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authorMarkus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org>2004-04-08 08:13:25 +0000
committerMarkus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org>2004-04-08 08:13:25 +0000
commita8ded74b07a6ac09d163286b7b4cf6aa35efa00c (patch)
tree0f8c708eea2ff880861c53a789b21637e475ad07 /lib
parent39742baebd0068e2a7d7a0d76c0fec797b61e8a6 (diff)
backout for now
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/digest.c15
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c8
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c55
3 files changed, 11 insertions, 67 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/digest.c b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/digest.c
index 0623ddf1f05..b22eed44211 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -248,7 +248,6 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
{
- unsigned char *tmp_buf;
if ((in == NULL) || (in->digest == NULL))
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY,EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED);
@@ -263,22 +262,15 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
}
#endif
- if (out->digest == in->digest)
- {
- tmp_buf = out->md_data;
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(out,EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE);
- }
- else tmp_buf = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out);
memcpy(out,in,sizeof *out);
if (out->digest->ctx_size)
{
- if (tmp_buf) out->md_data = tmp_buf;
- else out->md_data=OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size);
+ out->md_data=OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size);
memcpy(out->md_data,in->md_data,out->digest->ctx_size);
}
-
+
if (out->digest->copy)
return out->digest->copy(out,in);
@@ -316,8 +308,7 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx,EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED))
ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx);
- if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data
- && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE))
+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data,ctx->digest->ctx_size);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->md_data);
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index e31ebc6741a..9d09ae17e82 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -147,14 +147,8 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
return("unhandled critical extension");
- case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN:
- return("key usage does not include CRL signing");
-
- case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION:
- return("unhandled critical CRL extension");
-
default:
- BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"error number %ld",n);
+ snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"error number %ld",n);
return(buf);
}
}
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 2e4d0b823ab..2bb21b443ec 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -383,7 +383,6 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
{
- int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
@@ -394,10 +393,7 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
- ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i);
- if ((ret == 0)
- || ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && (ret != 1)))
+ if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i))
{
if (i)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
@@ -541,14 +537,6 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
if(issuer)
{
- /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
- if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
- !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
- }
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
@@ -623,46 +611,17 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int idx, ok;
X509_REVOKED rtmp;
- STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
- X509_EXTENSION *ext;
/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
- /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
+ /* Not found: OK */
+ if(idx == -1) return 1;
+ /* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than
* this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
*/
- if(idx >= 0)
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok) return 0;
- }
-
- if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- return 1;
-
- /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
- * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
- * rejected.
- * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
- * shouldn't do this.
- */
-
- exts = crl->crl->extensions;
-
- for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
- {
- ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
- if (ext->critical > 0)
- {
- ctx->error =
- X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) return 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- return 1;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return ok;
}
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)