Kerberos IV code, based on a merge of fixed code from KTH and original

4.4BSD Lite code (international edition).  Provides all functionality
from the original 4.4BSD code plus standard Kerberos elements that were
omitted in the 4.4BSD code.

1 files changed, 344 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kerberosIV/krb/rd_req.c b/kerberosIV/krb/rd_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c6128b11cf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kerberosIV/krb/rd_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+/*
+ * This software may now be redistributed outside the US.
+ *
+ * $Source: /cvs/OpenBSD/src/kerberosIV/krb/Attic/rd_req.c,v $
+ *
+ * $Locker:  $
+ */
+
+/* 
+  Copyright (C) 1989 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
+
+   Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed
+   to require a specific license from the United States Government.
+   It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
+   export to obtain such a license before exporting.
+
+WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+permission.  M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
+this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
+or implied warranty.
+
+  */
+
+#include "krb_locl.h"
+
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+static struct timeval t_local = { 0, 0 };
+
+/*
+ * Keep the following information around for subsequent calls
+ * to this routine by the same server using the same key.
+ */
+
+static des_key_schedule serv_key;	/* Key sched to decrypt ticket */
+static des_cblock ky;              /* Initialization vector */
+static int st_kvno;		/* version number for this key */
+static char st_rlm[REALM_SZ];	/* server's realm */
+static char st_nam[ANAME_SZ];	/* service name */
+static char st_inst[INST_SZ];	/* server's instance */
+
+/*
+ * This file contains two functions.  krb_set_key() takes a DES
+ * key or password string and returns a DES key (either the original
+ * key, or the password converted into a DES key) and a key schedule
+ * for it.
+ *
+ * krb_rd_req() reads an authentication request and returns information
+ * about the identity of the requestor, or an indication that the
+ * identity information was not authentic.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * krb_set_key() takes as its first argument either a DES key or a
+ * password string.  The "cvt" argument indicates how the first
+ * argument "key" is to be interpreted: if "cvt" is null, "key" is
+ * taken to be a DES key; if "cvt" is non-null, "key" is taken to
+ * be a password string, and is converted into a DES key using
+ * string_to_key().  In either case, the resulting key is returned
+ * in the external static variable "ky".  A key schedule is
+ * generated for "ky" and returned in the external static variable
+ * "serv_key".
+ *
+ * This routine returns the return value of des_key_sched.
+ *
+ * krb_set_key() needs to be in the same .o file as krb_rd_req() so that
+ * the key set by krb_set_key() is available in private storage for
+ * krb_rd_req().
+ */
+
+int
+krb_set_key(key, cvt)
+	char *key;
+	int cvt;
+{
+#ifdef NOENCRYPTION
+    bzero(ky, sizeof(ky));
+    return KSUCCESS;
+#else /* Encrypt */
+    if (cvt)
+        des_string_to_key(key,&ky);
+    else
+        bcopy(key,(char *)ky,8);
+    return(des_key_sched(&ky,serv_key));
+#endif /* NOENCRYPTION */
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * krb_rd_req() takes an AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST or
+ * AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST_MUTUAL message created by krb_mk_req(),
+ * checks its integrity and returns a judgement as to the requestor's
+ * identity.
+ *
+ * The "authent" argument is a pointer to the received message.
+ * The "service" and "instance" arguments name the receiving server,
+ * and are used to get the service's ticket to decrypt the ticket
+ * in the message, and to compare against the server name inside the
+ * ticket.  "from_addr" is the network address of the host from which
+ * the message was received; this is checked against the network
+ * address in the ticket.  If "from_addr" is zero, the check is not
+ * performed.  "ad" is an AUTH_DAT structure which is
+ * filled in with information about the sender's identity according
+ * to the authenticator and ticket sent in the message.  Finally,
+ * "fn" contains the name of the file containing the server's key.
+ * (If "fn" is NULL, the server's key is assumed to have been set
+ * by krb_set_key().  If "fn" is the null string ("") the default
+ * file KEYFILE, defined in "krb.h", is used.)
+ *
+ * krb_rd_req() returns RD_AP_OK if the authentication information
+ * was genuine, or one of the following error codes (defined in
+ * "krb.h"):
+ *
+ *	RD_AP_VERSION		- wrong protocol version number
+ *	RD_AP_MSG_TYPE		- wrong message type
+ *	RD_AP_UNDEC		- couldn't decipher the message
+ *	RD_AP_INCON		- inconsistencies found
+ *	RD_AP_BADD		- wrong network address
+ *	RD_AP_TIME		- client time (in authenticator)
+ *				  too far off server time
+ *	RD_AP_NYV		- Kerberos time (in ticket) too
+ *				  far off server time
+ *	RD_AP_EXP		- ticket expired
+ *
+ * For the message format, see krb_mk_req().
