The classic password paper by Thompson and Morris, with the Caldera license. It may be written

about 25 years ago, but it is still worth reading.

ok jmc@ mickey@

3 files changed, 611 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/share/doc/smm/17.password/Makefile b/share/doc/smm/17.password/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..442de7b9ca3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/share/doc/smm/17.password/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2003/11/10 20:32:17 otto Exp $
+
+DIR=	smm/17.password
+SRCS=	password.ms
+MACROS=	-ms
+
+paper.ps: ${SRCS}
+	${TBL} ${SRCS} | ${EQN} | ${ROFF} > ${.TARGET}
+
+.include <bsd.doc.mk>
diff --git a/share/doc/smm/17.password/password.ms b/share/doc/smm/17.password/password.ms
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..032f8aa10da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/share/doc/smm/17.password/password.ms
@@ -0,0 +1,597 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: password.ms,v 1.1 2003/11/10 20:32:17 otto Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (C) Caldera International Inc.  2001-2002.
+.\" All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code and documentation must retain the above
+.\"    copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+.\"    must display the following acknowledgement:
+.\"	This product includes software developed or owned by Caldera
+.\"	International, Inc.
+.\" 4. Neither the name of Caldera International, Inc. nor the names of other
+.\"    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+.\"    this software without specific prior written permission.
+.\"
+.\" USE OF THE SOFTWARE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THIS LICENSE BY CALDERA
+.\" INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL CALDERA INTERNATIONAL, INC. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+.\" INDIRECT INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+.\" (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+.\" SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+.\" STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
+.\" IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+.\" POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\"	@(#)password.ms	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/8/93
+.\"
+.\" tbl mm ^ eqn ^ troff -ms
+.EH 'SMM:17-%''Password Security: A Case History'
+.OH 'Password Security: A Case History''SMM:17-%'
+.EQ
+delim $$
+.EN
+.\".RP
+.\" TM 78-1271-5 39199 39199-11
+.ND April 3, 1978
+.TL
+Password Security:
+A Case History
+.\" .OK
+.\"Encryption
+.\"Computing
+.AU "MH 2C-524" 3878
+Robert Morris
+.AU "MH 2C-523" 2394
+Ken Thompson
+.AI
+AT&T Bell Laboratories
+Murray Hill, NJ
+.AB
+This paper describes the history of the design of the
+password security scheme on a remotely accessed time-sharing
+system.
+The present design was the result of countering
+observed attempts to penetrate the system.
+The result is a compromise between extreme security and
+ease of use.
+.AE
+.\" .CS 6 0 6 0 0 4
+.SH
+INTRODUCTION
+.PP
+Password security on the
+.UX
+time-sharing system [1] is provided by a
+collection of programs
+whose elaborate and strange design is the outgrowth of
+many years of experience with earlier versions.
+To help develop a secure system, we have had a continuing
+competition to devise new ways to
+attack the security of the system (the bad guy) and, at the same time, to
+devise new techniques to resist the new attacks (the good guy).
+This competition has been in the same vein as the
+competition of long standing between manufacturers of armor
+plate and those of armor-piercing shells.
+For this reason, the description that follows will
+trace the history of the password system rather than simply
+presenting the program in its current state.
+In this way, the reasons for the design will be made clearer,
+as the design cannot be understood without also
+understanding the potential attacks.
+.PP
+An underlying goal has been to provide password security
+at minimal inconvenience to the users of the system.
+For example, those who want to run a completely open
+system without passwords, or to have passwords only at the
+option of the individual users, are able to do so, while
+those who require all of their users to have passwords
+gain a high degree of security
+against penetration of the system by unauthorized
+users.
+.PP
+The password system must be able not only to prevent
+any access to the system by unauthorized users
+(i.e. prevent them from logging in at all),
+but it must also
+prevent users who are already logged in from doing
+things that they are not authorized to do.
+The so called ``super-user'' password, for example, is especially
+critical because the super-user has all sorts of
+permissions and has essentially unlimited access to
+all system resources.
+.PP
+Password security is of course only one component of
+overall system security, but it is an essential component.
+Experience has shown that attempts to penetrate
+remote-access systems have been astonishingly
+sophisticated.
+.PP
+Remote-access systems are peculiarly vulnerable to
+penetration by outsiders as there are threats at the
+remote terminal, along the communications link, as well
+as at the computer itself.
