, or ttys. If you use this for multiple-port connections, the single -block of data will now be a maximum of 8K minus the first line. Improvements -have been made to the logic in sending the saved chunk to each new port. Note -that any command-line arguments hidden using this mechanism could still be -extracted from a core dump. - -When netcat receives an inbound UDP connection, it creates a "connected socket" -back to the source of the connection so that it can also send out data using -normal write(). Using this mechanism instead of recvfrom/sendto has several -advantages -- the read/write select loop is simplified, and ICMP errors can in -effect be received by non-root users. However, it has the subtle side effect -that if further UDP packets arrive from the caller but from different source -ports, the listener will not receive them. UDP listen mode on a multihomed -machine may have similar quirks unless you specifically bind to one of its -addresses. It is not clear that kernel support for UDP connected sockets -and/or my understanding of it is entirely complete here, so experiment... - -You should be aware of some subtleties concerning UDP scanning. If -z is on, -netcat attempts to send a single null byte to the target port, twice, with a -small time in between. You can either use the -w timeout, or netcat will try -to make a "sideline" TCP connection to the target to introduce a small time -delay equal to the round-trip time between you and the target. Note that if -you have a -w timeout and -i timeout set, BOTH take effect and you wait twice -as long. The TCP connection is to a normally refused port to minimize traffic, -but if you notice a UDP fast-scan taking somewhat longer than it should, it -could be that the target is actually listening on the TCP port. Either way, -any ICMP port-unreachable messages from the target should have arrived in the -meantime. The second single-byte UDP probe is then sent. Under BSD kernels, -the ICMP error is delivered to the "connected socket" and the second write -returns an error, which tells netcat that there is NOT a UDP service there. -While Linux seems to be a fortunate exception, under many SYSV derived kernels -the ICMP is not delivered, and netcat starts reporting that *all* the ports are -"open" -- clearly wrong. [Some systems may not even *have* the "udp connected -socket" concept, and netcat in its current form will not work for UDP at all.] -If -z is specified and only one UDP port is probed, netcat's exit status -reflects whether the connection was "open" or "refused" as with TCP. - -It may also be that UDP packets are being blocked by filters with no ICMP error -returns, in which case everything will time out and return "open". This all -sounds backwards, but that's how UDP works. If you're not sure, try "echo -w00gumz | nc -u -w 2 target 7" to see if you can reach its UDP echo port at -all. You should have no trouble using a BSD-flavor system to scan for UDP -around your own network, although flooding a target with the high activity that --z generates will cause it to occasionally drop packets and indicate false -"opens". A more "correct" way to do this is collect and analyze the ICMP -errors, as does SATAN's "udp_scan" backend, but then again there's no guarantee -that the ICMP gets back to you either. Udp_scan also does the zero-byte -probes but is excruciatingly careful to calculate its own round-trip timing -average and dynamically set its own response timeouts along with decoding any -ICMP received. Netcat uses a much sleazier method which is nonetheless quite -effective. Cisco routers are known to have a "dead time" in between ICMP -responses about unreachable UDP ports, so a fast scan of a cisco will show -almost everything "open". If you are looking for a specific UDP service, you -can construct a file containing the right bytes to trigger a response from the -other end and send that as standard input. Netcat will read up to 8K of the -file and send the same data to every UDP port given. Note that you must use a -timeout in this case [as would any other UDP client application] since the -two-write probe only happens if -z is specified. - -Many telnet servers insist on a specific set of option negotiations before -presenting a login banner. On a raw connection you will see this as small -amount of binary gook. My attempts to create fixed input bytes to make a -telnetd happy worked some places but failed against newer BSD-flavor ones, -possibly due to timing problems, but there are a couple of much better -workarounds. First, compile with -DTELNET and use -t if you just want to get -past the option negotiation and talk to something on a telnet port. You will -still see the binary gook -- in fact you'll see a lot more of it as the options -are responded to behind the scenes. The telnet responder does NOT update the -total byte count, or show up in the hex dump -- it just responds negatively to -any options read from the incoming data stream. If you want to use a normal -full-blown telnet to get to something but also want some of netcat's features -involved like settable ports or timeouts, construct a tiny "foo" script: - - #! /bin/sh - exec nc -otheroptions