+ *
+ * Mutual authentication is not implemented.
+ */
+
+int
+krb_rd_req(authent, service, instance, from_addr, ad, fn)
+	register KTEXT authent;	/* The received message */
+	char *service;		/* Service name */
+	char *instance;		/* Service instance */
+	int32_t from_addr;	/* Net address of originating host */
+	AUTH_DAT *ad;		/* Structure to be filled in */
+	char *fn;		/* Filename to get keys from */
+{
+    static KTEXT_ST ticket;     /* Temp storage for ticket */
+    static KTEXT tkt = &ticket;
+    static KTEXT_ST req_id_st;  /* Temp storage for authenticator */
+    register KTEXT req_id = &req_id_st;
+
+    char realm[REALM_SZ];	/* Realm of issuing kerberos */
+    static des_key_schedule seskey_sched; /* Key sched for session key */
+    unsigned char skey[KKEY_SZ]; /* Session key from ticket */
+    char sname[SNAME_SZ];	/* Service name from ticket */
+    char iname[INST_SZ];	/* Instance name from ticket */
+    char r_aname[ANAME_SZ];	/* Client name from authenticator */
+    char r_inst[INST_SZ];	/* Client instance from authenticator */
+    char r_realm[REALM_SZ];	/* Client realm from authenticator */
+    unsigned int r_time_ms;     /* Fine time from authenticator */
+    unsigned long r_time_sec;   /* Coarse time from authenticator */
+    register char *ptr;		/* For stepping through */
+    unsigned long delta_t;      /* Time in authenticator - local time */
+    long tkt_age;		/* Age of ticket */
+    static int swap_bytes;	/* Need to swap bytes? */
+    static int mutual;		/* Mutual authentication requested? */
+    static unsigned char s_kvno;/* Version number of the server's key
+				 * Kerberos used to encrypt ticket */
+    int status;
+
+    if (authent->length <= 0)
+	return(RD_AP_MODIFIED);
+
+    ptr = (char *) authent->dat;
+
+    /* get msg version, type and byte order, and server key version */
+
+    /* check version */
+    if (KRB_PROT_VERSION != (unsigned int) *ptr++)
+        return(RD_AP_VERSION);
+
+    /* byte order */
+    swap_bytes = 0;
+    if ((*ptr & 1) != HOST_BYTE_ORDER)
+        swap_bytes++;
+
+    /* check msg type */
+    mutual = 0;
+    switch (*ptr++ & ~1) {
+    case AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST:
+        break;
+    case AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST_MUTUAL:
+        mutual++;
+        break;
+    default:
+        return(RD_AP_MSG_TYPE);
+    }
+
+#ifdef lint
+    /* XXX mutual is set but not used; why??? */
+    /* this is a crock to get lint to shut up */
+    if (mutual)
+        mutual = 0;
+#endif /* lint */
+    s_kvno = *ptr++;		/* get server key version */
+    (void) strcpy(realm,ptr);   /* And the realm of the issuing KDC */
+    ptr += strlen(ptr) + 1;     /* skip the realm "hint" */
+
+    /*
+     * If "fn" is NULL, key info should already be set; don't
+     * bother with ticket file.  Otherwise, check to see if we
+     * already have key info for the given server and key version
+     * (saved in the static st_* variables).  If not, go get it
+     * from the ticket file.  If "fn" is the null string, use the
+     * default ticket file.
