change arguments to suser. suser now takes the process, and a flags

argument.  old cred only calls user suser_ucred.  this will allow future
work to more flexibly implement the idea of a root process.  looks like
something i saw in freebsd, but a little different.
use of suser_ucred vs suser in file system code should be looked at again,
for the moment semantics remain unchanged.
review and input from art@  testing and further review miod@

4 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/sys/arch/i386/i386/linux_machdep.c b/sys/arch/i386/i386/linux_machdep.c
index 865767cec23..5e4abf72251 100644
--- a/sys/arch/i386/i386/linux_machdep.c
+++ b/sys/arch/i386/i386/linux_machdep.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: linux_machdep.c,v 1.28 2003/05/13 03:49:04 art Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: linux_machdep.c,v 1.29 2003/08/15 20:32:13 tedu Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: linux_machdep.c,v 1.29 1996/05/03 19:42:11 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ linux_sys_iopl(p, v, retval)
 #endif
 	struct trapframe *fp = p->p_md.md_regs;
 
-	if (suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag) != 0)
+	if (suser(p, 0) != 0)
 		return EPERM;
 	if (securelevel > 0)
 		return EPERM;
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ linux_sys_ioperm(p, v, retval)
 	} */ *uap = v;
 	struct trapframe *fp = p->p_md.md_regs;
 
-	if (suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag) != 0)
+	if (suser(p, 0) != 0)
 		return EPERM;
 	if (securelevel > 0)
 		return EPERM;
diff --git a/sys/arch/i386/i386/mem.c b/sys/arch/i386/i386/mem.c
index f24eac1c19b..fe2edbf4b56 100644
--- a/sys/arch/i386/i386/mem.c
+++ b/sys/arch/i386/i386/mem.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*	$NetBSD: mem.c,v 1.31 1996/05/03 19:42:19 christos Exp $	*/
-/*	$OpenBSD: mem.c,v 1.26 2003/06/02 23:27:47 millert Exp $ */
+/*	$OpenBSD: mem.c,v 1.27 2003/08/15 20:32:13 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1988 University of Utah.
  * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1990, 1993
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ mmopen(dev, flag, mode, p)
 		break;
 #ifdef APERTURE
 	case 4:
-	        if (suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag) != 0 || !allowaperture)
+	        if (suser(p, 0) != 0 || !allowaperture)
 			return (EPERM);
 
 		/* authorize only one simultaneous open() */
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ mmmmap(dev, off, prot)
 /* minor device 0 is physical memory */
 	case 0:
 		if ((u_int)off > ctob(physmem) &&
-		    suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag) != 0)
+		    suser(p, 0) != 0)
 			return -1;
 		return i386_btop((u_int)off);
 
diff --git a/sys/arch/i386/i386/sys_machdep.c b/sys/arch/i386/i386/sys_machdep.c
index e4afb9e9068..fa12399a187 100644
--- a/sys/arch/i386/i386/sys_machdep.c
+++ b/sys/arch/i386/i386/sys_machdep.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sys_machdep.c,v 1.21 2003/06/02 23:27:47 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: sys_machdep.c,v 1.22 2003/08/15 20:32:13 tedu Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: sys_machdep.c,v 1.28 1996/05/03 19:42:29 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*-
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ i386_iopl(p, args, retval)
 	struct trapframe *tf = p->p_md.md_regs;
 	struct i386_iopl_args ua;
 
-	if ((error = suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag)) != 0)
+	if ((error = suser(p, 0)) != 0)
 		return error;
 #ifdef APERTURE
 	if (!allowaperture && securelevel > 0)
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ i386_set_ioperm(p, args, retval)
 	struct pcb *pcb = &p->p_addr->u_pcb;
 	struct i386_set_ioperm_args ua;
 
-	if ((error = suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag)) != 0)
+	if ((error = suser(p, 0)) != 0)
 		return error;
 
 	if ((error = copyin(args, &ua, sizeof(ua))) != 0)
diff --git a/sys/arch/i386/isa/pccom.c b/sys/arch/i386/isa/pccom.c
index 88c1e849872..44ab6d562aa 100644
--- a/sys/arch/i386/isa/pccom.c
+++ b/sys/arch/i386/isa/pccom.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: pccom.c,v 1.43 2003/06/02 23:27:47 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: pccom.c,v 1.44 2003/08/15 20:32:13 tedu Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: com.c,v 1.82.4.1 1996/06/02 09:08:00 mrg Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ comioctl(dev, cmd, data, flag, p)
 	case TIOCSFLAGS: {
 		int userbits, driverbits = 0;
 
-		error = suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag); 
+		error = suser(p, 0); 
 		if (error != 0)
 			return(EPERM);