targethost 23 - -and then do - - nc -l -p someport -e foo localhost & - telnet localhost someport - -and your telnet should connect transparently through the exec'ed netcat to -the target, using whatever options you supplied in the "foo" script. Don't -use -t inside the script, or you'll wind up sending *two* option responses. - -I've observed inconsistent behavior under some Linuxes [perhaps just older -ones?] when binding in listen mode. Sometimes netcat binds only to "localhost" -if invoked with no address or port arguments, and sometimes it is unable to -bind to a specific address for listening if something else is already listening -on "any". The former problem can be worked around by specifying "-s 0.0.0.0", -which will do the right thing despite netcat claiming that it's listening on -[127.0.0.1]. This is a known problem -- for example, there's a mention of it -in the makefile for SOCKS. On the flip side, binding to localhost and sending -packets to some other machine doesn't work as you'd expect -- they go out with -the source address of the sending interface instead. The Linux kernel contains -a specific check to ensure that packets from 127.0.0.1 are never sent to the -wire; other kernels may contain similar code. Linux, of course, *still* -doesn't support source-routing, but they claim that it and many other network -improvements are at least breathing hard. - -There are several possible errors associated with making TCP connections, but -to specifically see anything other than "refused", one must wait the full -kernel-defined timeout for a connection to fail. Netcat's mechanism of -wrapping an alarm timer around the connect prevents the *real* network error -from being returned -- "errno" at that point indicates "interrupted system -call" since the connect attempt was interrupted. Some old 4.3 BSD kernels -would actually return things like "host unreachable" immediately if that was -the case, but most newer kernels seem to wait the full timeout and *then* pass -back the real error. Go figure. In this case, I'd argue that the old way was -better, despite those same kernels generally being the ones that tear down -*established* TCP connections when ICMP-bombed. - -Incoming socket options are passed to applications by the kernel in the -kernel's own internal format. The socket-options structure for source-routing -contains the "first-hop" IP address first, followed by the rest of the real -options list. The kernel uses this as is when sending reply packets -- the -structure is therefore designed to be more useful to the kernel than to humans, -but the hex dump of it that netcat produces is still useful to have. - -Kernels treat source-routing options somewhat oddly, but it sort of makes sense -once one understands what's going on internally. The options list of addresses -must contain hop1, hop2, ..., destination. When a source-routed packet is sent -by the kernel [at least BSD], the actual destination address becomes irrelevant -because it is replaced with "hop1", "hop1" is removed from the options list, -and all the other addresses in the list are shifted up to fill the hole. Thus -the outbound packet is sent from your chosen source address to the first -*gateway*, and the options list now contains hop2, ..., destination. During -all this address shuffling, the kernel does NOT change the pointer value, which -is why it is useful to be able to set the pointer yourself -- you can construct -some really bizarre return paths, and send your traffic fairly directly to the -target but around some larger loop on the way back. Some Sun kernels seem to -never flip the source-route around if it contains less than three hops, never -reset the pointer anyway, and tries to send the packet [with options containing -a "completed" source route!!] directly back to the source. This is way broken, -of course. [Maybe ipforwarding has to be on? I haven't had an opportunity to -beat on it thoroughly yet.] - -"Credits" section: The original idea for netcat fell out of a long-standing -desire and fruitless search for a tool resembling it and having the same -features. After reading some other network code and realizing just how many -cool things about sockets could be controlled by the calling user, I started -on the basics and the rest fell together pretty quickly. Some port-scanning -ideas were taken from Venema/Farmer's SATAN tool kit, and Pluvius' "pscan" -utility. Healthy amounts of BSD kernel source were perused in an attempt to -dope out socket options and source-route handling; additional help was obtained -from Dave Borman's telnet sources. The select loop is loosely based on fairly -well-known code from "rsh" and Richard Stevens' "sock" program [which itself is -sort of a "netcat" with more obscure features], with some more paranoid -sanity-checking thrown in to guard against the distinct likelihood that there -are subtleties about such things I still don't understand. I found the -argument-hiding method cleanly implemented in Barrett's "deslogin"; reading the -line as input allows greater versatility and is much less prone to cause -bizarre problems than the more common trick of overwriting the argv array. -After