diff options
| author | Miod Vallat <miod@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2007-04-10 17:47:57 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Miod Vallat <miod@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2007-04-10 17:47:57 +0000 |
| commit | b79f7d8019552bffbfb9132282c9e400ed234e23 (patch) | |
| tree | 746cae9358ef503518bb08df39c8d11a2ea50ded /sys/kern | |
| parent | 3b1e074fc83378f28653b59731c5a50a5b3d8bf3 (diff) | |
``it's'' -> ``its'' when the grammar gods require this change.
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/exec_elf.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/sys_process.c | 4 |
2 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/exec_elf.c b/sys/kern/exec_elf.c index f09a19ff141..1481356b67c 100644 --- a/sys/kern/exec_elf.c +++ b/sys/kern/exec_elf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: exec_elf.c,v 1.59 2007/03/20 12:32:07 thib Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: exec_elf.c,v 1.60 2007/04/10 17:47:55 miod Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996 Per Fogelstrom @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ ELFNAME(copyargs)(struct exec_package *pack, struct ps_strings *arginfo, */ if (pack->ep_interp != NULL) { pack->ep_emul_argp = stack; - (char *)stack += ELF_AUX_ENTRIES * sizeof (AuxInfo); + stack = (char *)stack + ELF_AUX_ENTRIES * sizeof (AuxInfo); } return (stack); } @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ native: /* * Check if we found a dynamically linked binary and arrange to load - * it's interpreter when the exec file is released. + * its interpreter when the exec file is released. */ if (interp) { struct elf_args *ap; diff --git a/sys/kern/sys_process.c b/sys/kern/sys_process.c index 188c581983d..748e07bf99f 100644 --- a/sys/kern/sys_process.c +++ b/sys/kern/sys_process.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sys_process.c,v 1.38 2007/03/15 10:22:30 art Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sys_process.c,v 1.39 2007/04/10 17:47:55 miod Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: sys_process.c,v 1.55 1996/05/15 06:17:47 tls Exp $ */ /*- @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ sys_ptrace(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval) * [Note: once P_SUGID or P_SUGIDEXEC gets set in * execve(), they stay set until the process does * another execve(). Hence this prevents a setuid - * process which revokes it's special privileges using + * process which revokes its special privileges using * setuid() from being traced. This is good security.] */ if ((t->p_cred->p_ruid != p->p_cred->p_ruid || |