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authorDamien Miller <djm@cvs.openbsd.org>2020-10-03 08:11:29 +0000
committerDamien Miller <djm@cvs.openbsd.org>2020-10-03 08:11:29 +0000
commit19b5e7ec5feb6e6037e8587dbfc6525b3ce08305 (patch)
treebd2a290eff1e16a60dbc74aa4b4faffe8abe9924 /usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c
parent84928f6c16cce6e8ea694fb22aae7d16f7c75e21 (diff)
record when the host key checking code downgrades a certificate host
key to a plain key. This occurs when the user connects to a host with a certificate host key but no corresponding CA key configured in known_hosts; feedback and ok markus@
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c')
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c55
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c
index fdf0c2d9c66..96e776b1b71 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.332 2020/09/09 21:57:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.333 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -669,6 +669,10 @@ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
/*
* check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
* is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
+ *
+ * If cert_fallbackp is not NULL then will attempt to convert certificate host
+ * keys to plain keys if no certificate match was found and will return
+ * non-zero via *cert_fallbackp if this fall-back was used.
*/
#define RDRW 0
#define RDONLY 1
@@ -677,7 +681,7 @@ static int
check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly,
char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
- char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
+ char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles, int *cert_fallbackp)
{
HostStatus host_status;
HostStatus ip_status;
@@ -688,12 +692,15 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
const char *type;
const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed;
- int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
+ int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr), cert_fallback = 0;
int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
u_int i;
+ if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
+ *cert_fallbackp = 0;
+
/*
* Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
* problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
@@ -809,9 +816,15 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
debug("checking without port identifier");
+ /*
+ * NB. do not perform cert->key fallback in this
+ * recursive call. Fallback will only be performed in
+ * the top-level call.
+ */
if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
- system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
+ system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles,
+ NULL) == 0) {
debug("found matching key w/out port");
break;
}
@@ -1088,10 +1101,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
+ if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
+ *cert_fallbackp = cert_fallback;
return 0;
fail:
- if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
+ if (cert_fallbackp != NULL && want_cert &&
+ host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
/*
* No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
* search normally.
@@ -1103,6 +1119,7 @@ fail:
if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r));
host_key = raw_key;
+ cert_fallback = 1;
goto retry;
}
sshkey_free(raw_key);
@@ -1115,15 +1132,24 @@ fail:
return -1;
}
-/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
+/*
+ * returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify.
+ *
+ * If the host key was a certificate that was downgraded to a plain key in
+ * the process of matching, then cert_fallbackp will be non-zero.
+ */
int
-verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
+verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key,
+ int *cert_fallbackp)
{
u_int i;
- int r = -1, flags = 0;
+ int r = -1, flags = 0, cert_fallback = 0;
char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
+ if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
+ *cert_fallbackp = 0;
+
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
@@ -1214,15 +1240,20 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
}
r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
- options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
+ options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles,
+ &cert_fallback);
out:
sshkey_free(plain);
free(fp);
free(cafp);
- if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
- sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
- r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ if (host_key != NULL) {
+ sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
+ r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
+ }
+ if (r == 0 && cert_fallbackp != NULL)
+ *cert_fallbackp = cert_fallback;
}
return r;