diff options
author | Ted Unangst <tedu@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2014-05-05 15:03:23 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ted Unangst <tedu@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2014-05-05 15:03:23 +0000 |
commit | 417c21dfca0d125dcbef8d3bd9dc8f5a3b58988f (patch) | |
tree | 5760b58b24d5e59f1d882be09171145c3dd6e640 /lib | |
parent | 95525370bb791dbea12c3109386bf563c1360ad7 (diff) |
Remove SRP and Kerberos support from libssl. These are complex protocols
all on their own and we can't effectively maintain them without using them,
which we don't. If the need arises, the code can be resurrected.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c | 134 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.c | 1549 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.h | 114 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 258 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c | 445 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c | 317 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h | 70 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c | 66 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_sess.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_txt.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssltest.c | 98 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c | 50 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/tls_srp.c | 516 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile | 4 |
18 files changed, 2 insertions, 3711 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c index 38118b13852..8967879f70b 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c @@ -115,9 +115,6 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -#include "kssl_lcl.h" -#endif #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> @@ -926,9 +923,6 @@ dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) unsigned long alg_k; unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - KSSL_ERR kssl_err; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; @@ -992,134 +986,6 @@ dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { - krb5_error_code krb5rc; - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; - /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ - krb5_data *enc_ticket; - krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", - alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - authp = NULL; -#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH - if (KRB5SENDAUTH) - authp = &authenticator; -#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ - - krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, - &kssl_err); - enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); - if (enc == NULL) - goto err; -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); - if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) - printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (krb5rc) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ - ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: - ** - ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) - ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; - ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); - ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) - ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); - ** - ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper - ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) - ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced - ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. - ** Example: - ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms - ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with - ** optional authenticator omitted. - */ - - /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ - s2n(enc_ticket->length, p); - memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); - p += enc_ticket->length; - n = enc_ticket->length + 2; - - /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ - if (authp && authp->length) { - s2n(authp->length, p); - memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); - p += authp->length; - n += authp->length + 2; - - free(authp->data); - authp->data = NULL; - authp->length = 0; - } else { - s2n(0, p);/* null authenticator length */ - n += 2; - } - - if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. - ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); - ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, - ** kssl_ctx->length); - ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); - */ - - memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); - /* per RFC 1510 */ - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, - kssl_ctx->key, iv); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf, - sizeof tmp_buf); - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl); - outl += padl; - if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - - /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ - s2n(outl, p); - memcpy(p, epms, outl); - p += outl; - n += outl + 2; - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); - - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); - OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); - } -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c index 9995278a264..6183815a6d1 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c @@ -429,9 +429,6 @@ dtls1_accept(SSL *s) /* clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ) /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key * even when forbidden by protocol specs diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.c deleted file mode 100644 index b04c83e17fe..00000000000 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1549 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/kssl.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ -/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project 2000. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - - -/* ssl/kssl.c -- Routines to support (& debug) Kerberos5 auth for openssl -** -** 19990701 VRS Started. -** 200011?? Jeffrey Altman, Richard Levitte -** Generalized for Heimdal, Newer MIT, & Win32. -** Integrated into main OpenSSL 0.9.7 snapshots. -** 20010413 Simon Wilkinson, VRS -** Real RFC2712 KerberosWrapper replaces AP_REQ. -*/ - -#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> - -#include <string.h> - -#define KRB5_PRIVATE 1 - -#include <openssl/ssl.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> -#include "kssl_lcl.h" - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - -#ifndef ENOMEM -#define ENOMEM KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC -#endif - -char * -kstring(char *string) -{ - static char *null = "[NULL]"; - - return ((string == NULL) ? null : string); -} - -/* Given KRB5 enctype (basically DES or 3DES), -** return closest match openssl EVP_ encryption algorithm. -** Return NULL for unknown or problematic (krb5_dk_encrypt) enctypes. -** Assume ENCTYPE_*_RAW (krb5_raw_encrypt) are OK. -*/ -const EVP_CIPHER * -kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype) -{ - switch (enctype) { - case ENCTYPE_DES_HMAC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_cbc(); */ - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC: - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4: - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5: - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: - return EVP_des_cbc(); - break; - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */ - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA: - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: - return EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); - break; - default: - return NULL; - break; - } -} - - -/* Return true:1 if p "looks like" the start of the real authenticator -** described in kssl_skip_confound() below. The ASN.1 pattern is -** "62 xx 30 yy" (APPLICATION-2, SEQUENCE), where xx-yy =~ 2, and -** xx and yy are possibly multi-byte length fields. -*/ -static int -kssl_test_confound(unsigned char *p) -{ - int len = 2; - int xx = 0, yy = 0; - - if (*p++ != 0x62) - return 0; - if (*p > 0x82) - return 0; - switch (*p) { - case 0x82: - p++; - xx = (*p++ << 8); - xx += *p++; - break; - case 0x81: - p++; - xx = *p++; - break; - case 0x80: - return 0; - default: - xx = *p++; - break; - } - if (*p++ != 0x30) - return 0; - if (*p > 0x82) - return 0; - switch (*p) { - case 0x82: - p++; - len += 2; - yy = (*p++ << 8); - yy += *p++; - break; - case 0x81: - p++; - len++; - yy = *p++; - break; - case 0x80: - return 0; - default: - yy = *p++; - break; - } - - return (xx - len == yy) ? 1 : 0; -} - -/* Allocate, fill, and return cksumlens array of checksum lengths. -** This array holds just the unique elements from the krb5_cksumarray[]. -** array[n] == 0 signals end of data. -** -** The krb5_cksumarray[] was an internal variable that has since been -** replaced by a more general method for storing the data. It should -** not be used. Instead we use real API calls and make a guess for -** what the highest assigned CKSUMTYPE_ constant is. As of 1.2.2 -** it is 0x000c (CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3). So we will use 0x0010. -*/ -static size_t * -populate_cksumlens(void) -{ - int i, j, n; - static size_t *cklens = NULL; - -#ifdef KRB5_MIT_OLD11 - n = krb5_max_cksum; -#else - n = 0x0010; -#endif /* KRB5_MIT_OLD11 */ - -#ifdef KRB5CHECKAUTH - if (!cklens && !(cklens = (size_t *) - calloc(sizeof(int), n + 1))) return NULL; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - if (!valid_cksumtype(i)) - continue; /* array has holes */ - for (j = 0; j < n; j++) { - if (cklens[j] == 0) { - cklens[j] = krb5_checksum_size(NULL, i); - break; - /* krb5 elem was new: add */ - } - if (cklens[j] == krb5_checksum_size(NULL, i)) { - break; - /* ignore duplicate elements */ - } - } - } -#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */ - - return cklens; -} - -/* Return pointer to start of real authenticator within authenticator, or -** return NULL on error. -** Decrypted authenticator looks like this: -** [0 or 8 byte confounder] [4-24 byte checksum] [real authent'r] -** This hackery wouldn't be necessary if MIT KRB5 1.0.6 had the -** krb5_auth_con_getcksumtype() function advertised in its krb5.h. -*/ -unsigned char * -kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype etype, unsigned char *a) -{ - int i, conlen; - size_t cklen; - static size_t *cksumlens = NULL; - unsigned char *test_auth; - - conlen = (etype) ? 8 : 0; - - if (!cksumlens && !(cksumlens = populate_cksumlens())) - return NULL; - for (i = 0; (cklen = cksumlens[i]) != 0; i++) { - test_auth = a + conlen + cklen; - if (kssl_test_confound(test_auth)) - return test_auth; - } - - return NULL; -} - - -/* Set kssl_err error info when reason text is a simple string -** kssl_err = struct { int reason; char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX]; } -*/ -void -kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text) -{ - if (kssl_err == NULL) - return; - - kssl_err->reason = reason; - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, "%s", text); - return; -} - - -/* Display contents of krb5_data struct, for debugging -*/ -void -print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata) -{ - int i; - - printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length); - for (i = 0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++) { - if (0 && isprint((int) kdata->data[i])) - printf( "%c ", kdata->data[i]); - else - printf( "%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]); - } - printf("\n"); -} - - -/* Display contents of krb5_authdata struct, for debugging -*/ -void -print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata) -{ - if (adata == NULL) { - printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label); - return; - } - printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata); -#if 0 - { - int i; - printf("%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length); - for (i = 0; i < adata->length; i++) { - printf((isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x", - adata->contents[i]); - } - printf("\n"); - } -#endif -} - - -/* Display contents of krb5_keyblock struct, for debugging -*/ -void -print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk) -{ - int i; - - if (keyblk == NULL) { - printf("%s, keyblk==0\n", label); - return; - } -#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL - printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype, - keyblk->keyvalue->length); - for (i = 0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++) { - printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]); - } - printf("\n"); -#else - printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length); - for (i = 0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++) { - printf("%02x", keyblk->contents[i]); - } - printf("\n"); -#endif -} - - -/* Display contents of krb5_principal_data struct, for debugging -** (krb5_principal is typedef'd == krb5_principal_data *) -*/ -static void -print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ) -{ - int i, ui, uj; - - printf("%s principal Realm: ", label); - if (princ == NULL) - return; - for (ui = 0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++) - putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]); - printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type, princ->length); - for (i = 0; i < (int)princ->length; i++) { - printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length); - for (uj = 0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++) { - putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]); - } - printf("\n"); - } - return; -} - - -/* Given krb5 service (typically "kssl") and hostname in kssl_ctx, -** Return encrypted Kerberos ticket for service @ hostname. -** If authenp is non-NULL, also return encrypted authenticator, -** whose data should be freed by caller. -** (Originally was: Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.) -** -** 19990628 VRS Started; Returns Kerberos AP_REQ message. -** 20010409 VRS Modified for RFC2712; Returns enc tkt. -** 20010606 VRS May also return optional authenticator. -*/ -krb5_error_code -kssl_cget_tkt( - /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, - /* OUT */ krb5_data **enc_ticketp, - /* UPDATE */ krb5_data *authenp, - /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err) -{ - krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - krb5_context krb5context = NULL; - krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL; - krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL; - krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL; - krb5_data krb5_app_req; - - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, ""); - memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds)); - - if (!kssl_ctx) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "No kssl_ctx defined.