+Although the security of a password encryption algorithm
+is an interesting intellectual and mathematical problem,
+it is only one tiny facet of a very large problem.
+In practice, physical security of the computer, communications
+security of the communications link, and physical control
+of the computer itself loom as far more important issues.
+Perhaps most important of all is control over the actions
+of ex-employees, since they are not under any direct control
+and they may have intimate
+knowledge about the system, its resources, and
+methods of access.
+Good system security involves realistic
+evaluation of the risks not only of deliberate
+attacks but also of casual unauthorized access
+and accidental disclosure.
+.SH
+PROLOGUE
+.PP
+The UNIX system was first implemented with a password file that contained
+the actual passwords of all the users, and for that reason
+the password file had to
+be heavily protected against being either read or written.
+Although historically, this had been the technique used
+for remote-access systems,
+it was completely unsatisfactory for several reasons.
+.PP
+The technique is excessively vulnerable to lapses in
+security.
+Temporary loss of protection can occur when
+the password file is being edited or otherwise modified.
+There is no way to prevent the making of copies by
+privileged users.
+Experience with several earlier remote-access systems
+showed that such lapses occur with frightening frequency.
+Perhaps the most memorable such occasion occurred
+in the early 60's when
+a system administrator on the CTSS system at MIT
+was editing the
+password file and another system administrator was editing
+the daily message that is printed on everyone's terminal
+on login.
+Due to a software design error, the temporary editor files
+of the two users were interchanged and thus, for a time, the password
+file was printed on every terminal when it was logged in.
+.PP
+Once such a lapse in security has been discovered, everyone's
+password must be changed, usually simultaneously, at a considerable
+administrative cost.
+This is not a great matter, but
+far more serious is the high probability of such lapses
+going unnoticed by the system administrators.
+.PP
+Security against unauthorized disclosure of the passwords was,
+in the last analysis, impossible with this system because,
+for example, if the
+contents of the file system are put on to magnetic tape for
+backup, as they must be, then anyone who has physical
+access to the tape
+can read anything on it with no restriction.
+.PP
+Many programs must get information of various kinds
+about the users of the system, and these programs in general
+should have no special permission to read the password file.
+The information which should have been in the password file actually was
+distributed (or replicated) into a number of files, all of
+which had to be updated whenever a user was added to or
+dropped from the system.
+.SH
+THE FIRST SCHEME
+.PP
+The obvious solution is to arrange that the passwords not
+appear in the system at all, and it is not difficult to decide
+that this can be done by encrypting each user's password,
+putting only the encrypted form in the password file, and
+throwing away his original password (the one that
+he typed in).
+When the user later tries to log in to the system, the password
+that he types is encrypted and compared with the encrypted
+version in the password file.
+If the two match, his login attempt is accepted.
+Such a scheme was first described
+in [3, p.91ff.].
+It also seemed advisable to devise
+a system in which neither the password file nor the
+password program itself needed to be
+protected against being read by anyone.
+.PP
+All that was needed to implement these ideas
+was to find a means of encryption that was very difficult
+to invert, even when the encryption program
+is available.
+Most of the standard encryption methods used (in the past)
+for encryption of messages are rather easy to invert.
+A convenient and rather good encryption program happened
+to exist on the system at the time; it simulated the
+M-209 cipher machine [4]
+used by the U.S. Army during World War II.
+It turned out that the M-209 program was usable, but with
+a given key, the ciphers produced by this program are
+trivial to invert.
+It is a much more difficult matter to find out the key
+given the cleartext input and the enciphered output of the program.
+Therefore,
+the password was used not as the text to be encrypted but as the
+key, and a constant was encrypted using this key.
+The encrypted result was entered into the password file.
+.SH
+ATTACKS ON THE FIRST APPROACH
+.PP
+Suppose that the bad guy has available
+the text of the password encryption program and
+the complete password file.
+Suppose also that he has substantial computing
+capacity at his disposal.
+.PP
+One obvious approach to penetrating the password
+mechanism is to attempt to find a general method of inverting
+the encryption algorithm.
+Very possibly this can be done, but few
+successful results
+have come to light, despite substantial efforts extending
+over a period of more than five years.
+The results have not proved to be very useful
+in penetrating systems.
