diff options
| author | Jonathan Gray <jsg@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2011-12-28 21:09:49 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jonathan Gray <jsg@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2011-12-28 21:09:49 +0000 |
| commit | 85f53545ad3b83738b02f92363a5938346b39bcb (patch) | |
| tree | da5910aa654ae33551566ddc1adf44f8a05b220a /usr.bin | |
| parent | d106457f651c5559c73850e6388875b34321b4bd (diff) | |
As pointed out by Dan Rosenberg our telnet client has the same
overflow when using encryption as the recent FreeBSD advisory.
Use the same approach taken in FreeBSD to protect against malicious servers.
ok miod@
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin')
| -rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/telnet/encrypt.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/telnet/encrypt.c b/usr.bin/telnet/encrypt.c index 4781e991b3d..006bd25cfe7 100644 --- a/usr.bin/telnet/encrypt.c +++ b/usr.bin/telnet/encrypt.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: encrypt.c,v 1.3 2006/12/21 02:44:55 krw Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: encrypt.c,v 1.4 2011/12/28 21:09:48 jsg Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 @@ -739,6 +739,9 @@ encrypt_keyid(struct key_info *kp, unsigned char *keyid, int len) int dir = kp->dir; int ret = 0; + if (len > MAXKEYLEN) + len = MAXKEYLEN; + if (!(ep = (*kp->getcrypt)(*kp->modep))) { if (len == 0) return; |