\n"); - goto err; - } else if (!kssl_ctx->service_host) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "kssl_ctx service_host undefined.\n"); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0) { - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "krb5_init_context() fails: %d\n", krb5rc); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT; - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, - kssl_ctx->service_host, - (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC, - KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0) { - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails for %s/%s\n", - kssl_ctx->service_host, (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? - kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT; - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC, - "krb5_cc_default fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef, - &krb5creds.client)) != 0) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC, - "krb5_cc_get_principal() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef, - &krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED, - "krb5_get_credentials() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - - *enc_ticketp = &krb5credsp->ticket; -#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL - kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->session.keytype; -#else - kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->keyblock.enctype; -#endif - - krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - /* caller should free data of krb5_app_req */ - /* 20010406 VRS deleted for real KerberosWrapper - ** 20010605 VRS reinstated to offer Authenticator to KerberosWrapper - */ - krb5_app_req.length = 0; - if (authenp) { - krb5_data krb5in_data; - const unsigned char *p; - long arlen; - KRB5_APREQBODY *ap_req; - - authenp->length = 0; - krb5in_data.data = NULL; - krb5in_data.length = 0; - if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context, - &krb5auth_context, 0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp, - &krb5_app_req)) != 0) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ, - "krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - - arlen = krb5_app_req.length; - p = (unsigned char *)krb5_app_req.data; - ap_req = (KRB5_APREQBODY *) d2i_KRB5_APREQ(NULL, &p, arlen); - if (ap_req) { - authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA( - ap_req->authenticator, NULL); - if (authenp->length && - (authenp->data = malloc(authenp->length))) { - unsigned char *adp = (unsigned char *)authenp->data; - authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA( - ap_req->authenticator, &adp); - } - } - - if (ap_req) - KRB5_APREQ_free((KRB5_APREQ *) ap_req); - if (krb5_app_req.length) - kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5context, &krb5_app_req); - } -#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL - if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session)) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT, - "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n"); - } -#else - if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock)) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT, - "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n"); - } -#endif - else - krb5rc = 0; - -err: -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (krb5creds.client) - krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client); - if (krb5creds.server) - krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server); - if (krb5auth_context) - krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context); - if (krb5context) - krb5_free_context(krb5context); - return (krb5rc); -} - - -/* Given d2i_-decoded asn1ticket, allocate and return a new krb5_ticket. -** Return Kerberos error code and kssl_err struct on error. -** Allocates krb5_ticket and krb5_principal; caller should free these. -** -** 20010410 VRS Implemented krb5_decode_ticket() as -** old_krb5_decode_ticket(). Missing from MIT1.0.6. -** 20010615 VRS Re-cast as openssl/asn1 d2i_*() functions. -** Re-used some of the old krb5_decode_ticket() -** code here. This tkt should alloc/free just -** like the real thing. -*/ -static krb5_error_code -kssl_TKT2tkt( - /* IN */ krb5_context krb5context, - /* IN */ KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket, - /* OUT */ krb5_ticket **krb5ticket, - /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err ) -{ - krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - krb5_ticket *new5ticket = NULL; - ASN1_GENERALSTRING *gstr_svc, *gstr_host; - - *krb5ticket = NULL; - - if (asn1ticket == NULL || asn1ticket->realm == NULL || - asn1ticket->sname == NULL || - sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_num(asn1ticket->sname->namestring) < 2) { - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "Null field in asn1ticket.\n"); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - } - - if ((new5ticket = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_ticket))) == NULL) { - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "Unable to allocate new krb5_ticket.\n"); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - return ENOMEM; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */ - } - - gstr_svc = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 0); - gstr_host = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 1); - - if ((krb5rc = kssl_build_principal_2(krb5context, &new5ticket->server, - asn1ticket->realm->length, (char *)asn1ticket->realm->data, - gstr_svc->length, (char *)gstr_svc->data, gstr_host->length, - (char *)gstr_host->data)) != 0) { - free(new5ticket); - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "Error building ticket server principal.\n"); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - return krb5rc; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */ - } - - krb5_princ_type(krb5context, new5ticket->server) = - asn1ticket->sname->nametype->data[0]; - new5ticket->enc_part.enctype = asn1ticket->encdata->etype->data[0]; - new5ticket->enc_part.kvno = asn1ticket->encdata->kvno->data[0]; - new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.length = - asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length; - if ((new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data = - calloc(1, asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length)) == NULL) { - free(new5ticket); - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "Error allocating cipher in krb5ticket.\n"); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - } else { - memcpy(new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data, - asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->data, - asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length); - } - - *krb5ticket = new5ticket; - return 0; -} - - -/* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"), -** and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length, -** Return Kerberos session key and client principle -** to SSL Server in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx. -** -** 19990702 VRS Started. -*/ -krb5_error_code -kssl_sget_tkt( - /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, - /* IN */ krb5_data *indata, - /* OUT */ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes, - /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err ) -{ - krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - static krb5_context krb5context = NULL; - static krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL; - krb5_ticket *krb5ticket = NULL; - KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket = NULL; - const unsigned char *p; - krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL; - krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry; - krb5_principal krb5server; - krb5_rcache rcache = NULL; - - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, ""); - - if (!kssl_ctx) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "No kssl_ctx defined.\n"); - goto err; - } - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name)); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (!krb5context && (krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context))) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_init_context() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - if (krb5auth_context && - (krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context))) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_auth_con_free() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } else - krb5auth_context = NULL; - if (!krb5auth_context && - (krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_init(krb5context, &krb5auth_context))) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_auth_con_init() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context, - &rcache))) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_auth_con_getrcache() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL, - (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC, - KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5server)) != 0) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - - if (rcache == NULL) { - if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5context, - krb5_princ_component(krb5context, krb5server, 0), - &rcache))) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_get_server_rcache() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - } - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context, - rcache))) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_auth_con_setrcache() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - - - /* kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default - */ - if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) { - krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file, - &krb5keytab); - if (krb5rc) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_kt_resolve() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - } else { - krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context, &krb5keytab); - if (krb5rc) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "krb5_kt_default() fails.\n"); - goto err; - } - } - - /* Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here - ** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS - ** unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION - ** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS - ** o send "0" msg if all OK - */ - - /* 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper - ** - ** if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context, - ** &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab, - ** &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error } - */ - - p = (unsigned char *)indata->data; - if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p, - (long)indata->length)) == NULL) { - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "d2i_KRB5_TICKET() ASN.1 decode failure.\n"); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - goto err; - } - - /* Was: krb5rc = krb5_decode_ticket(krb5in_data,&krb5ticket)) != 0) */ - if ((krb5rc = kssl_TKT2tkt(krb5context, asn1ticket, &krb5ticket, - kssl_err)) != 0) { - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "Error converting ASN.1 ticket to krb5_ticket.\n"); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - goto err; - } - - if (!krb5_principal_compare(krb5context, krb5server, - krb5ticket->server)) { - krb5rc = KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH; - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "server principal != ticket principal\n"); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - goto err; - } - if ((krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab, - krb5ticket->server, krb5ticket->enc_part.kvno, - krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype, &kt_entry)) != 0) { - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "krb5_kt_get_entry() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - goto err; - } - if ((krb5rc = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5context, &kt_entry.key, - krb5ticket)) != 0) { - (void) snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, - "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part() failed.