+.PP
+Another approach to penetration is simply to keep trying
+potential
+passwords until one succeeds; this is a general cryptanalytic
+approach called
+.I
+key search.
+.R
+Human beings being what they are, there is a strong tendency
+for people to choose relatively short and simple passwords that
+they can remember.
+Given free choice, most people will choose their passwords
+from a restricted character set (e.g. all lower-case letters),
+and will often choose words or names.
+This human habit makes the key search job a great deal easier.
+.PP
+The critical factor involved in key search is the amount of
+time needed to encrypt a potential password and to check the result
+against an entry in the password file.
+The running time to encrypt one trial password and check
+the result turned out to be approximately 1.25 milliseconds on
+a PDP-11/70 when the encryption algorithm was recoded for
+maximum speed.
+It is takes essentially no more time to test the encrypted
+trial password against all the passwords in
+an entire password file, or for that matter, against
+any collection of encrypted passwords, perhaps collected
+from many installations.
+.PP
+If we want to check all passwords of length
+.I
+n
+.R
+that consist entirely of lower-case letters, the number
+of such passwords is $26 sup n$.
+If we suppose that the password consists of
+printable characters only, then the number of possible passwords
+is somewhat less than $95 sup n$.
+(The standard system ``character erase'' and ``line kill''
+characters are, for example, not prime
+candidates.)
+We can immediately estimate the running time of a program that
+will test every password of a given length with all of its
+characters chosen from some set of characters.
+The following table gives estimates of the running time
+required on a PDP-11/70
+to test all possible character strings of length $n$
+chosen from various sets of characters: namely, all lower-case
+letters, all lower-case letters plus digits,
+all alphanumeric characters, all 95 printable
+ASCII characters, and finally all 128 ASCII characters.
+.TS
+cccccc
+cccccc
+nnnnnn.
+	26 lower-case	36 lower-case letters	62 alphanumeric	95 printable	all 128 ASCII
+n	letters	and digits	characters	characters	characters
+.sp .5
+1	30 msec.	40 msec.	80 msec.	120 msec.	160 msec.
+2	800 msec.	2 sec.	5 sec.	11 sec.	20 sec.
+3	22 sec.	58 sec.	5 min.	17 min.	43 min.
+4	10 min.	35 min.	5 hrs.	28 hrs.	93 hrs.
+5	4 hrs.	21 hrs.	318 hrs.
+6	107 hrs.
+.TE
+.LP
+One has to conclude that it is no great matter for someone with
+access to a PDP-11 to test all lower-case alphabetic strings up
+to length five
+and, given access to the machine for, say, several weekends, to test
+all such strings up to six characters in length.
+By using such a program against a collection of actual encrypted
+passwords, a substantial fraction of all the passwords will be
+found.
+.PP
+Another profitable approach for the bad guy is to use the word
+list from a dictionary or to use a list of names.
+For example, a large commercial dictionary contains typicallly about
+250,000 words; these words can be checked in about five minutes.
+Again, a noticeable fraction of any collection of passwords
+will be found.
+Improvements and extensions will be (and have been) found by
+a determined bad guy.
+Some ``good'' things to try are:
+.IP -
+The dictionary with the words spelled backwards.
+.IP -
+A list of first names (best obtained from some mailing list).
+Last names, street names, and city names also work well.
+.IP -
+The above with initial upper-case letters.
+.IP -
+All valid license plate numbers in your state.
+(This takes about five hours in New Jersey.)
+.IP -
+Room numbers, social security numbers, telephone numbers, and
+the like.
+.PP
+The authors have conducted experiments to try to determine
+typical users' habits in the choice of passwords when no
+constraint is put on their choice.
+The results were disappointing, except to the bad guy.
+In a collection of 3,289 passwords
+gathered from many users over a long period of time;
+.IP
+15 were a single ASCII character;
+.IP
+72 were strings of two ASCII characters;
+.IP
+464 were strings of three ASCII characters;
+.IP
+477 were string of four alphamerics;
+.IP
+706 were five letters, all upper-case or all lower-case;
+.IP
+605 were six letters, all lower-case.
+.LP
+An additional 492 passwords appeared in various available
+dictionaries, name lists, and the like.
+A total of 2,831, or 86% of this sample of passwords fell into one of
+these classes.
+.PP
+There was, of course, considerable overlap between the
+dictionary results and the character string searches.
