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authorBob Beck <beck@cvs.openbsd.org>2023-05-28 09:06:35 +0000
committerBob Beck <beck@cvs.openbsd.org>2023-05-28 09:06:35 +0000
commit0556cac25103ec24fa9cc396eb3a1fdc739a4b03 (patch)
tree8d812ac327ca12f6912160554687fbd3c9f5a41d
parentf1e545a20f37b3d886115e9b4bfcfa96341e9d11 (diff)
correct comment, spotted by tb@
-rw-r--r--lib/libtls/tls_verify.c8
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c b/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
index 420e278c996..acc034d9c13 100644
--- a/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
+++ b/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tls_verify.c,v 1.24 2023/05/28 09:02:01 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tls_verify.c,v 1.25 2023/05/28 09:06:34 beck Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Jeremie Courreges-Anglas <jca@openbsd.org>
*
@@ -243,9 +243,9 @@ tls_check_common_name(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *name,
data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subject_name,
lastpos));
/*
- * Fail if we cannot encode as UTF-8, or if the UTF-8 encoding of the
- * string contains a 0 byte. We treat any certificate with such data
- * in the CN as hostile and fail.
+ * Fail if we cannot encode as UTF-8, if the CN is of invalid length, or
+ * if the UTF-8 encoding of the string contains a 0 byte. We treat any
+ * certificate with such data in the CN as hostile and fail.
*/
if ((common_name_len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_bytes, data)) < 0) {
tls_set_errorx(ctx, "error verifying name '%s': "