\n"); - kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ; - goto err; - } else { - krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &kt_entry); -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - int i; - krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs; - printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n"); - printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X", - krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags, - krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type); - print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ", - &(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents)); - printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n", - krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs, - krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data); - if (paddr) { - printf("\tcaddrs:\n"); - for (i = 0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++) { - krb5_data d; - d.length = paddr[i]->length; - d.data = paddr[i]->contents; - print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d); - } - } - printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n", - krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime, - krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime, - krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - } - - krb5rc = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; - if (!krb5ticket || !krb5ticket->enc_part2 || - !krb5ticket->enc_part2->client || - !krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data || - !krb5ticket->enc_part2->session) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET, - "bad ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n"); - } else if (kssl_ctx_setprinc(kssl_ctx, KSSL_CLIENT, - &krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->realm, - krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data, - krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->length)) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET, - "kssl_ctx_setprinc() fails.\n"); - } else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, krb5ticket->enc_part2->session)) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET, - "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n"); - } else if (krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INVALID) { - krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID; - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET, - "invalid ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n"); - } else - krb5rc = 0; - - kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype; - ttimes->authtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime; - ttimes->starttime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime; - ttimes->endtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime; - ttimes->renew_till = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till; - -err: -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (asn1ticket) - KRB5_TICKET_free((KRB5_TICKET *) asn1ticket); - if (krb5keytab) - krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab); - if (krb5ticket) - krb5_free_ticket(krb5context, krb5ticket); - if (krb5server) - krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5server); - return (krb5rc); -} - - -/* Allocate & return a new kssl_ctx struct. -*/ -KSSL_CTX * -kssl_ctx_new(void) -{ - return (calloc(1, sizeof(KSSL_CTX))); -} - - -/* Frees a kssl_ctx struct and any allocated memory it holds. -** Returns NULL. -*/ -KSSL_CTX * -kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx) -{ - if (kssl_ctx == NULL) - return kssl_ctx; - - if (kssl_ctx->key) - OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length); - if (kssl_ctx->key) - free(kssl_ctx->key); - if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) - free(kssl_ctx->client_princ); - if (kssl_ctx->service_host) - free(kssl_ctx->service_host); - if (kssl_ctx->service_name) - free(kssl_ctx->service_name); - if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) - free(kssl_ctx->keytab_file); - - free(kssl_ctx); - return (KSSL_CTX *) NULL; -} - - -/* Given an array of (krb5_data *) entity (and optional realm), -** set the plain (char *) client_princ or service_host member -** of the kssl_ctx struct. -*/ -krb5_error_code -kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, krb5_data *realm, - krb5_data *entity, int nentities) -{ - char **princ; - int length; - int i; - - if (kssl_ctx == NULL || entity == NULL) - return KSSL_CTX_ERR; - - switch (which) { - case KSSL_CLIENT: - princ = &kssl_ctx->client_princ; - break; - case KSSL_SERVER: - princ = &kssl_ctx->service_host; - break; - default: - return KSSL_CTX_ERR; - break; - } - free(*princ); - *princ = NULL; - - /* Add up all the entity->lengths */ - length = 0; - for (i = 0; i < nentities; i++) { - length += entity[i].length; - } - /* Add in space for the '/' character(s) (if any) */ - length += nentities - 1; - /* Space for the ('@'+realm+NULL | NULL) */ - length += ((realm) ? realm->length + 2 : 1); - - if ((*princ = calloc(1, length)) == NULL) - return KSSL_CTX_ERR; - else { - for (i = 0; i < nentities; i++) { - strncat(*princ, entity[i].data, entity[i].length); - if (i < nentities - 1) { - strcat (*princ, "/"); - } - } - if (realm) { - strcat (*princ, "@"); - (void) strncat(*princ, realm->data, realm->length); - } - } - - return KSSL_CTX_OK; -} - - -/* Set one of the plain (char *) string members of the kssl_ctx struct. -** Default values should be: -** which == KSSL_SERVICE => "khost" (KRB5SVC) -** which == KSSL_KEYTAB => "/etc/krb5.keytab" (KRB5KEYTAB) -*/ -krb5_error_code -kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text) -{ - char **string; - - if (!kssl_ctx) - return KSSL_CTX_ERR; - - switch (which) { - case KSSL_SERVICE: - string = &kssl_ctx->service_name; - break; - case KSSL_SERVER: - string = &kssl_ctx->service_host; - break; - case KSSL_CLIENT: - string = &kssl_ctx->client_princ; - break; - case KSSL_KEYTAB: - string = &kssl_ctx->keytab_file; - break; - default: - return KSSL_CTX_ERR; - break; - } - free(*string); - *string = NULL; - - if (text && (*string = strdup(text)) == NULL) - return KSSL_CTX_ERR; - - return KSSL_CTX_OK; -} - - -/* Copy the Kerberos session key from a (krb5_keyblock *) to a kssl_ctx -** struct. Clear kssl_ctx->key if Kerberos session key is NULL. -*/ -krb5_error_code -kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session) -{ - int length; - krb5_enctype enctype; - krb5_octet FAR *contents = NULL; - - if (!kssl_ctx) - return KSSL_CTX_ERR; - - if (kssl_ctx->key) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length); - free(kssl_ctx->key); - kssl_ctx->key = NULL; - } - - if (session) { - -#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL - length = session->keyvalue->length; - enctype = session->keytype; - contents = session->keyvalue->contents; -#else - length = session->length; - enctype = session->enctype; - contents = session->contents; -#endif - kssl_ctx->enctype = enctype; - kssl_ctx->length = length; - } else { - kssl_ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN; - kssl_ctx->length = 0; - return KSSL_CTX_OK; - } - - if ((kssl_ctx->key = calloc(1, kssl_ctx->length)) == NULL) { - kssl_ctx->length = 0; - return KSSL_CTX_ERR; - } else - memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, contents, length); - - return KSSL_CTX_OK; -} - - -/* Display contents of kssl_ctx struct -*/ -void -kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx) -{ - int i; - - printf("kssl_ctx: "); - if (kssl_ctx == NULL) { - printf("NULL\n"); - return; - } else - printf("%p\n", (void *)kssl_ctx); - - printf("\tservice:\t%s\n", - (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? kssl_ctx->service_name : "NULL"); - printf("\tclient:\t%s\n", - (kssl_ctx->client_princ) ? kssl_ctx->client_princ : "NULL"); - printf("\tserver:\t%s\n", - (kssl_ctx->service_host) ? kssl_ctx->service_host : "NULL"); - printf("\tkeytab:\t%s\n", - (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) ? kssl_ctx->keytab_file : "NULL"); - printf("\tkey [%d:%d]:\t", - kssl_ctx->enctype, kssl_ctx->length); - - for (i = 0; i < kssl_ctx->length && kssl_ctx->key; i++) { - printf("%02x", kssl_ctx->key[i]); - } - printf("\n"); - return; -} - -int -kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx) -{ - krb5_context krb5context = NULL; - krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL; - krb5_keytab_entry entry; - krb5_principal princ = NULL; - krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - int rc = 0; - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context))) - return (0); - - /* kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default - */ - if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) { - krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file, - &krb5keytab); - if (krb5rc) - goto exit; - } else { - krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context, &krb5keytab); - if (krb5rc) - goto exit; - } - - /* the host key we are looking for */ - krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL, - kssl_ctx->service_name ? kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC, - KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &princ); - - if (krb5rc) - goto exit; - - krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab, princ, - 0 /* IGNORE_VNO */, - 0 /* IGNORE_ENCTYPE */, - &entry); - if (krb5rc == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) { - rc = 1; - goto exit; - } else if (krb5rc) - goto exit; - - krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &entry); - rc = 1; - -exit: - if (krb5keytab) - krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab); - if (princ) - krb5_free_principal(krb5context, princ); - if (krb5context) - krb5_free_context(krb5context); - return (rc); -} - -int -kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx) -{ - krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - krb5_context krb5context = NULL; - krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL; - krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL; - int rc = 0; - - memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds)); - - if (!kssl_ctx) - return (0); - - if (!kssl_ctx->service_host) - return (0); - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0) - goto err; - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal( - krb5context, kssl_ctx->service_host, - (kssl_ctx->service_name) ? kssl_ctx->service_name : KRB5SVC, - KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0) - goto err; - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0) - goto err; - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef, - &krb5creds.client)) != 0) - goto err; - - if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef, - &krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0) - goto err; - - rc = 1; - -err: -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (krb5creds.client) - krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client); - if (krb5creds.server) - krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server); - if (krb5context) - krb5_free_context(krb5context); - return (rc); -} - -void -kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data) -{ -#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL - data->length = 0; - if (data->data) - free(data->data); -#elif defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11) - if (data->data) { - krb5_xfree(data->data); - data->data = 0; - } -#else - krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, data); -#endif -} - -/* Given pointers to KerberosTime and struct tm structs, convert the -** KerberosTime string to struct tm. Note that KerberosTime is a -** ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME value, constrained to GMT with no fractional -** seconds as defined in RFC 1510. -** Return pointer to the (partially) filled in struct tm on success, -** return NULL on failure. -*/ -static struct tm * -k_gmtime(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime, struct tm *k_tm) -{ - char c, *p; - - if (!k_tm) - return NULL; - if (gtime == NULL || gtime->length < 14) - return NULL; - if (gtime->data == NULL) - return NULL; - - p = (char *)>ime->data[14]; - - c = *p; - *p = '\0'; - p -= 2; - k_tm->tm_sec = atoi(p); - *(p + 2) = c; - c = *p; - *p = '\0'; - p -= 2; - k_tm->tm_min = atoi(p); - *(p + 2) = c; - c = *p; - *p = '\0'; - p -= 2; - k_tm->tm_hour = atoi(p); - *(p + 2) = c; - c = *p; - *p = '\0'; - p -= 2; - k_tm->tm_mday = atoi(p); - *(p + 2) = c; - c = *p; - *p = '\0'; - p -= 2; - k_tm->tm_mon = atoi(p) - 1; - *(p + 2) = c; - c = *p; - *p = '\0'; - p -= 4; - k_tm->tm_year = atoi(p) - 1900; - *(p + 4) = c; - - return k_tm; -} - - -/* Helper function for kssl_validate_times(). -** We need context->clockskew, but krb5_context is an opaque struct. -** So we try to sneek the clockskew out through the replay cache. -** If that fails just return a likely default (300 seconds). -*/ -static krb5_deltat -get_rc_clockskew(krb5_context context) -{ - krb5_rcache rc; - krb5_deltat clockskew; - - if (krb5_rc_default(context, &rc)) - return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW; - if (krb5_rc_initialize(context, rc, 0)) - return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW; - if (krb5_rc_get_lifespan(context, rc, &clockskew)) { - clockskew = KSSL_CLOCKSKEW; - } - (void)krb5_rc_destroy(context, rc); - return clockskew; -} - - -/* kssl_validate_times() combines (and more importantly exposes) -** the MIT KRB5 internal function krb5_validate_times() and the -** in_clock_skew() macro. The authenticator client time is checked -** to be within clockskew secs of the current time and the current -** time is checked to be within the ticket start and expire times. -** Either check may be omitted by supplying a NULL