Move the clearing of as->state in auth_challenge() to after the sanity

checks.  The check for "as != NULL" is useless if you have already
dereferenced "as".  Also fix some comment typos.  From Moritz Jodeit.

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/lib/libc/gen/auth_subr.c b/lib/libc/gen/auth_subr.c
index 32b1f309fea..24417d3b23f 100644
--- a/lib/libc/gen/auth_subr.c
+++ b/lib/libc/gen/auth_subr.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: auth_subr.c,v 1.12 2002/08/04 22:44:12 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: auth_subr.c,v 1.13 2002/10/13 21:12:59 millert Exp $	*/
 
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 1995,1996,1997 Berkeley Software Design, Inc.
@@ -285,11 +285,11 @@ auth_challenge(auth_session_t *as)
 {
 	char path[MAXPATHLEN];
 
-	as->state = 0;
-
 	if (as == NULL || as->style == NULL || as->name == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 
+	as->state = 0;
+
 	if (as->challenge) {
 		free(as->challenge);
 		as->challenge = NULL;
@@ -748,10 +748,9 @@ auth_check_change(auth_session_t *as)
  * is AUTH_OKAY for approval like scripts.
  *
  * Internally additional trailing arguments can be read from as->ap
- * Options will be placed be placed just after the first argument
- * (not including path).
+ * Options will be placed just after the first argument (not including path).
  *
- * Any data will sent (and freed) to the script
+ * Any data will be sent to (and freed by) the script
  */
 int
 auth_call(auth_session_t *as, char *path, ...)
@@ -764,7 +763,7 @@ auth_call(auth_session_t *as, char *path, ...)
 	int okay;
 	int pfd[2];
 	int argc;
-	char *argv[64];		/* 64 args should more than enough */
+	char *argv[64];		/* 64 args should be more than enough */
 #define	Nargc	(sizeof(argv)/sizeof(argv[0]))
 
 	va_start(as->ap0, path);