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authorTheo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org>2002-05-22 23:18:26 +0000
committerTheo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org>2002-05-22 23:18:26 +0000
commitde1882fc3891bd806ba70fc46afa17e48665f9c7 (patch)
tree3bbd2a526fc6ae7fd133f749f2a186d79c884a38
parent4e0e2da2c6153c1268c228078b321b85ab3a213f (diff)
spelling; abishoff@arc.nasa.gov
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c6
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c8
2 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c
index 1ffdbdb031a..7022d04b616 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.171 2002/05/16 22:09:59 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.172 2002/05/22 23:18:25 deraadt Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int stdin_null_flag = 0;
/*
* Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
- * so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
+ * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
* background.
*/
int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
@@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command));
channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", /*want reply*/ 1);
/* register callback for reply */
- /* XXX we asume that client_loop has already been called */
+ /* XXX we assume that client_loop has already been called */
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &client_subsystem_reply);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &client_subsystem_reply);
} else {
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
index 117f7366f38..5afafec952a 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.242 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.243 2002/05/22 23:18:25 deraadt Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
fatal_cleanup();
}
- /* Read other side's version identification. */
+ /* Read other sides version identification. */
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
/*
* Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
- * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
+ * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
* programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
* machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
* authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
- /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+ /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();