value. -** Returns 0 for valid times, SSL_R_KRB5* error codes otherwise. -** See Also: (Kerberos source)/krb5/lib/krb5/krb/valid_times.c -** 20010420 VRS -*/ -krb5_error_code -kssl_validate_times(krb5_timestamp atime, krb5_ticket_times *ttimes) -{ - krb5_deltat skew; - krb5_timestamp start, now; - krb5_error_code rc; - krb5_context context; - - if ((rc = krb5_init_context(&context))) - return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET; - skew = get_rc_clockskew(context); - - if ((rc = krb5_timeofday(context, &now))) - return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET; - krb5_free_context(context); - - if (atime && labs(atime - now) >= skew) - return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW; - - if (!ttimes) - return 0; - - start = (ttimes->starttime != 0) ? ttimes->starttime : ttimes->authtime; - if (start - now > skew) - return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV; - if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew) - return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED; - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<- | %d - %d | < %d ->| %d\n", - start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - return 0; -} - - -/* Decode and decrypt given DER-encoded authenticator, then pass -** authenticator ctime back in *atimep (or 0 if time unavailable). -** Returns krb5_error_code and kssl_err on error. A NULL -** authenticator (authentp->length == 0) is not considered an error. -** Note that kssl_check_authent() makes use of the KRB5 session key; -** you must call kssl_sget_tkt() to get the key before calling this routine. -*/ -krb5_error_code -kssl_check_authent( - /* IN */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, - /* IN */ krb5_data *authentp, - /* OUT */ krb5_timestamp *atimep, - /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err ) -{ - krb5_error_code krb5rc = 0; - KRB5_ENCDATA *dec_authent = NULL; - KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *auth = NULL; - krb5_enctype enctype; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - const unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *unenc_authent; - int outl, unencbufsize; - struct tm tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g; - time_t now, tl, tg, tr, tz_offset; - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); - *atimep = 0; - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, ""); - -#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH - authentp = NULL; -#else -#if KRB5CHECKAUTH == 0 - authentp = NULL; -#endif -#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */ - - if (authentp == NULL || authentp->length == 0) - return 0; - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - unsigned int ui; - printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n", authentp->length); - p = authentp->data; - - for (ui = 0; ui < authentp->length; ui++) printf("%02x ", p[ui]); - printf("\n"); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - unencbufsize = 2 * authentp->length; - if ((unenc_authent = calloc(1, unencbufsize)) == NULL) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "Unable to allocate authenticator buffer.\n"); - krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - goto err; - } - - p = (unsigned char *)authentp->data; - if ((dec_authent = d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA(NULL, &p, - (long)authentp->length)) == NULL) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "Error decoding authenticator.\n"); - krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - goto err; - } - - enctype = dec_authent->etype->data[0]; /* should = kssl_ctx->enctype */ -#if !defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11) - switch (enctype ) { - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */ - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA: - case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: - krb5rc = 0; - /* Skip, can't handle derived keys */ - goto err; - } -#endif - enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype); - memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); - /* per RFC 1510 */ - - if (enc == NULL) { - /* Disable kssl_check_authent for ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1. - ** This enctype indicates the authenticator was encrypted - ** using key-usage derived keys which openssl cannot decrypt. - */ - goto err; - } - - if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ciph_ctx, enc, kssl_ctx->key, iv, 0)) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "EVP_CipherInit error decrypting authenticator.\n"); - krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - goto err; - } - outl = dec_authent->cipher->length; - if (!EVP_Cipher(&ciph_ctx, unenc_authent, dec_authent->cipher->data, outl)) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "EVP_Cipher error decrypting authenticator.\n"); - krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - goto err; - } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - int padl; - printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl); - for (padl = 0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ", unenc_authent[padl]); - printf("\n"); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if ((p = kssl_skip_confound(enctype, unenc_authent)) == NULL) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "confounded by authenticator.\n"); - krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - goto err; - } - outl -= p - unenc_authent; - - if ((auth = (KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *)d2i_KRB5_AUTHENT(NULL, &p, - (long)outl)) == NULL) { - kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, - "Error decoding authenticator body.\n"); - krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - goto err; - } - - memset(&tm_time, 0, sizeof(struct tm)); - if (k_gmtime(auth->ctime, &tm_time) && - ((tr = mktime(&tm_time)) != (time_t)(-1))) { - now = time(&now); - tm_l = localtime(&now); - tl = mktime(tm_l); - tm_g = gmtime(&now); - tg = mktime(tm_g); - tz_offset = tg - tl; - - *atimep = (krb5_timestamp)(tr - tz_offset); - } - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep); - if (auth && auth->ctime && auth->ctime->length && auth->ctime->data) - printf("%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data); - else - printf("NULL\n"); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - -err: - if (auth) - KRB5_AUTHENT_free((KRB5_AUTHENT *) auth); - if (dec_authent) - KRB5_ENCDATA_free(dec_authent); - if (unenc_authent) - free(unenc_authent); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - return krb5rc; -} - - -/* Replaces krb5_build_principal_ext(), with varargs length == 2 (svc, host), -** because I dont't know how to stub varargs. -** Returns krb5_error_code == ENOMEM on alloc error, otherwise -** passes back newly constructed principal, which should be freed by caller. -*/ -krb5_error_code -kssl_build_principal_2( - /* UPDATE */ krb5_context context, - /* OUT */ krb5_principal *princ, - /* IN */ int rlen, const char *realm, - /* IN */ int slen, const char *svc, - /* IN */ int hlen, const char *host) -{ - krb5_data *p_data = NULL; - krb5_principal new_p = NULL; - char *new_r = NULL; - - if ((p_data = calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_data))) == NULL || - (new_p = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_principal_data))) == NULL) - goto err; - new_p->length = 2; - new_p->data = p_data; - - if ((new_r = calloc(1, rlen + 1)) == NULL) - goto err; - memcpy(new_r, realm, rlen); - krb5_princ_set_realm_length(context, new_p, rlen); - krb5_princ_set_realm_data(context, new_p, new_r); - - if ((new_p->data[0].data = calloc(1, slen + 1)) == NULL) - goto err; - memcpy(new_p->data[0].data, svc, slen); - new_p->data[0].length = slen; - - if ((new_p->data[1].data = calloc(1, hlen + 1)) == NULL) - goto err; - memcpy(new_p->data[1].data, host, hlen); - new_p->data[1].length = hlen; - - krb5_princ_type(context, new_p) = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; - *princ = new_p; - return 0; - -err: - if (new_p && new_p[0].data) - free(new_p[0].data); - if (new_p && new_p[1].data) - free(new_p[1].data); - if (new_p) - free(new_p); - if (new_r) - free(new_r); - return ENOMEM; -} - -void -SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s, KSSL_CTX *kctx) -{ - s->kssl_ctx = kctx; -} - -KSSL_CTX * -SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s) -{ - return s->kssl_ctx; -} - -char * -kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(KSSL_CTX *kctx) -{ - if (kctx) - return kctx->client_princ; - return NULL; -} - -#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.h b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.h index ec75188a8e8..5070066cb37 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.h +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl.h @@ -65,118 +65,4 @@ #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <ctype.h> -#include <krb5.h> - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* -** Depending on which KRB5 implementation used, some types from -** the other may be missing. Resolve that here and now -*/ -#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL -typedef unsigned char krb5_octet; -#define FAR -#else - -#ifndef FAR -#define FAR -#endif - -#endif - -/* Uncomment this to debug kssl problems or -** to trace usage of the Kerberos session key -** -** #define KSSL_DEBUG -*/ - -#ifndef KRB5SVC -#define KRB5SVC "host" -#endif - -#ifndef KRB5KEYTAB -#define KRB5KEYTAB "/etc/krb5.keytab" -#endif - -#ifndef KRB5SENDAUTH -#define KRB5SENDAUTH 1 -#endif - -#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH -#define KRB5CHECKAUTH 1 -#endif - -#ifndef KSSL_CLOCKSKEW -#define KSSL_CLOCKSKEW 300; -#endif - -#define KSSL_ERR_MAX 256 -typedef struct kssl_err_st { - int reason; - char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX]; -} KSSL_ERR; - - -/* Context for passing -** (1) Kerberos session key to SSL, and -** (2) Config data between application and SSL lib -*/ -typedef struct kssl_ctx_st { - /* used by: disposition: */ - char *service_name; /* C,S default ok (kssl) */ - char *service_host; /* C input, REQUIRED */ - char *client_princ; /* S output from krb5 ticket */ - char *keytab_file; /* S NULL (/etc/krb5.keytab) */ - char *cred_cache; /* C NULL (default) */ - krb5_enctype enctype; - int length; - krb5_octet FAR *key; -} KSSL_CTX; - -#define KSSL_CLIENT 1 -#define KSSL_SERVER 2 -#define KSSL_SERVICE 3 -#define KSSL_KEYTAB 4 - -#define KSSL_CTX_OK 0 -#define KSSL_CTX_ERR 1 -#define KSSL_NOMEM 2 - -/* Public (for use by applications that use OpenSSL with Kerberos 5 support */ -krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text); -KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_new(void); -KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx); -void kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx); -krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, - krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity, int nentities); -krb5_error_code kssl_cget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data **enc_tktp, - krb5_data *authenp, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err); -krb5_error_code kssl_sget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *indata, - krb5_ticket_times *ttimes, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err); -krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session); -void kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text); -void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data); -krb5_error_code kssl_build_principal_2(krb5_context context, - krb5_principal *princ, int rlen, const char *realm, int slen, - const char *svc, int hlen, const char *host); -krb5_error_code kssl_validate_times(krb5_timestamp atime, - krb5_ticket_times *ttimes); -krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *authentp, - krb5_timestamp *atimep, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err); -unsigned char *kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype enctype, unsigned char *authn); - -void SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s, KSSL_CTX *kctx); -KSSL_CTX *SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s); -char *kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(KSSL_CTX *kctx); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #endif /* KSSL_H */ diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h index c039c91b4ec..35e203b7d6a 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h @@ -61,27 +61,4 @@ #include <openssl/kssl.