the first release, several people contributed portability fixes; they are -credited in generic.h and the Makefile. Lauren Burka inspired the ascii art -for this revised document. Dean Gaudet at Wired supplied a precursor to -the hex-dump code, and mudge@l0pht.com originally experimented with and -supplied code for the telnet-options responder. Outbound "-e <prog>" resulted -from a need to quietly bypass a firewall installation. Other suggestions and -patches have rolled in for which I am always grateful, but there are only 26 -hours per day and a discussion of feature creep near the end of this document. - -Netcat was written with the Russian railroad in mind -- conservatively built -and solid, but it *will* get you there. While the coding style is fairly -"tight", I have attempted to present it cleanly [keeping *my* lines under 80 -characters, dammit] and put in plenty of comments as to why certain things -are done. Items I know to be questionable are clearly marked with "XXX". -Source code was made to be modified, but determining where to start is -difficult with some of the tangles of spaghetti code that are out there. -Here are some of the major points I feel are worth mentioning about netcat's -internal design, whether or not you agree with my approach. - -Except for generic.h, which changes to adapt more platforms, netcat is a single -source file. This has the distinct advantage of only having to include headers -once and not having to re-declare all my functions in a billion different -places. I have attempted to contain all the gross who's-got-what-.h-file -things in one small dumping ground. Functions are placed "dependencies-first", -such that when the compiler runs into the calls later, it already knows the -type and arguments and won't complain. No function prototyping -- not even the -__P(()) crock -- is used, since it is more portable and a file of this size is -easy enough to check manually. Each function has a standard-format comment -ahead of it, which is easily found using the regexp " :$". I freely use gotos. -Loops and if-clauses are made as small and non-nested as possible, and the ends -of same *marked* for clarity [I wish everyone would do this!!]. - -Large structures and buffers are all malloc()ed up on the fly, slightly larger -than the size asked for and zeroed out. This reduces the chances of damage -from those "end of the buffer" fencepost errors or runaway pointers escaping -off the end. These things are permanent per run, so nothing needs to be freed -until the program exits. - -File descriptor zero is always expected to be standard input, even if it is -closed. If a new network descriptor winds up being zero, a different one is -asked for which will be nonzero, and fd zero is simply left kicking around -for the rest of the run. Why? Because everything else assumes that stdin is -always zero and "netfd" is always positive. This may seem silly, but it was a -lot easier to code. The new fd is obtained directly as a new socket, because -trying to simply dup() a new fd broke subsequent socket-style use of the new fd -under Solaris' stupid streams handling in the socket library. - -The catch-all message and error handlers are implemented with an ample list of -phoney arguments to get around various problems with varargs. Varargs seems -like deliberate obfuscation in the first place, and using it would also -require use of vfprintf() which not all platforms support. The trailing -sleep in bail() is to allow output to flush, which is sometimes needed if -netcat is already on the other end of a network connection. - -The reader may notice that the section that does DNS lookups seems much -gnarlier and more confusing than other parts. This is NOT MY FAULT. The -sockaddr and hostent abstractions are an abortion that forces the coder to -deal with it. Then again, a lot of BSD kernel code looks like similar -struct-pointer hell. I try to straighten it out somewhat by defining my own -HINF structure, containing names, ascii-format IP addresses, and binary IP -addresses. I fill this structure exactly once per host argument, and squirrel -everything safely away and handy for whatever wants to reference it later. - -Where many other network apps use the FIONBIO ioctl to set non-blocking I/O -on network sockets, netcat uses straightforward blocking I/O everywhere. -This makes everything very lock-step, relying on the network and filesystem -layers to feed in data when needed. Data read in is completely written out -before any more is fetched. This may not be quite the right thing to do under -some OSes that don't do timed select() right, but this remains to be seen. - -The hexdump routine is written to be as fast as possible, which is why it does -so much work itself instead of just sprintf()ing everything together. Each -dump line is built into a single buffer and atomically written out using the -lowest level I/O calls. Further improvements could undoubtedly be made by -using writev() and eliminating all sprintf()s, but it seems to fly right along -as is. If both exec-a-prog mode and a hexdump file is asked for, the hexdump -flag is deliberately turned off to avoid creating random zero-length