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author	Damien Miller <djm@cvs.openbsd.org>	2018-04-10 00:10:50 +0000
committer	Damien Miller <djm@cvs.openbsd.org>	2018-04-10 00:10:50 +0000
commit	6d193537cb5a244e7fb2e9c4a5fcf83dacb82acf (patch)
tree	867a19bf95048b2928d27a3b03805b529ad2c832 /usr.bin
parent	71401985bd10cd01ab232cfa30b32d8e01c79f40 (diff)

lots of typos in comments/docs. Patch from Karsten Weiss after checking

with codespell tool (https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell)

Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin')

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.krl

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/auth.h

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/authfd.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/channels.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/clientloop.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/kexdhs.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/kexgexs.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/scp.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/servconf.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/sftp.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/ssh_api.h

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/sshbuf.h

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/sshkey-xmss.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/umac.c

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin/ssh/xmss_wots.c

22 files changed, 54 insertions, 54 deletions

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys
index 64cb18700ee..65f11f5384e 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01

valid after <= current time < valid before

-criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as

+critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as

below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation

must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.

@@ -291,4 +291,4 @@ permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of

of this script will not be permitted if

this option is not present.

-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.13 2017/11/03 02:32:19 djm Exp $

+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.14 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
index 4857d38533d..9ce2a1e3a14 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use

The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an

authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that

proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of

-data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet

+data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encryption of the packet

lengths.

Negotiation

@@ -103,5 +103,5 @@ References

[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03

-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.3 2016/05/03 13:10:24 djm Exp $

+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.krl b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.krl
index b9695107bac..f319bad21d3 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.krl
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.krl

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ This section may appear multiple times.

5. KRL signature sections

The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the

-preceeding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that

+preceding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that

is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.

Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:

in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"

@@ -166,4 +166,4 @@ Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify

signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by

trusted means.

-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $

+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h
index 9302f4d611d..db00668331d 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.95 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.96 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct Authctxt {

struct sshkey **prev_keys;

u_int nprev_keys;

- /* Last used key and ancilliary information from active auth method */

+ /* Last used key and ancillary information from active auth method */

struct sshkey *auth_method_key;

char *auth_method_info;

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/authfd.c b/usr.bin/ssh/authfd.c
index 358c977438b..45fdd78985b 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/authfd.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/authfd.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.108 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.109 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)

-/* encode signature algoritm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */

+/* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */

static u_int

agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)

{

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/channels.c b/usr.bin/ssh/channels.c
index 00d9f1c5579..c410d7193b1 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/channels.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/channels.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.379 2018/02/05 05:36:49 tb Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.380 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>

@@ -2568,7 +2568,7 @@ channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)

* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID

* with the newly allocated channel ID.

* 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY

- * channels and procesed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID

+ * channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID

* is then translated back to the original mux client ID.

* 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE

* messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels.

@@ -2579,7 +2579,7 @@ channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)

* channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure

* out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a

* specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port.

- * 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currenly

+ * 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently

* not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified

* easily.

@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)

* When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we

* need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we

- * restore the orignal channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,

+ * restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,

* so we can cleanup the channel.

if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY)

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/clientloop.c b/usr.bin/ssh/clientloop.c
index 586ee827e74..8cde8986138 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/clientloop.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/clientloop.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.311 2018/02/11 21:16:56 dtucker Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.312 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>

@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)

options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))

cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;

- /* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */

+ /* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */

tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&

c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/kexdhs.c b/usr.bin/ssh/kexdhs.c
index 20a061bf502..fb174352a6d 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/kexdhs.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/kexdhs.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.26 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.27 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)

/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */

- /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */

+ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */

if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||

(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||

(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/kexgexs.c b/usr.bin/ssh/kexgexs.c
index 025ce9af4fa..017e543a73d 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/kexgexs.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/kexgexs.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.32 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.33 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)

/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */

- /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */

+ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */

if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||

(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||

(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/scp.c b/usr.bin/ssh/scp.c
index 08a6d5ad564..e3af4bbf942 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/scp.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/scp.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.195 2018/02/10 06:15:12 djm Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.196 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which

* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).

@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)

}

- * This functions executes a command simlar to do_cmd(), but expects the

+ * This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the

* input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().

* This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/servconf.c b/usr.bin/ssh/servconf.c
index e1c97c49650..6022db6a7c6 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/servconf.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/servconf.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.327 2018/04/04 15:12:17 job Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.328 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

@@ -1888,7 +1888,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,

case sAuthenticationMethods:

if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {

value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */

- value2 = 0; /* sucessfully parsed any method */

+ value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */

while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {

if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {

if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {

@@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@ int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)

* If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or

* array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we

- * do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().