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Private (internal to OpenSSL) */ -void print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata); -void print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata); -void print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk); - -char *kstring(char *string); -char *knumber(int len, krb5_octet *contents); - -const EVP_CIPHER *kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype); - -int kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx); -int kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #endif /* KSSL_LCL_H */ diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c index eb55fc96826..68817cd33a8 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -369,17 +369,6 @@ ssl3_connect(SSL *s) ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { - if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, - SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto end; - } - } -#endif if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; else @@ -1137,10 +1126,6 @@ ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, @@ -1361,81 +1346,6 @@ ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) n -= param_len; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - n2s(p, i); - param_len = i + 2; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p += i; - - n2s(p, i); - param_len += i + 2; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p += i; - - i = (unsigned int)(p[0]); - p++; - param_len += i + 1; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p += i; - - n2s(p, i); - param_len += i + 2; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p += i; - n -= param_len; - - /* We must check if there is a certificate */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey( - s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[ - SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); - else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey( - s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[ - SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); - } else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, @@ -2156,9 +2066,6 @@ ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) unsigned long alg_k; unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - KSSL_ERR kssl_err; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; @@ -2226,140 +2133,6 @@ ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) s, s->session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { - krb5_error_code krb5rc; - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; - /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ - krb5_data *enc_ticket; - krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", - alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - authp = NULL; -#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH - if (KRB5SENDAUTH) - authp = &authenticator; -#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ - - krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, - authp, &kssl_err); - enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); - if (enc == NULL) - goto err; -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); - if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) - printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", - kssl_err.text); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (krb5rc) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - /* - * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ - * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: - * - * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) - * n = krb5_ap_req.length; - * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); - * if (krb5_ap_req.data) - * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); - * - * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper - * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) - * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced - * with a 2-byte length followed by the value. - * Example: - * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms - * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with - * optional authenticator omitted. - */ - - /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ - s2n(enc_ticket->length, p); - memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); - p += enc_ticket->length; - n = enc_ticket->length + 2; - - /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ - if (authp && authp->length) { - s2n(authp->length, p); - memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); - p += authp->length; - n += authp->length + 2; - - free(authp->data); - authp->data = NULL; - authp->length = 0; - } else { - s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */ - n += 2; - } - - tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8; - tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; - if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* - * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. - * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); - * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, - * kssl_ctx->length); - * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); - */ - - memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); - /* per RFC 1510 */ - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, - kssl_ctx->key, iv); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf, - sizeof tmp_buf); - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl); - outl += padl; - if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - - /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ - s2n(outl, p); - memcpy(p, epms, outl); - p += outl; - n += outl + 2; - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); - - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); - OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); - } -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; @@ -2716,37 +2489,6 @@ ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { - /* send off the data */ - n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); - s2n(n, p); - BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p); - n += 2; - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) - free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((s->session->master_key_length = - SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key)) < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN]; diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c index 12ce8a16055..c68748809c5 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -605,232 +605,6 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = { 168, 168, }, -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -/* The Kerberos ciphers*/ -/* Cipher 1E */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_DES, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 56, - 56, - }, - -/* Cipher 1F */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_3DES, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 168, - 168, - }, - -/* Cipher 20 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_RC4, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 128, - 128, - }, - -/* Cipher 21 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_IDEA, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 128, - 128, - }, - -/* Cipher 22 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_DES, - SSL_MD5, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 56, - 56, - }, - -/* Cipher 23 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_3DES, - SSL_MD5, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 168, - 168, - }, - -/* Cipher 24 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_RC4, - SSL_MD5, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 128, - 128, - }, - -/* Cipher 25 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_IDEA, - SSL_MD5, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 128, - 128, - }, - -/* Cipher 26 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_DES, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 40, - 56, - }, - -/* Cipher 27 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_RC2, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 40, - 128, - }, - -/* Cipher 28 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_RC4, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 40, - 128, - }, - -/* Cipher 29 */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_DES, - SSL_MD5, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 40, - 56, - }, - -/* Cipher 2A */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_RC2, - SSL_MD5, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 40, - 128, - }, - -/* Cipher 2B */ - { - 1, - SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5, - SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5, - SSL_kKRB5, - SSL_aKRB5, - SSL_RC4, - SSL_MD5, - SSL_SSLV3, - SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 40, - 128, - }, -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ /* New AES ciphersuites */ /* Cipher 2F */ @@ -2250,151 +2024,6 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = { }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* Cipher C01A */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aNULL, - SSL_3DES, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 168, - 168, - }, - - /* Cipher C01B */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aRSA, - SSL_3DES, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 168, - 168, - }, - - /* Cipher C01C */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aDSS, - SSL_3DES, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 168, - 168, - }, - - /* Cipher C01D */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aNULL, - SSL_AES128, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 128, - 128, - }, - - /* Cipher C01E */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aRSA, - SSL_AES128, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 128, - 128, - }, - - /* Cipher C01F */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aDSS, - SSL_AES128, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 128, - 128, - }, - - /* Cipher C020 */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aNULL, - SSL_AES256, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 256, - 256, - }, - - /* Cipher C021 */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aRSA, - SSL_AES256, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 256, - 256, - }, - - /* Cipher C022 */ - { - 1, - TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aDSS, - SSL_AES256, - SSL_SHA1, - SSL_TLSV1, - SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, - SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF, - 256, - 256, - }, -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH /* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */ @@ -2787,9 +2416,6 @@ ssl3_new(SSL *s) s->s3 = s3; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s); -#endif s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); err: @@ -2832,9 +2458,6 @@ ssl3_free(SSL *s) } if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) ssl3_free_digest_list(s); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s); -#endif OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3, sizeof *s->s3); free(s->s3); s->s3 = NULL; @@ -2919,13 +2542,6 @@ ssl3_clear(SSL *s) #endif } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -static char * -srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) -{ - return BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info); -} -#endif long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) @@ -3380,40 +2996,6 @@ ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) return 1; break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME: - ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP; - if (ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) - free(ctx->srp_ctx.login); - ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL; - if (parg == NULL) - break; - if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || - strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, - SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME); - return 0; - } - if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - break; - case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD: - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = - srp_password_from_info_cb; - ctx->srp_ctx.info = parg; - break; - case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG: - ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP; - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg; - break; - - case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH: - ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg; - break; -#endif #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ /* A Thawte special :-) */ @@ -3491,23 +3073,6 @@ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) unsigned char *, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, HMAC_CTX *, int))fp; break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB: - ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP; - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = - (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp; - break; - case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB: - ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP; - ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = - (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp; - break; - case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB: - ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP; - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = - (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp; - break; -#endif #endif default: return (0); @@ -3616,10 +3181,6 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, mask_a = cert->mask_a; emask_k = cert->export_mask_k; emask_a = cert->export_mask_a; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - mask_k = cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask; - emask_k = cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask; -#endif #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG /* printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/ @@ -3628,12 +3189,6 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { - if (!kssl_keytab_is_available(s->kssl_ctx) ) - continue; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be server callback set */ if ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL) diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 6d8ccd66b7e..081aebf1f5d 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -164,9 +164,6 @@ #include <openssl/dh.h> #endif #include <openssl/bn.