+     */
+    if (fn && (strcmp(st_nam,service) || strcmp(st_inst,instance) ||
+               strcmp(st_rlm,realm) || (st_kvno != s_kvno))) {
+        if (*fn == 0) fn = KEYFILE;
+        st_kvno = s_kvno;
+#ifndef NOENCRYPTION
+        if (read_service_key(service,instance,realm,(int) s_kvno,
+                            fn,(char *)skey))
+            return(RD_AP_UNDEC);
+        if ((status = krb_set_key((char *)skey,0)))
+	    return(status);
+#endif /* !NOENCRYPTION */
+        (void) strcpy(st_rlm,realm);
+        (void) strcpy(st_nam,service);
+        (void) strcpy(st_inst,instance);
+    }
+
+    /* Get ticket from authenticator */
+    tkt->length = (int) *ptr++;
+    if ((tkt->length + (ptr+1 - (char *) authent->dat)) > authent->length)
+	return(RD_AP_MODIFIED);
+    bcopy(ptr+1,(char *)(tkt->dat),tkt->length);
+
+    if (krb_ap_req_debug)
+        log("ticket->length: %d",tkt->length);
+
+#ifndef NOENCRYPTION
+    /* Decrypt and take apart ticket */
+#endif
+
+    if (decomp_ticket(tkt,&ad->k_flags,ad->pname,ad->pinst,ad->prealm,
+                      &(ad->address),ad->session, &(ad->life),
+                      &(ad->time_sec),sname,iname,&ky,serv_key))
+        return(RD_AP_UNDEC);
+
+    if (krb_ap_req_debug) {
+        log("Ticket Contents.");
+        log(" Aname:   %s.%s",ad->pname,
+            ((int)*(ad->prealm) ? ad->prealm : "Athena"));
+        log(" Service: %s%s%s",sname,((int)*iname ? "." : ""),iname);
+    }
+
+    /* Extract the authenticator */
+    req_id->length = (int) *(ptr++);
+    if ((req_id->length + (ptr + tkt->length - (char *) authent->dat)) >
+	authent->length)
+	return(RD_AP_MODIFIED);
+    bcopy(ptr + tkt->length, (char *)(req_id->dat),req_id->length);
+
+#ifndef NOENCRYPTION
+    /* And decrypt it with the session key from the ticket */
+    if (krb_ap_req_debug) log("About to decrypt authenticator");
+    des_key_sched(&ad->session,seskey_sched);
+    des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)req_id->dat,(des_cblock *)req_id->dat,
+                 (long) req_id->length, seskey_sched,&ad->session,DES_DECRYPT);
+    if (krb_ap_req_debug) log("Done.");
+#endif /* NOENCRYPTION */
+
+#define check_ptr() if ((ptr - (char *) req_id->dat) > req_id->length) return(RD_AP_MODIFIED);
+
+    ptr = (char *) req_id->dat;
+    (void) strcpy(r_aname,ptr);	/* Authentication name */
+    ptr += strlen(r_aname)+1;
+    check_ptr();
+    (void) strcpy(r_inst,ptr);	/* Authentication instance */
+    ptr += strlen(r_inst)+1;
+    check_ptr();
+    (void) strcpy(r_realm,ptr);	/* Authentication name */
+    ptr += strlen(r_realm)+1;
+    check_ptr();
+    bcopy(ptr,(char *)&ad->checksum,4);	/* Checksum */
+    ptr += 4;
+    check_ptr();
+    if (swap_bytes) swap_u_long(ad->checksum);
+    r_time_ms = *(ptr++);	/* Time (fine) */
+#ifdef lint
+    /* XXX r_time_ms is set but not used.  why??? */
+    /* this is a crock to get lint to shut up */
+    if (r_time_ms)
+        r_time_ms = 0;
+#endif /* lint */
+    check_ptr();
+    /* assume sizeof(r_time_sec) == 4 ?? */
+    bcopy(ptr,(char *)&r_time_sec,4); /* Time (coarse) */
+    if (swap_bytes) swap_u_long(r_time_sec);
+
+    /* Check for authenticity of the request */
+    if (krb_ap_req_debug)
+        log("Pname:   %s %s",ad->pname,r_aname);
+    if (strcmp(ad->pname,r_aname) != 0)
+        return(RD_AP_INCON);
+    if (strcmp(ad->pinst,r_inst) != 0)
+        return(RD_AP_INCON);
+    if (krb_ap_req_debug)
+        log("Realm:   %s %s",ad->prealm,r_realm);
+    if ((strcmp(ad->prealm,r_realm) != 0))
+        return(RD_AP_INCON);
+
+    if (krb_ap_req_debug)
+        log("Address: %d %d",ad->address,from_addr);
+    if (from_addr && (!krb_equiv(ad->address, from_addr)))
+        return(RD_AP_BADD);
+
+    (void) gettimeofday(&t_local,(struct timezone *) 0);
+    delta_t = abs((int)(t_local.tv_sec - r_time_sec));
+    if (delta_t > CLOCK_SKEW) {
+        if (krb_ap_req_debug)
+            log("Time out of range: %d - %d = %d",
+                t_local.tv_sec,r_time_sec,delta_t);
+        return(RD_AP_TIME);
+    }
+
+    /* Now check for expiration of ticket */
+
+    tkt_age = t_local.tv_sec - ad->time_sec;
+    if (krb_ap_req_debug)
+        log("Time: %d Issue Date: %d Diff: %d Life %x",
+            t_local.tv_sec,ad->time_sec,tkt_age,ad->life);
+
+    if (t_local.tv_sec < ad->time_sec) {
+        if ((ad->time_sec - t_local.tv_sec) > CLOCK_SKEW)
+            return(RD_AP_NYV);
+    }
+    else if (t_local.tv_sec > krb_life_to_time(ad->time_sec, ad->life))
+        return(RD_AP_EXP);
+
+    /* All seems OK */
+    ad->reply.length = 0;
+
+    return(RD_AP_OK);
+}