+ * do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().

void

copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sftp.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sftp.c
index f72e321359f..042780cb7d2 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sftp.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sftp.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.182 2017/11/03 03:46:52 djm Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.183 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

@@ -1815,7 +1815,7 @@ complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,

return 0;

}

- /* Complete ambigious command */

+ /* Complete ambiguous command */

tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);

if (count > 1)

complete_display(list, 0);

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c
index 55b1827b028..ffcdb8cd427 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-agent.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.229 2018/04/09 23:54:49 djm Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.230 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>

@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ process_message(u_int socknum)

debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type);

- /* check wheter agent is locked */

+ /* check whether agent is locked */

if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {

sshbuf_reset(e->request);

switch (type) {

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c
index 4f2ffd03dd1..e06542a2879 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.475 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.476 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>

@@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)

/* load options.identity_files */

load_public_identity_files(pw);

- /* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME varibale */

+ /* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */

if (options.identity_agent &&

strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {

if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_api.h b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_api.h
index a7e14e06ec5..d5ba574802b 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_api.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_api.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.1 2015/01/19 20:30:23 markus Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ int ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,

* ssh_packet_next() sets typep if there is no new packet available.

* in this case the caller must fill the input byte-stream by passing

* the data received over network to ssh_input_append().

- * additinally, the caller needs to send the resulting output

+ * additionally, the caller needs to send the resulting output

* byte-stream back over the network. otherwise the key exchange

* would not proceed. the output byte-stream is accessed through

* ssh_output_ptr().

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5 b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5
index 1ca0862b88e..bcd18a87221 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh_config.5

@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@

.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF

.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

.\"

-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.272 2018/04/07 13:50:10 jmc Exp $

-.Dd $Mdocdate: April 7 2018 $

+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.273 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $

+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 10 2018 $

.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5

.Os

.Sh NAME

@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ section.

.It Cm RemoteForward

Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over

the secure channel.

-The remote port may either be fowarded to a specified host and port

+The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port

from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote

client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine.

The first argument must be

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshbuf.h b/usr.bin/ssh/sshbuf.h
index 13fde3f1aa4..f4cc4a6bec0 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshbuf.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshbuf.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.9 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.10 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct sshbuf {

#ifndef SSHBUF_NO_DEPREACTED

* NB. Please do not use sshbuf_init() in new code. Please use sshbuf_new()

- * instead. sshbuf_init() is deprectated and will go away soon (it is

+ * instead. sshbuf_init() is deprecated and will go away soon (it is

* only included to allow compat with buffer_* in OpenSSH)

void sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *buf);

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c
index 29400574863..b9c58907508 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.297 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.298 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>

@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)

* Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an

- * address that matches the desired address family on the specifed interface.

+ * address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface.

* Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure.

static int

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
index a5e2dd17db8..3d658a9b059 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.506 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.507 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>

@@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)

* return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about

* source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody

* (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"

- * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless

+ * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless

* if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped

* source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do

* rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshkey-xmss.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshkey-xmss.c
index 41cc1bade17..b5d40ac6570 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshkey-xmss.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshkey-xmss.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ struct ssh_xmss_state {

treehash_inst *treehash;

u_int32_t idx; /* state read from file */

- u_int32_t maxidx; /* resticted # of signatures */

+ u_int32_t maxidx; /* restricted # of signatures */

int have_state; /* .state file exists */

int lockfd; /* locked in sshkey_xmss_get_state() */

int allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */

@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr)

}

idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);

if (idx == state->idx) {

- /* no signature happend, no need to update */

+ /* no signature happened, no need to update */

ret = 0;

goto done;

} else if (idx != state->idx + 1) {

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/umac.c b/usr.bin/ssh/umac.c
index f69fb291da9..f3cacdbfa3c 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/umac.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/umac.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.16 2017/12/12 15:06:12 naddy Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.17 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------

* umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@

/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */

/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */

/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */

-/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable auhthenticated encrytion */

+/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable authenticated encryption */

/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */

/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */

@@ -291,9 +291,9 @@ static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])

* Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine

* must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to

* the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is

- * optimized and should be prefered whenever the multiple-buffer interface

+ * optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface

* is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's

- * responsability to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.

+ * responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.

* The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and

* must be called once, before any other PDF routine.

@@ -315,8 +315,8 @@ static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])

typedef struct {

UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */

UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */

- int next_data_empty; /* Bookeeping variable for data buffer. */

- int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorperated. */

+ int next_data_empty; /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer. */

+ int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated. */

UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */

} nh_ctx;

@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])

/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash

- * produces a result not neccesarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-

+ * produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-

* product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and

* multiplies each with a 36 bit key.

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/xmss_wots.c b/usr.bin/ssh/xmss_wots.c
index 1d6e88c4922..a29453760c5 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/xmss_wots.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/xmss_wots.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */

+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */

wots.c version 20160722

Andreas Hülsing

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static void expand_seed(unsigned char *outseeds, const unsigned char *inseed, co

* Computes the chaining function.

* out and in have to be n-byte arrays

- * interpretes in as start-th value of the chain

+ * interprets in as start-th value of the chain

* addr has to contain the address of the chain

static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int start, unsigned int steps, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])