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> -#endif #include <openssl/md5.h> static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); @@ -179,30 +176,6 @@ ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) return (NULL); } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -static int -ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) -{ - int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; - - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && - (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { - if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { - /* - * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, - * we do so if There is no srp login name - */ - ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - } else { - ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); - } - } - return (ret); -} -#endif IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) @@ -342,39 +315,6 @@ ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if (ret <= 0) goto end; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - { - int al; - if ((ret = - ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) - < 0) { - /* - * Callback indicates further work to - * be done. - */ - s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - goto end; - } - if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - - /* - * This is not really an error but the - * only means for a client to detect - * whether srp is supported. - */ - if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, - SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - - ret = -1; - goto end; - - } - } -#endif s->renegotiate = 2; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; @@ -441,9 +381,6 @@ ssl3_accept(SSL *s) * send_server_key_exchange. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ) /* * option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary @@ -473,10 +410,6 @@ ssl3_accept(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ - || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) -#endif || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) @@ -1796,20 +1729,6 @@ ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) n += 2 + pskhintlen; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (type & SSL_kSRP) { - if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || - (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); - goto err; - } - r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; - r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; - r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; - r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; - } else -#endif { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, @@ -1818,11 +1737,6 @@ ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) - n += 1 + nr[i]; - else -#endif n += 2 + nr[i]; } @@ -1848,12 +1762,6 @@ ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) p = &(d[4]); for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { - *p = nr[i]; - p++; - } else -#endif s2n(nr[i], p); BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); p += nr[i]; @@ -2112,9 +2020,6 @@ ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) BIGNUM *pub = NULL; DH *dh_srvr; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - KSSL_ERR kssl_err; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; @@ -2299,191 +2204,6 @@ ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); } else #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { - krb5_error_code krb5rc; - krb5_data enc_ticket; - krb5_data authenticator; - krb5_data enc_pms; - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; - int padl, outl; - krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; - krb5_ticket_times ttimes; - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); - - if (!kssl_ctx) - kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); - - n2s(p, i); - enc_ticket.length = i; - - if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; - p += enc_ticket.length; - - n2s(p, i); - authenticator.length = i; - - if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - authenticator.data = (char *)p; - p += authenticator.length; - - n2s(p, i); - enc_pms.length = i; - enc_pms.data = (char *)p; - p += enc_pms.length; - - /* - * Note that the length is checked again below, - * after decryption - */ - if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + - enc_pms.length + 6)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, - &kssl_err)) != 0) { -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", - krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); - if (kssl_err.text) - printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, - ** but will return authtime == 0. - */ - if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, - &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", - krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); - if (kssl_err.text) - printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - krb5rc); - goto err; - } - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); - if (enc == NULL) - goto err; - - memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ - - if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, - kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, - (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - outl += padl; - if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { - /* - * The premaster secret must contain the same version - * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback - * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such - * protection for DH ciphersuites). - * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes - * instead of the protocol version. - * - * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such - * clients. - * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for - * the Kerberos cipher) - */ - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, pms, outl); - - if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { - size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); - if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) { - s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; - memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, - kssl_ctx->client_princ, len); - } - } - - - /* - * Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, but it caused problems for - * apache. - * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); - * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; - */ - } else -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) { @@ -2717,43 +2437,6 @@ ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto f_err; } else #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - int param_len; - - n2s(p, i); - param_len = i + 2; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) - free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((s->session->master_key_length = - SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key)) < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - p += i; - } else -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h index 0e117dbca47..dc56abaa99a 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl.h @@ -466,10 +466,6 @@ struct ssl_session_st { unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len; - unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH]; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char *psk_identity_hint; char *psk_identity; @@ -522,9 +518,6 @@ struct ssl_session_st { size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */ #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - char *srp_username; -#endif }; #endif @@ -672,42 +665,6 @@ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, #define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) #define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN - -typedef struct srp_ctx_st { - /* param for all the callbacks */ - void *SRP_cb_arg; - /* set client Hello login callback */ - int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback)(SSL *, int *, void *); - /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */ - int (*SRP_verify_param_callback)(SSL *, void *); - /* set SRP client passwd callback */ - char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback)(SSL *, void *); - - char *login; - BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A; - BIGNUM *a, *b, *v; - char *info; - int strength; - - unsigned long srp_Mask; -} SRP_CTX; - -#endif - -/* see tls_srp.c */ -int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s); -int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx); -int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx); -int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx); -int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad); -int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key); -int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s); -int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key); - -#endif #define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */ @@ -922,9 +879,6 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */ -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT @@ -1213,9 +1167,6 @@ struct ssl_st { int error; /* error bytes to be written */ int error_code; /* actual code */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx; /* Kerberos 5 context */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, @@ -1327,9 +1278,6 @@ struct ssl_st { * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */ -#endif }; #endif @@ -1771,24 +1719,6 @@ int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust); int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name); -int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password); -int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength); -int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb)(SSL *, void *)); -int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *, void *)); -int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *, int *, void *)); -int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); - -int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info); -int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp); - -BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s); -BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s); - -char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s); -char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s); -#endif void SSL_free(SSL *ssl); int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c index 1d2590268ce..566590f171f 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c @@ -97,9 +97,6 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key; ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id; ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id_context; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - ASN1_OCTET_STRING krb5_princ; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ASN1_INTEGER time; ASN1_INTEGER timeout; ASN1_INTEGER verify_result; @@ -112,9 +109,6 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint; ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ } SSL_SESSION_ASN1; int @@ -132,9 +126,6 @@ i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) unsigned char cbuf; int v11 = 0; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - int v12 = 0; -#endif long l; SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a; M_ASN1_I2D_vars(in); @@ -189,13 +180,6 @@ i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) a.session_id_context.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; a.session_id_context.data = in->sid_ctx; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (in->krb5_client_princ_len) { - a.krb5_princ.length = in->krb5_client_princ_len; - a.krb5_princ.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - a.krb5_princ.data = in->krb5_client_princ; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (in->time != 0L) { a.time.length = LSIZE2; @@ -248,23 +232,12 @@ i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) a.psk_identity.data = (unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (in->srp_username) { - a.srp_username.length = strlen(in->srp_username); - a.srp_username.