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authorIngo Schwarze <schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org>2022-07-13 20:52:37 +0000
committerIngo Schwarze <schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org>2022-07-13 20:52:37 +0000
commit99b06562f84e10a2fc8844c14d32ecea4d8c1897 (patch)
tree569989bcb3d5fa7915c96cf1e53dac152b1febf3
parent5213fa4cb166c22a9bd0c96ee33a573eed93ed72 (diff)
Start documenting our new pet octopus, SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3).
Or should we call it a centipede? Feedback and OK on a previous version from jsing@ and from our chief myriapodologist, tb@.
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/man/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.3159
2 files changed, 161 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/man/Makefile b/lib/libssl/man/Makefile
index 787780ece7c..c8f6e285415 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/man/Makefile
+++ b/lib/libssl/man/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.76 2021/10/25 15:16:35 tb Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.77 2022/07/13 20:52:36 schwarze Exp $
.include <bsd.own.mk>
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ MAN = BIO_f_ssl.3 \
SSL_CTX_set_options.3 \
SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.3 \
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.3 \
+ SSL_CTX_set_security_level.3 \
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.3 \
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.3 \
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.3 \
diff --git a/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.3 b/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.3
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..529352cf0f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.3
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: SSL_CTX_set_security_level.3,v 1.1 2022/07/13 20:52:36 schwarze Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2022 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+.\"
+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+.\"
+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 13 2022 $
+.Dt SSL_CTX_SET_SECURITY_LEVEL 3
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm SSL_CTX_set_security_level ,
+.Nm SSL_set_security_level ,
+.Nm SSL_CTX_get_security_level ,
+.Nm SSL_get_security_level
+.Nd change security level for TLS
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.In openssl/ssl.h
+.Ft void
+.Fo SSL_CTX_set_security_level
+.Fa "SSL_CTX *ctx"
+.Fa "int level"
+.Fc
+.Ft void
+.Fo SSL_set_security_level
+.Fa "SSL *s"
+.Fa "int level"
+.Fc
+.Ft int
+.Fo SSL_CTX_get_security_level
+.Fa "const SSL_CTX *ctx"
+.Fc
+.Ft int
+.Fo SSL_get_security_level
+.Fa "const SSL *s"
+.Fc
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+A security level is a set of restrictions on algorithms, key lengths,
+protocol versions, and other features in TLS connections.
+These restrictions apply in addition to those that exist from individually
+selecting supported features, for example ciphers, curves, or algorithms.
+.Pp
+The following table shows properties of the various security levels:
+.Bl -column # sec 15360 ECC TLS SHA1 -offset indent
+.It # Ta sec Ta \0\0RSA Ta ECC Ta TLS Ta MAC
+.It 0 Ta \0\00 Ta \0\0\0\00 Ta \0\00 Ta 1.0 Ta MD5
+.It 1 Ta \080 Ta \01024 Ta 160 Ta 1.0 Ta RC4
+.It 2 Ta 112 Ta \02048 Ta 224 Ta 1.0 Ta
+.It 3 Ta 128 Ta \03072 Ta 256 Ta 1.1 Ta SHA1
+.It 4 Ta 192 Ta \07680 Ta 384 Ta 1.2 Ta
+.It 5 Ta 256 Ta 15360 Ta 512 Ta 1.2 Ta
+.El
+.Pp
+The meaning of the columns is as follows:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width features -compact
+.It #
+The number of the
+.Fa level .
+.It sec
+The minimum security strength measured in bits, which is approximately
+the binary logarithm of the number of operations an attacker has
+to perform in order to break a cryptographic key.
+This minimum strength is enforced for all relevant parameters
+including cipher suite encryption algorithms, ECC curves, signature
+algorithms, DH parameter sizes, and certificate algorithms and key
+sizes.
+See SP800-57 below
+.Sx SEE ALSO
+for details on individual algorithms.
+.It RSA
+The minimum key length in bits for the RSA, DSA, and DH algorithms.
+.It ECC
+The minimum key length in bits for ECC algorithms.
+.It TLS
+The minimum TLS protocol version.
+.It MAC
+Cipher suites using the given MACs are allowed on this level
+and on lower levels, but not on higher levels.
+.El
+.Pp
+Level 0 is only provided for backward compatibility and permits everything.
+.Pp
+Level 3 and higher disable support for session tickets
+and only accept cipher suites that provide forward secrecy.
+.Pp
+The functions
+.Fn SSL_CTX_set_security_level
+and
+.Fn SSL_set_security_level
+choose the security
+.Fa level
+for
+.Fa ctx
+or
+.Fa s ,
+respectively.
+If not set, security level 1 is used.
+.Pp
+.Xr SSL_CTX_new 3
+initializes the security level of the new object to 1.
+.Pp
+.Xr SSL_new 3
+and
+.Xr SSL_set_SSL_CTX 3
+copy the security level from the context to the SSL object.
+.Pp
+.Xr SSL_dup 3
+copies the security level from the old to the new object.
+.Sh RETURN VALUES
+.Fn SSL_CTX_get_security_level
+and
+.Fn SSL_get_security_level
+return the security level configured in
+.Fa ctx
+or
+.Fa s ,
+respectively.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr EVP_PKEY_security_bits 3 ,
+.Xr RSA_security_bits 3 ,
+.Xr ssl 3 ,
+.Xr SSL_CTX_new 3 ,
+.Xr SSL_new 3
+.Rs
+.%A Elaine Barker
+.%T Recommendation for Key Management
+.%I U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
+.%R NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5
+.%U https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5
+.%C Gaithersburg, MD
+.%D May 2020
+.Re
+.Sh HISTORY
+These functions first appeared in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+and have been available since
+.Ox 7.2 .
+.Sh CAVEATS
+Applications which do not check the return values
+of configuration functions will misbehave.
+For example, if an application does not check the return value
+after trying to set a certificate and the certificate is rejected
+because of the security level, the application may behave as if
+no certificate had been provided at all.
+.Pp
+While some restrictions may be handled gracefully by negotiations
+between the client and the server, other restrictions may be
+fatal and abort the TLS handshake.
+For example, this can happen if the peer certificate contains a key
+that is too short or if the DH parameter size is too small.