files. -Files are opened in "truncate" mode; if you want "append" mode instead, change -the open flags in main(). - -main() may look a bit hairy, but that's only because it has to go down the -argv list and handle multiple ports, random mode, and exit status. Efforts -have been made to place a minimum of code inside the getopt() loop. Any real -work is sent off to functions in what is hopefully a straightforward way. - -Obligatory vendor-bash: If "nc" had become a standard utility years ago, -the commercial vendors would have likely packaged it setuid root and with --DGAPING_SECURITY_HOLE turned on but not documented. It is hoped that netcat -will aid people in finding and fixing the no-brainer holes of this sort that -keep appearing, by allowing easier experimentation with the "bare metal" of -the network layer. - -It could be argued that netcat already has too many features. I have tried -to avoid "feature creep" by limiting netcat's base functionality only to those -things which are truly relevant to making network connections and the everyday -associated DNS lossage we're used to. Option switches already have slightly -overloaded functionality. Random port mode is sort of pushing it. The -hex-dump feature went in later because it *is* genuinely useful. The -telnet-responder code *almost* verges on the gratuitous, especially since it -mucks with the data stream, and is left as an optional piece. Many people have -asked for example "how 'bout adding encryption?" and my response is that such -things should be separate entities that could pipe their data *through* netcat -instead of having their own networking code. I am therefore not completely -enthusiastic about adding any more features to this thing, although you are -still free to send along any mods you think are useful. - -Nonetheless, at this point I think of netcat as my tcp/ip swiss army knife, -and the numerous companion programs and scripts to go with it as duct tape. -Duct tape of course has a light side and a dark side and binds the universe -together, and if I wrap enough of it around what I'm trying to accomplish, -it *will* work. Alternatively, if netcat is a large hammer, there are many -network protocols that are increasingly looking like nails by now... - -_H* 960320 v1.10 RELEASE -- happy spring! diff --git a/usr.bin/nc/netcat.blurb b/usr.bin/nc/netcat.blurb deleted file mode 100644 index 2c540ad9dcc..00000000000 --- a/usr.bin/nc/netcat.blurb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -Netcat 1.10 is an updated release of Netcat, a simple Unix utility which reads -and writes data across network connections using TCP or UDP protocol. It is -designed to be a reliable "back-end" tool that can be used directly or easily -driven by other programs and scripts. At the same time it is a feature-rich -network debugging and exploration tool, since it can create almost any kind of -connection you would need and has several interesting built-in capabilities. - -Some of netcat's major features are: - - Outbound or inbound connections, TCP or UDP, to or from any ports - Full DNS forward/reverse checking, with appropriate warnings - Ability to use any local source port - Ability to use any locally-configured network source address - Built-in port-scanning capabilities, with randomizer - Built-in loose source-routing capability - Can read command line arguments from standard input - Slow-send mode, one line every N seconds - Hex dump of transmitted and received data - Optional ability to let another program service established connections - Optional telnet-options responder - -A very short list of potential uses: - - Script backends - Scanning ports and inventorying services, automated probes - Backup handlers - File transfers - Server testing, simulation, debugging, and hijacking - Firewall testing - Proxy gatewaying - Network performance testing - Address spoofing tests - Protecting X servers - 1001 other uses you'll likely come up with - -Changes between the 1.00 release and this release: - - Better portability -- updated generic.h and Makefile [thanx folks!] - Indication of local-end interface address on inbound connections - That's *Dave* Borman's telnet, not Paul Borman... - Better indication of DNS errors - Total byte counts printed if -v -v is used - A bunch of front-end driver companion programs and scripts - Better handling of stdin arguments-plus-data - Hex-dump feature - Telnet responder - Program exec works inbound or outbound now - -Netcat and the associated package is a product of Avian Research, and is freely -available in full source form with no restrictions save an obligation to give -credit where due. Get it via anonymous FTP at avian.org:/src/hacks/nc110.tgz -which is a gzipped tar file and not to be confused with its version 1.00 -precursor, nc100.tgz. Other distribution formats can be accomodated upon -request. Netcat is also mirrored at the following [faster] sites: - - zippy.telcom.arizona.edu:/pub/mirrors/avian.org/hacks/nc110.tgz - ftp.sterling.com:/mirrors/avian.org/src/hacks/nc110.tgz - coast.cs.purdue.edu:/pub/tools/unix/netcat/nc110.tgz - ftp.rge.com:/pub/security/coast/mirrors/avian.org/netcat/nc110.tgz - -_H* 960320 |