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - a.srp_username.data = (unsigned char *)(in->srp_username); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (in->krb5_client_princ_len) - M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (in->time != 0L) M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1); if (in->timeout != 0L) @@ -293,10 +266,6 @@ i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) if (in->psk_identity) M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8, v8); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (in->srp_username) - M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12, v12); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total(); @@ -305,10 +274,6 @@ i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (in->krb5_client_princ_len) - M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (in->time != 0L) M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1); if (in->timeout != 0L) @@ -339,10 +304,6 @@ i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) if (in->compress_meth) M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11, v11); #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (in->srp_username) - M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12, v12); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ M_ASN1_I2D_finish(); } @@ -420,21 +381,6 @@ d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) os.length = 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - os.length = 0; - M_ASN1_D2I_get_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); - if (os.data) { - if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) - ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0; - else - ret->krb5_client_princ_len = os.length; - memcpy(ret->krb5_client_princ, os.data, ret->krb5_client_princ_len); - free(os.data); - os.data = NULL; - os.length = 0; - } else - ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ai.length = 0; M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 1); /* XXX 2038 */ @@ -561,18 +507,6 @@ d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) } #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - os.length = 0; - os.data = NULL; - M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12); - if (os.data) { - ret->srp_username = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length); - free(os.data); - os.data = NULL; - os.length = 0; - } else - ret->srp_username = NULL; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a, SSL_SESSION_free, SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION); } diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index 00ab752de1a..a1523524a1e 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -702,10 +702,8 @@ ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, unsigned long *mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH; *auth |= SSL_aDH; #endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 *mkey |= SSL_kKRB5; *auth |= SSL_aKRB5; -#endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA *auth |= SSL_aECDSA; #endif @@ -717,9 +715,7 @@ ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, unsigned long *mkey |= SSL_kPSK; *auth |= SSL_aPSK; #endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP *mkey |= SSL_kSRP; -#endif /* Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they * do not present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange */ if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) { diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 195271a554f..d046480feb5 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -284,9 +284,6 @@ SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) if (s == NULL) goto err; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ s->options = ctx->options; s->mode = ctx->mode; @@ -580,10 +577,6 @@ SSL_free(SSL *s) if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) - kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (s->next_proto_negotiated) @@ -1415,9 +1408,6 @@ ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p, int i, j = 0; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (sk == NULL) return (0); @@ -1429,11 +1419,6 @@ ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p, if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) continue; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || - (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && nokrb5) - continue; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || @@ -1877,9 +1862,6 @@ SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->psk_client_callback = NULL; ret->psk_server_callback = NULL; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret); -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO @@ -1983,9 +1965,6 @@ SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) if (a->psk_identity_hint) free(a->psk_identity_hint); #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a); -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (a->client_cert_engine) ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); @@ -2147,12 +2126,6 @@ ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) mask_a|=SSL_aNULL; emask_a|=SSL_aNULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5; - mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5; - emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5; - emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5; -#endif /* * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 2b8da1ccaeb..05c6948efcb 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -223,9 +223,6 @@ SSL_SESSION_new(void) ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL; ss->psk_identity = NULL; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - ss->srp_username = NULL; -#endif return (ss); } @@ -726,10 +723,6 @@ SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) if (ss->psk_identity != NULL) free(ss->psk_identity); #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (ss->srp_username != NULL) - free(ss->srp_username); -#endif OPENSSL_cleanse(ss, sizeof(*ss)); free(ss); } @@ -754,15 +747,6 @@ SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) return (0); } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ && - session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) { - s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1); - memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ, session->krb5_client_princ, - session->krb5_client_princ_len); - s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0'; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_txt.c index c6bfd68de66..01dd846596f 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_txt.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_txt.c @@ -161,19 +161,6 @@ SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x) if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0) goto err; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n Krb5 Principal: ") <= 0) - goto err; - if (x->krb5_client_princ_len == 0) { - if (BIO_puts(bp, "None") <= 0) - goto err; - } else { - for (i = 0; i < x->krb5_client_princ_len; i++) { - if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->krb5_client_princ[i]) <= 0) - goto err; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n PSK identity: ") <= 0) goto err; @@ -184,12 +171,6 @@ SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x) if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0) goto err; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n SRP username: ") <= 0) - goto err; - if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->srp_username ? x->srp_username : "None") <= 0) - goto err; -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) { if (BIO_printf(bp, diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssltest.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssltest.c index 1f5014baf38..879bf4b3eda 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssltest.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssltest.c @@ -178,9 +178,6 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include <openssl/dh.h> #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -#include <openssl/srp.h> -#endif #include <openssl/bn.h> #define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED 1 @@ -227,46 +224,6 @@ static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -/* SRP client */ -/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */ -typedef struct srp_client_arg_st { - char *srppassin; - char *srplogin; -} SRP_CLIENT_ARG; - -#define PWD_STRLEN 1024 - -static char * -ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) -{ - SRP_CLIENT_ARG *srp_client_arg = (SRP_CLIENT_ARG *)arg; - return BUF_strdup((char *)srp_client_arg->srppassin); -} - -/* SRP server */ -/* This is a context that we pass to SRP server callbacks */ -typedef struct srp_server_arg_st { - char *expected_user; - char *pass; -} SRP_SERVER_ARG; - -static int -ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) -{ - SRP_SERVER_ARG *p = (SRP_SERVER_ARG *) arg; - - if (strcmp(p->expected_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "User %s doesn't exist\n", SSL_get_srp_username(s)); - return SSL3_AL_FATAL; - } - if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s, p->expected_user, p->pass, "1024") < 0) { - *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return SSL3_AL_FATAL; - } - return SSL_ERROR_NONE; -} -#endif static BIO *bio_err = NULL; static BIO *bio_stdout = NULL; @@ -311,10 +268,6 @@ sv_usage(void) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK fprintf(stderr, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n"); #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - fprintf(stderr, " -srpuser user - SRP username to use\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -srppass arg - password for 'user'\n"); -#endif fprintf(stderr, " -ssl3 - use SSLv3\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -tls1 - use TLSv1\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n"); @@ -484,12 +437,6 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* client */ - SRP_CLIENT_ARG srp_client_arg = {NULL, NULL}; - /* server */ - SRP_SERVER_ARG srp_server_arg = {NULL, NULL}; -#endif int no_dhe = 0; int no_ecdhe = 0; int no_psk = 0; @@ -577,19 +524,6 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) no_psk = 1; #endif } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) { - if (--argc < 1) - goto bad; - srp_server_arg.expected_user = srp_client_arg.srplogin= *(++argv); - tls1 = 1; - } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) { - if (--argc < 1) - goto bad; - srp_server_arg.pass = srp_client_arg.srppassin= *(++argv); - tls1 = 1; - } -#endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0) ssl2 = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) @@ -895,42 +829,10 @@ bad: } #endif } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (srp_client_arg.srplogin) { - if (!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.srplogin)) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n"); - goto end; - } - SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(c_ctx, &srp_client_arg); - SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(c_ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb); - /*SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.strength);*/ - } - - if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL) { - SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback); - SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg); - SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb); - } -#endif c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx); s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (c_ssl && c_ssl->kssl_ctx) { - char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 2]; - - if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof localhost - 1) == 0) { - localhost[sizeof localhost - 1] = '\0'; - if (strlen(localhost) == sizeof localhost - 1) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "localhost name too long\n"); - goto end; - } - kssl_ctx_setstring(c_ssl->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVER, - localhost); - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ for (i = 0; i < number; i++) { if (!reuse) diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c index bb333318620..2e183bb2334 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -415,35 +415,6 @@ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) ret += el; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* Add SRP username if there is one */ - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { - /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ - - int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); - - if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - /* check for enough space. - 4 for the srp type type and entension length - 1 for the srp user identity - + srp user identity length - */ - if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) - return NULL; - - - /* fill in the extension */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); - s2n(login_len + 1, ret); - (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; - memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); - ret += login_len; - } -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && @@ -1063,27 +1034,6 @@ ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, } } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { - if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if ((s->srp_ctx.login = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) - return -1; - memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); - s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; - - if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/tls_srp.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/tls_srp.c deleted file mode 100644 index e03eabcef66..00000000000 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/tls_srp.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,516 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/tls_srp.c */ -/* Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou@edelweb.fr) with - * the precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr) - * for the EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include <openssl/srp.