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authorNiklas Hallqvist <niklas@cvs.openbsd.org>2000-02-07 01:32:33 +0000
committerNiklas Hallqvist <niklas@cvs.openbsd.org>2000-02-07 01:32:33 +0000
commit1e22d809ed2b65bdac0c1d1537bd5af5e1f431cc (patch)
treebea9eb279e6c1bf7b8f006ff2eb51f500ebe7526 /sbin/isakmpd
parent8d27a9badbcad88ebcb15977d8343d05387729be (diff)
Merge with EOM 1.8
author: angelos Add Canonical Names as policy targets (so they can be specified in the Licensees field), with the "CN:..." format. author: angelos Done. author: angelos One missing item left... author: angelos More text. author: angelos Passphrases are encoded as "passphrase:xxxx" now, to distinguish between passphrases and logic labels. author: angelos Consistent references. author: angelos Minor tweak.
Diffstat (limited to 'sbin/isakmpd')
-rw-r--r--sbin/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy.540
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/sbin/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy.5 b/sbin/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy.5
index 689e164b7e6..16baae2de80 100644
--- a/sbin/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy.5
+++ b/sbin/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy.5
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-.\" $EOM: isakmpd.policy.5,v 1.1 1999/10/16 20:07:18 angelos Exp $
-.\" $OpenBSD: isakmpd.policy.5,v 1.2 2000/01/26 15:21:22 niklas Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: isakmpd.policy.5,v 1.3 2000/02/07 01:32:32 niklas Exp $
+.\" $EOM: isakmpd.policy.5,v 1.8 2000/02/07 01:30:35 angelos Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999, Angelos D. Keromytis. All rights reserved.
.\"
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ characteristics:
below, for use of policy delegation).
* The Licensees field can be an expression of passphrases used for
- authentication of the Main Mode exchanges and/or public keys
- (typically, X509 certificates).
+ authentication of the Main Mode exchanges, and/or public keys
+ (typically, X509 certificates), and/or X509 Canonical names.
* The Conditions field contains an expression of attributes from the
IPsec policy action set (see below as well as the keynote syntax man
@@ -157,6 +157,19 @@ certificate encoded as "abcd==" will be accepted, as long as it
contains ESP with a non-null algorithm (i.e., the packet will be
encrypted).
.Pp
+The following policy assertion:
+.Bd -literal
+ Authorizer: "POLICY"
+ Licensees: "CN:/CN=CA Certificate"
+ Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy" && esp_present == "yes"
+ && esp_enc_alg != "null" -> "true";
+.Ed
+
+is similar to the previous one, but instead of including a complete
+X509 credential in the Licensees field, only the X509 certificate's
+Subject Canonical Name need to be specified (note that the "CN:"
+prefix is necessary).
+.Pp
KeyNote credentials have the same format as policy assertions, with
one difference: the Authorizer field always contains a public key, and
the assertion is signed (and thus its integrity can be
@@ -396,6 +409,8 @@ Set to the local date/time, in YYYYMMDDHHmmSS format.
Authorizer: "POLICY"
Comment: This bare-bones assertion accepts everything
+
+
Authorizer: "POLICY"
Licensees: "passphrase:mekmitasisgoat"
Comment: This policy accepts anyone using shared-secret
@@ -405,6 +420,8 @@ Set to the local date/time, in YYYYMMDDHHmmSS format.
esp_present == "yes" &&
esp_enc_alg != "null" -> "true";
+
+
Authorizer: "POLICY"
Licensees: "subpolicy1" || "subpolicy2"
Comment: Delegate to two other sub-policies, so we
@@ -413,11 +430,15 @@ Set to the local date/time, in YYYYMMDDHHmmSS format.
have to be in isakmpd.policy.
Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy";
+
+
KeyNote-Version: 2
Licensees: "passphrase:somepassword"
Conditions: esp_present == "yes" -> "true";
Authorizer: "subpolicy1"
+
+
Conditions: ah_present == "yes" ->
{
ah_auth_alg == "md5" -> "true";
@@ -427,6 +448,15 @@ Set to the local date/time, in YYYYMMDDHHmmSS format.
Licensees: "passphrase:otherpassword" || "passphrase:thirdpassword"
Authorizer: "subpolicy2"
+
+
+ keynote-version: 2
+ comment: this is an example of a policy delegating to a CN.
+ authorizer: "POLICY"
+ licensees: "CN:/CN=CA Certificate/Email=ca@foo.bar.com"
+
+
+
keynote-version: 2
comment: This is an example of a policy delegating to a key.
authorizer: "POLICY"
@@ -449,6 +479,8 @@ Set to the local date/time, in YYYYMMDDHHmmSS format.
pfs == "yes" && esp_present == "yes" && ah_present == "no" &&
(esp_enc_alg == "3des" || esp_enc_alg == "idea") -> "true";
+
+
keynote-version: 2
comment: This is an example of a credential, the signature does
not really verify (although the keys are real).