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authorDamien Miller <djm@cvs.openbsd.org>2010-10-01 22:59:02 +0000
committerDamien Miller <djm@cvs.openbsd.org>2010-10-01 22:59:02 +0000
commit367b2622e0527401666a65476f4111fdda2e3c12 (patch)
treedc507d2394eb3b616bd9eae56d17671899a24a05 /lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c
parentae9cbeba0dc25f0e95e6a0e50b6c161bf6384e17 (diff)
resolve conflicts, fix local changes
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c624
1 files changed, 462 insertions, 162 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c b/lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c
index 50308487aa5..41769febab7 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -121,6 +121,32 @@
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
@@ -130,10 +156,6 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
@@ -142,18 +164,10 @@
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
-int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs);
-#endif
-
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
@@ -169,8 +183,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
- unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL),l;
- long num1;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
@@ -265,6 +278,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
else
@@ -289,7 +303,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
}
#endif
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ /* or PSK */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -364,7 +380,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
* sent back */
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
@@ -385,6 +400,11 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ }
s->init_num=0;
break;
@@ -499,16 +519,13 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
- /* number of bytes to be flushed */
- num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
- if (num1 > 0)
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
- s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
- num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
- if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
}
-
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
@@ -594,9 +611,15 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
- if ((s->session == NULL) ||
- (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
- (s->session->not_resumable))
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+ if ((sess == NULL) ||
+ (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+ (sess->not_resumable))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
goto err;
@@ -651,7 +674,9 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++)=1;
#else
- if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
+
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j=0;
else
j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
@@ -663,13 +688,21 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
#endif
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-#endif
+#endif
+
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
@@ -690,7 +723,7 @@ err:
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,al,ok;
unsigned int j;
@@ -708,7 +741,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
if (!ok) return((int)n);
- if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
{
@@ -759,6 +792,23 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &s->session->master_key_length,
+ NULL, &pref_cipher,
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
+ {
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+ pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
{
@@ -825,6 +875,8 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
}
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto f_err;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
@@ -835,10 +887,31 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
+ /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
#else
j= *(p++);
+ if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (j == 0)
comp=NULL;
+ else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
else
comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
@@ -853,9 +926,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
}
#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
{
@@ -871,7 +945,6 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
}
#endif
-
if (p != (d+n))
{
/* wrong packet length */
@@ -909,7 +982,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5) &&
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
@@ -974,10 +1047,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
+ && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- )
+ )
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
@@ -1001,15 +1074,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
- & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
+ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+ ? 0 : 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", (void *)pkey,(void *)x);
+ printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
- printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
+ printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
@@ -1081,7 +1154,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
- long n,alg;
+ long n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
@@ -1105,17 +1178,28 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
-
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
+ omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
+ session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
+ later.*/
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -1146,11 +1230,57 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
param_len=0;
- alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len=i+2;
+ /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
+ * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
+ * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
+ * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
+ * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
+ * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
+ * NULL-terminated string. */
+ memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
+ memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p+=i;
+ n-=param_len;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg & SSL_kRSA)
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
@@ -1189,7 +1319,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n-=param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
- if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
@@ -1204,7 +1334,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- else if (alg & SSL_kEDH)
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
@@ -1258,14 +1388,14 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n-=param_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if (alg & SSL_aDSS)
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
@@ -1273,7 +1403,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
- else if ((alg & SSL_kDHr) || (alg & SSL_kDHd))
+ else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
@@ -1282,7 +1412,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- else if (alg & SSL_kECDHE)
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
@@ -1305,7 +1435,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
param_len=3;
if ((param_len > n) ||
(*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
- ((curve_nid = curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
+ ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
@@ -1366,11 +1496,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
@@ -1381,19 +1511,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
- else if (alg & SSL_kECDH)
+ else if (alg_k)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
- if (alg & SSL_aFZA)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
@@ -1422,8 +1546,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
- EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
@@ -1494,12 +1616,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
else
{
- /* still data left over */
- if (!(alg & SSL_aNULL))
+ if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+ /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ /* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -1569,8 +1692,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
- l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
- if (l & SSL_aNULL)
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
@@ -1715,6 +1837,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
+
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
n2s(p, ticklen);
@@ -1738,7 +1861,28 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
-
+ /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
+ * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
+ * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
+ * client session ID matching to work and we know much
+ * earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
+ *
+ * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
+ * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
+ * session resumption.
+ *
+ * We choose the former approach because this fits in with
+ * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
+ * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
+ * ticket.
+ */
+ EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
+ s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+#else
+ EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+#endif
ret=1;
return(ret);
f_err:
@@ -1750,8 +1894,7 @@ err:
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
- unsigned long resplen;
- long n;
+ unsigned long resplen,n;
const unsigned char *p;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -1777,7 +1920,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
goto f_err;
}
n2l3(p, resplen);
- if (resplen + 4 != (unsigned long)n)
+ if (resplen + 4 != n)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
@@ -1846,7 +1989,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int n;
- unsigned long l;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
@@ -1868,12 +2011,12 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
- l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
@@ -1932,7 +2075,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
@@ -1940,7 +2083,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
@@ -1951,7 +2094,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- l, SSL_kKRB5);
+ alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
authp = NULL;
@@ -2043,7 +2186,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
sizeof tmp_buf);
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
outl += padl;
- if (outl > sizeof epms)
+ if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
@@ -2057,7 +2200,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n+=outl + 2;
s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
@@ -2066,7 +2209,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
@@ -2075,7 +2218,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
- }
+ }
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
@@ -2130,7 +2273,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- else if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
@@ -2142,7 +2285,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* computation as part of client certificate?
* If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
- if ((l & SSL_kECDH) && (s->cert != NULL))
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
{
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
@@ -2314,6 +2457,178 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
+ {
+ /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ size_t msglen;
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ int keytype;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
+ EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
+
+ /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
+ peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
+ if (!peer_cert)
+ peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
+ if (!peer_cert) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
+ /* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+
+ * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+ * certificate key for key exchange
+ */
+
+ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+
+ EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+ /* Generate session key */
+ RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
+ /* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
+ /* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
+ * would be used
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ /* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
+ * context data */
+ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
+ 8,shared_ukm)<0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+ /*Encapsulate it into sequence */
+ *(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+ msglen=255;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (msglen >= 0x80)
+ {
+ *(p++)=0x81;
+ *(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
+ n=msglen+3;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
+ n=msglen+2;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
+ /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+ {
+ /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
+
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+
+ n = 0;
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ else if (psk_len == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t+=psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+ n = strlen(identity);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ memcpy(p, identity, n);
+ n+=2;
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
else
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
@@ -2350,28 +2665,37 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p,*d;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned u=0;
#endif
unsigned long n;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
int j;
-#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
{
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
-
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
-
+/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
+ {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_sha1,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),&(data[0]));
+ NID_md5,
+ &(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
@@ -2417,10 +2741,30 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
}
else
#endif
- {
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
+ {
+ unsigned char signbuf[64];
+ int i;
+ size_t sigsize=64;
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_94,
+ data);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
+ p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
- }
+ }
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
l2n3(n,d);
@@ -2428,8 +2772,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
s->init_num=(int)n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return(-1);
}
@@ -2514,7 +2860,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i,idx;
- long algs;
+ long alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -2524,14 +2870,14 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
DH *dh;
#endif
- sc=s->session->sess_cert;
-
- algs=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
- if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5))
+ if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return(1);
+ sc=s->session->sess_cert;
if (sc == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -2551,11 +2897,11 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
{
- if (check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
+ if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0)
{ /* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
- goto f_err;
+ goto f_err;
}
else
{
@@ -2569,20 +2915,20 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
- if ((algs & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if ((algs & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if ((algs & SSL_kRSA) &&
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
@@ -2590,19 +2936,19 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if ((algs & SSL_kEDH) &&
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
- else if ((algs & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
+ else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if ((algs & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
+ else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
@@ -2613,7 +2959,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (algs & SSL_kRSA)
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if (rsa == NULL
|| RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
@@ -2625,7 +2971,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (algs & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
if (dh == NULL
|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
@@ -2648,64 +2994,18 @@ err:
return(0);
}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-/* This is the complement of nid2curve_id in s3_srvr.c. */
-static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
-{
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
- * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
- static int nid_list[26] =
- {
- 0,
- NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
- NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
- };
-
- if ((curve_id < 1) || (curve_id > 25)) return 0;
-
- return nid_list[curve_id];
-}
-#endif
-
/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
* case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
* session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
- /* If we have no ticket or session ID is non-zero length (a match of
- * a non-zero session length would never reach here) it cannot be a
- * resumed session.
- */
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick || s->session->session_id_length)
+ /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return 1;
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
* message, so permit appropriate message length */