diff options
| author | Theo Buehler <tb@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2021-12-09 17:54:42 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Theo Buehler <tb@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2021-12-09 17:54:42 +0000 |
| commit | fcc7f5cf9077f65ef7fac27586d1814ba1237d14 (patch) | |
| tree | 65d041917b248504053a36968958bdacaaeb6ce0 | |
| parent | bd2bd1ea24e8b670fbf2f696abc880c57f3ff6ac (diff) | |
Convert t1_enc.c to opaque EVP_MD_CTX.
ok inoguchi jsing
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/t1_enc.c | 51 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c b/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c index 65abcbdcaf7..a63da9c2636 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.152 2021/10/23 15:02:27 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.153 2021/12/09 17:54:41 tb Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, { unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t A1_len, hmac_len; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; - EVP_PKEY *mac_key; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL; int ret = 0; int chunk; size_t i; @@ -173,42 +173,43 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); + if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret, secret_len); - if (!mac_key) + if (mac_key == NULL) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) + if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) goto err; - if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) + if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) goto err; - if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) + if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) goto err; - if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) + if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) goto err; - if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) + if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) goto err; - if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) + if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) + if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; for (;;) { - if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) + if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) + if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len)) goto err; - if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) + if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) goto err; - if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) + if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) goto err; - if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) + if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) goto err; - if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) + if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) goto err; - if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) + if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, hmac, &hmac_len)) + if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, hmac, &hmac_len)) goto err; if (hmac_len > out_len) @@ -223,18 +224,18 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, if (out_len == 0) break; - if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) + if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) + if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len)) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) + if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); explicit_bzero(hmac, sizeof(hmac)); @@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, if (!ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(s, &md)) return (0); - if (md->type == NID_md5_sha1) { + if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) { /* * Partition secret between MD5 and SHA1, then XOR result. * If the secret length is odd, a one byte overlap is used. |