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> - -int -SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) - return 0; - free(ctx->srp_ctx.login); - BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.N); - BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.g); - BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.s); - BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.B); - BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.A); - BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.a); - BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.b); - BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.v); - ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.N = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.g = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.s = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.B = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.A = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.a = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.b = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.v = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.info = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N; - ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0; - return (1); -} - -int -SSL_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_st *s) -{ - if (s == NULL) - return 0; - free(s->srp_ctx.login); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v); - s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.N = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.g = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.s = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.B = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.A = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.a = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.b = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.v = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.info = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N; - s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0; - return (1); -} - -int -SSL_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_st *s) -{ - SSL_CTX *ctx; - - if ((s == NULL) || ((ctx = s->ctx) == NULL)) - return 0; - s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg; - /* set client Hello login callback */ - s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback; - /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */ - s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback; - /* set SRP client passwd callback */ - s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback; - - s->srp_ctx.N = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.g = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.s = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.B = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.A = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.a = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.b = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.v = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; - s->srp_ctx.info = ctx->srp_ctx.info; - s->srp_ctx.strength = ctx->srp_ctx.strength; - - if (((ctx->srp_ctx.N != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)) || - ((ctx->srp_ctx.g != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.g)) == NULL)) || - ((ctx->srp_ctx.s != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.s)) == NULL)) || - ((ctx->srp_ctx.B != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.B)) == NULL)) || - ((ctx->srp_ctx.A != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.A)) == NULL)) || - ((ctx->srp_ctx.a != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.a = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.a)) == NULL)) || - ((ctx->srp_ctx.v != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.v)) == NULL)) || - ((ctx->srp_ctx.b != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.b = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.b)) == NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) && - ((s->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.login)) == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask; - - return (1); -err: - free(s->srp_ctx.login); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b); - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v); - return (0); -} - -int -SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) - return 0; - - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL; - /* set client Hello login callback */ - ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL; - /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */ - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL; - /* set SRP client passwd callback */ - ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL; - - ctx->srp_ctx.N = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.g = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.s = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.B = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.A = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.a = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.b = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.v = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0; - ctx->srp_ctx.info = NULL; - ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N; - - return (1); -} - -/* server side */ -int -SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad) -{ - unsigned char b[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - int al; - - *ad = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - if ((s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback !=NULL) && - ((al = s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback(s, ad, - s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE)) - return al; - - *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || - (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.v == NULL)) - return SSL3_AL_FATAL; - - if (RAND_bytes(b, sizeof(b)) <= 0) - return SSL3_AL_FATAL; - s->srp_ctx.b = BN_bin2bn(b, sizeof(b), NULL); - OPENSSL_cleanse(b, sizeof(b)); - - /* Calculate: B = (kv + g^b) % N */ - - return ((s->srp_ctx.B = SRP_Calc_B(s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g, s->srp_ctx.v)) != NULL) ? SSL_ERROR_NONE : SSL3_AL_FATAL; -} - -/* If the server just has the raw password, make up a verifier entry on the fly */ -int -SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp) -{ - SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN(grp); - if (GN == NULL) - return -1; - s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(GN->N); - s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(GN->g); - if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL) { - BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.v); - s->srp_ctx.v = NULL; - } - if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL) { - BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.s); - s->srp_ctx.s = NULL; - } - if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s->srp_ctx.s, &s->srp_ctx.v, - GN->N, GN->g)) - return -1; - - return 1; -} - -int -SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, - BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info) -{ - if (N != NULL) { - if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL) { - if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.N, N)) { - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N); - s->srp_ctx.N = NULL; - } - } else - s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(N); - } - if (g != NULL) { - if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL) { - if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.g, g)) { - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g); - s->srp_ctx.g = NULL; - } - } else - s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(g); - } - if (sa != NULL) { - if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL) { - if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.s, sa)) { - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s); - s->srp_ctx.s = NULL; - } - } else - s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(sa); - } - if (v != NULL) { - if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL) { - if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.v, v)) { - BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v); - s->srp_ctx.v = NULL; - } - } else - s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(v); - } - s->srp_ctx.info = info; - - if (!(s->srp_ctx.N) || !(s->srp_ctx.g) || - !(s->srp_ctx.s) || !(s->srp_ctx.v)) - return -1; - - return 1; -} - -int -SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key) -{ - BIGNUM *K = NULL, *u = NULL; - int ret = -1, tmp_len; - unsigned char *tmp = NULL; - - if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N)) - goto err; - if (!(u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N))) - goto err; - if (!(K = SRP_Calc_server_key(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.v, u, s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N))) - goto err; - - tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K); - if ((tmp = malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_bn2bin(K, tmp); - ret = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, master_key, tmp, tmp_len); -err: - if (tmp) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, tmp_len); - free(tmp); - } - BN_clear_free(K); - BN_clear_free(u); - return ret; -} - -/* client side */ -int -SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key) -{ - BIGNUM *x = NULL, *u = NULL, *K = NULL; - int ret = -1, tmp_len; - char *passwd = NULL; - unsigned char *tmp = NULL; - - /* Checks if b % n == 0 - */ - if (SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N) == 0) - goto err; - if (!(u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N))) - goto err; - if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback == NULL) - goto err; - if (!(passwd = s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s, - s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))) - goto err; - if (!(x = SRP_Calc_x(s->srp_ctx.s, s->srp_ctx.login, passwd))) - goto err; - if (!(K = SRP_Calc_client_key(s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.g, - x, s->srp_ctx.a, u))) - goto err; - - tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K); - if ((tmp = malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_bn2bin(K, tmp); - ret = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, master_key, - tmp, tmp_len); -err: - if (tmp) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, tmp_len); - free(tmp); - } - BN_clear_free(K); - BN_clear_free(x); - if (passwd) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(passwd, strlen(passwd)); - free(passwd); - } - BN_clear_free(u); - return ret; -} - -int -SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - - if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength) - return -1; - - if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL && - !SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g, s->srp_ctx.N)) - return -1; - - RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); - s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a); - OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); - - if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a, s->srp_ctx.N, - s->srp_ctx.g))) - return -1; - - /* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */ - if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL) - return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s, - s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg); - - return 1; -} - -BIGNUM * -SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s) -{ - if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL) - return s->srp_ctx.g; - return s->ctx->srp_ctx.g; -} - -BIGNUM * -SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s) -{ - if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL) - return s->srp_ctx.N; - return s->ctx->srp_ctx.N; -} - -char * -SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s) -{ - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) - return s->srp_ctx.login; - return s->ctx->srp_ctx.login; -} - -char * -SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s) -{ - if (s->srp_ctx.info != NULL) - return s->srp_ctx.info; - return s->ctx->srp_ctx.info; -} - -#define tls1_ctx_ctrl ssl3_ctx_ctrl -#define tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl - -int -SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name) -{ - return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME, 0, name); -} - -int -SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password) -{ - return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD, 0, password); -} - -int -SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength) -{ - return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH, strength, - NULL); -} - -int -SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *, void *)) -{ - return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB, - (void (*)(void))cb); -} - -int -SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) -{ - return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG, 0, arg); -} - -int -SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb)(SSL *, int *, void *)) -{ - return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB, - (void (*)(void))cb); -} - -int -SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb)(SSL *, void *)) -{ - return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB, - (void (*)(void))cb); -} - -#endif diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile b/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile index 64dd10bb6d1..737121fce4b 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile +++ b/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.40 2014/04/23 05:13:57 beck Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.41 2014/05/05 15:03:22 tedu Exp $ LIB= ssl @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ SRCS=\ ssl_lib.c ssl_err2.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \ ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \ ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_algs.c \ - bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c tls_srp.c t1_reneg.c + bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c t1_reneg.c SRCS+= s3_cbc.c HDRS= srtp.h ssl.h ssl2.h ssl3.h ssl23.h tls1.h dtls1.h kssl.h |