+The dictionary search alone, which required only five
+minutes to run, produced about one third of the passwords.
+.PP
+Users could be urged (or forced) to use either longer passwords
+or passwords chosen from a larger character set, or the system
+could itself choose passwords for the users.
+.SH
+AN ANECDOTE
+.PP
+An entertaining and instructive example is
+the attempt made at one installation to force users to use less predictable
+passwords.
+The users did not choose their own passwords; the system supplied
+them.
+The supplied passwords were eight characters long and 
+were taken from the character set consisting of
+lower-case letters and digits.
+They were generated by a pseudo-random number generator
+with only $2 sup 15$ starting values.
+The time required to search (again on a PDP-11/70) through
+all character strings of length 8 from a 36-character
+alphabet is 112 years.
+.PP
+Unfortunately, only $2 sup 15$ of them need be looked at,
+because that is the number of possible outputs of the random
+number generator.
+The bad guy did, in fact, generate and test each of these strings
+and found every one of the system-generated passwords using
+a total of only about one minute of machine time.
+.SH
+IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FIRST APPROACH
+.NH
+Slower Encryption
+.PP
+Obviously, the first algorithm used was far too fast.
+The announcement of the DES encryption algorithm [2]
+by the National Bureau of Standards
+was timely and fortunate.
+The DES is, by design, hard to invert, but equally valuable
+is the fact that it is extremely slow when implemented in
+software.
+The DES was implemented and used in the following way:
+The first eight characters of the user's password are
+used as a key for the DES; then the algorithm
+is used to encrypt a constant.
+Although this constant is zero at the moment, it is easily
+accessible and can be made installation-dependent.
+Then the DES algorithm is iterated 25 times and the
+resulting 64 bits are repacked to become a string of
+11 printable characters.
+.NH
+Less Predictable Passwords
+.PP
+The password entry program was modified so as to urge
+the user to use more obscure passwords.
+If the user enters an alphabetic password (all upper-case or
+all lower-case) shorter than six characters, or a
+password from a larger character set shorter than five
+characters, then the program asks him to enter a
+longer password.
+This further reduces the efficacy of key search.
+.PP
+These improvements make it exceedingly difficult to find
+any individual password.
+The user is warned of the risks and if he cooperates,
+he is very safe indeed.
+On the other hand, he is not prevented from using
+his spouse's name if he wants to.
+.NH
+Salted Passwords
+.PP
+The key search technique is still
+likely to turn up a few passwords when it is used
+on a large collection of passwords, and it seemed wise to make this
+task as difficult as possible.
+To this end, when a password is first entered, the password program
+obtains a 12-bit random number (by reading the real-time clock)
+and appends this to the password typed in by the user.
+The concatenated string is encrypted and both the
+12-bit random quantity (called the $salt$) and the 64-bit
+result of the encryption are entered into the password
+file.
+.PP
+When the user later logs in to the system, the 12-bit
+quantity is extracted from the password file and appended
+to the typed password.
+The encrypted result is required, as before, to be the same as the
+remaining 64 bits in the password file.
+This modification does not increase the task of finding
+any individual
+password,
+starting from scratch,
+but now the work of testing a given character string
+against a large collection of encrypted passwords has
+been multiplied by 4096 ($2 sup 12$).
+The reason for this is that there are 4096 encrypted
+versions of each password and one of them has been picked more
+or less at random by the system.
+.PP
+With this modification,
+it is likely that the bad guy can spend days of computer
+time trying to find a password on a system with hundreds
+of passwords, and find none at all.
+More important is the fact that it becomes impractical
+to prepare an encrypted dictionary in advance.
+Such an encrypted dictionary could be used to crack
+new passwords in milliseconds when they appear.
+.PP
+There is a (not inadvertent) side effect of this
+modification.
+It becomes nearly impossible to find out whether a
+person with passwords on two or more systems has used
+the same password on all of them,
+unless you already know that.
+.NH
+The Threat of the DES Chip
+.PP
+Chips to perform the DES encryption are already commercially
+available and they are very fast.
+The use of such a chip speeds up the process of password
+hunting by three orders of magnitude.
+To avert this possibility, one of the internal tables
+of the DES algorithm
+(in particular, the so-called E-table)
+is changed in a way that depends on the 12-bit random
+number.
+The E-table is inseparably wired into the DES chip,
+so that the commercial chip cannot be used.
+Obviously, the bad guy could have his own chip designed and
+built, but the cost would be unthinkable.
+.NH
+A Subtle Point
+.PP
+To login successfully on the UNIX system, it is necessary
+after dialing in to type a valid user name, and then the
+correct password for that user name.
+It is poor design to write the login command in such a way that it
+tells an interloper when he has typed in a invalid user name.
+The response to an invalid name should be identical to
+that for a valid name.
+.PP
+When the slow encryption algorithm was first implemented,
+the encryption was done only if the user name was valid,
+because otherwise there was no encrypted password to
+compare with the supplied password.
+The result was that the response was delayed
+by about one-half second if the name was valid, but was
+immediate if invalid.
+The bad guy could find out
+whether a particular user name was valid.
+The routine was modified to do the encryption in either
+case.
+.SH
+CONCLUSIONS
+.PP
+On the issue of password security, UNIX is probably
+better than most systems.
+The use of encrypted passwords appears reasonably
+secure in the absence of serious attention of experts
+in the field.
+.PP
+It is also worth some effort to conceal even the encrypted
+passwords.
+Some UNIX systems have instituted what is called an
+``external security code'' that must be typed when
+dialing into the system, but before logging in.
+If this code is changed periodically, then someone
+with an old password will likely be prevented from
+using it.
+.PP
+Whenever any security procedure is instituted that attempts
+to deny access to unauthorized persons, it is wise to
+keep a record of both successful and unsuccessful attempts
+to get at the secured resource.
+Just as an out-of-hours visitor to a computer center normally
+must not only identify himself, but a record is usually also kept of
+his entry.
+Just so, it is a wise precaution to make and keep a record
+of all attempts to log into a remote-access time-sharing
+system, and certainly all unsuccessful attempts.
+.PP
+Bad guys fall on a spectrum whose one end is someone with
+ordinary access to a system and whose goal is to find
+out a particular password (usually that of the super-user)
+and, at the other end, someone who wishes to collect as
+much password information as possible from as many systems
+as possible.
+Most of the work reported here serves to frustrate the latter type;
+our experience indicates that the former type of bad guy never
+was very successful.
+.PP
+We recognize that a time-sharing system must operate in a
+hostile environment.
+We did not attempt to hide the security aspects of the operating
+system, thereby playing the customary make-believe game in
+which weaknesses of the system are not discussed no matter
+how apparent.
+Rather we advertised the password algorithm and invited attack
+in the belief that this approach would minimize future trouble.
+The approach has been successful.
+.\" .SG MH-1271-RM/KT
+.SH
+References
+.IP [1]
+Ritchie, D.M. and Thompson, K.
+The UNIX Time-Sharing System.
+.I
+Comm. ACM
+.B
+17
+.R
+(July 1974),
+pp. 365-375.
+.IP [2]
+.I
+Proposed Federal Information Processing Data Encryption Standard.
+.R
+Federal Register (40FR12134), March 17, 1975
+.IP [3]
+Wilkes, M. V.
+.I
+Time-Sharing Computer Systems.
+.R
+American Elsevier,
+New York, (1968).
+.IP [4]
+U. S. Patent Number 2,089,603.
diff --git a/share/doc/smm/Makefile b/share/doc/smm/Makefile
index 7d46af46217..7403c89ab98 100644
--- a/share/doc/smm/Makefile
+++ b/share/doc/smm/Makefile
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 1997/08/07 09:01:49 niklas Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2003/11/10 20:32:17 otto Exp $
 #	from: @(#)Makefile	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/10/93
 
 # The following modules do not build/install:
 # 10.named, 13.amd
 
 # Missing:
-# 02.config 11.timedop 12.timed
+# 02.config
 
 # Missing from 4.4BSD-Lite:
-# 14.uucpimpl 15.uucpnet 16.security 17.password
+# 14.uucpimpl 15.uucpnet 16.security
 
 DOCDIR=	/usr/share/doc/smm
 FILES=	00.contents Makefile Title
-SUBDIR=	01.setup 04.quotas 05.fastfs 06.nfs 18.net
+SUBDIR=	01.setup 04.quotas 05.fastfs 06.nfs 17.password 18.net
 .if exists(03.fsck_ffs)
 SUBDIR+= 03.fsck_ffs
 .endif