Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in RFC 8017.

Based on an OpenSSL commit by David Benjamin.

Alex Gaynor and Paul Kehrer from the pyca/cryptography Python library
reported that more than 200 "expected to fail" signatures among Project
Wycheproof's test vectors validated on LibreSSL. This patch makes them
all fail.

ok jsing

commit 608a026494c1e7a14f6d6cfcc5e4994fe2728836
Author: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Date:   Sat Aug 20 13:35:17 2016 -0400

    Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified.

    RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode
    the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key
    operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal.

    OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding
    round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient
    laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in
    https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html

    Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme,
    this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This
    avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy
    ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations
    which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature
    producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and
    accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a
    responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical.

    In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and
    security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not
    here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed
    RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so
    this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL
    releases.

    See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00

    As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this
    version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces
    digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath
    wasn't quite doing this right.

    Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

    GH: #1474

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions