summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/usr.bin/openssl/s_cb.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorBrent Cook <bcook@cvs.openbsd.org>2015-09-10 06:36:46 +0000
committerBrent Cook <bcook@cvs.openbsd.org>2015-09-10 06:36:46 +0000
commit77f7e64cf6e916273a229a48fe327e382f43d99a (patch)
tree1e6e950ecc0b28afa658ae59f616e06806dff5b4 /usr.bin/openssl/s_cb.c
parent08141686b4a3b35a22d2c902c9a9c74c9f589f77 (diff)
Fix shadowed verify_error in s_server by removing the unused global.
's_time -verify 1' will now actually verify the peer certificate. ok beck@
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin/openssl/s_cb.c')
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/openssl/s_cb.c5
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/openssl/s_cb.c b/usr.bin/openssl/s_cb.c
index 3bead8236a7..596884ff16d 100644
--- a/usr.bin/openssl/s_cb.c
+++ b/usr.bin/openssl/s_cb.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: s_cb.c,v 1.4 2015/07/20 21:52:07 doug Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: s_cb.c,v 1.5 2015/09/10 06:36:45 bcook Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@
#define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH 16
int verify_depth = 0;
-int verify_error = X509_V_OK;
int verify_return_error = 0;
unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
int cookie_initialized = 0;
@@ -157,10 +156,8 @@ verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
if (verify_depth >= depth) {
if (!verify_return_error)
ok = 1;
- verify_error = X509_V_OK;
} else {
ok = 0;
- verify_error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
}
}
switch (err) {