implementation of the interface between privileged and unprivileged process

for ssh-privsep

4 files changed, 2530 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4b41da528b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1464 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.1 2002/03/18 17:28:37 provos Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+#include <skey.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "zlib.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+extern u_char session_id[];
+extern Buffer input, output;
+extern Buffer auth_debug;
+extern int auth_debug_init;
+
+/* State exported from the child */
+
+struct {
+	z_stream incoming;
+	z_stream outgoing;
+	u_char *keyin;
+	u_int keyinlen;
+	u_char *keyout;
+	u_int keyoutlen;
+	u_char *ivin;
+	u_int ivinlen;
+	u_char *ivout;
+	u_int ivoutlen;
+	int ssh1cipher;
+	int ssh1protoflags;
+	u_char *input;
+	u_int ilen;
+	u_char *output;
+	u_int olen;
+} child_state;
+
+/* Prototypes for request sending and receiving */
+void mm_request_send(int, enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
+void mm_request_receive(int, Buffer *);
+void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
+
+/* Prototypes for authentication functions */
+int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
+int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int);
+Key *get_hostkey_by_type(int);
+int get_hostkey_index(Key *);
+int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
+BIGNUM *auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+
+void	session_pty_cleanup2(void *);
+Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
+
+/* Functions on the montior that answer unprivileged requests */
+
+int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
+
+static Authctxt *authctxt;
+static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+
+/* local state for key verify */
+static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
+static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
+static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static u_char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+static u_char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
+static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+
+struct mon_table {
+	enum monitor_reqtype type;
+	int flags;
+	int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
+};
+
+#define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
+#define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
+#define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
+
+#define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
+
+#define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+
+/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+
+static void
+monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
+{
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->type == type) {
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+			return;
+		}
+		ent++;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
+{
+	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
+
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+		}
+		ent++;
+	}
+}
+
+Authctxt *
+monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct mon_table *ent;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+
+		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+	} else {
+		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
+	}
+
+	authctxt = authctxt_new();
+
+	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+	while (!authenticated) {
+		authenticated = monitor_read(monitor, mon_dispatch, &ent);
+		if (authenticated) {
+			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
+				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
+				    __FUNCTION__, ent->type);
+			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+			    !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
+				authenticated = 0;
+		}
+
+		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
+			    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+			if (!authenticated)
+				authctxt->failures++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
+	    __FUNCTION__, authctxt->user);
+
+	mm_get_keystate(monitor);
+
+	return (authctxt);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	if (compat20) {
+		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+
+	} else {
+		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+	}
+	if (!no_pty_flag) {
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
+	}
+
+	for (;;)
+		monitor_read(monitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_sync(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	/* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
+	mm_share_sync(&monitor->m_zlib, &monitor->m_zback);
+}
+
+int
+monitor_read(struct monitor *monitor, struct mon_table *ent,
+    struct mon_table **pent)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int ret;
+	u_char type;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+
+	mm_request_receive(monitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: checking request %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->type == type)
+			break;
+		ent++;
+	}
+
+	if (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
+			fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __FUNCTION__,
+			    type);
+		ret = (*ent->f)(monitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+
+		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
+		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
+			debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __FUNCTION__,
+			    type);
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+		}
+
+		if (pent != NULL)
+			*pent = ent;
+		
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d\n", __FUNCTION__, type); 
+
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+/* allowed key state */
+static int
+monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+{
+	/* make sure key is allowed */
+	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
+	    memcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
+		return (0);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_reset_key_state(void)
+{
+	/* reset state */
+	if (key_blob != NULL)
+		xfree(key_blob);
+	if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
+		xfree(hostbased_cuser);
+	if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
+		xfree(hostbased_chost);
+	key_blob = NULL;
+	key_bloblen = 0;
+	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+	hostbased_chost = NULL;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_moduli(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	DH *dh;
+	int min, want, max;
+
+	min = buffer_get_int(m);
+	want = buffer_get_int(m);
+	max = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+	debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
+	    __FUNCTION__, min, want, max);
+	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
+	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
+		fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
+		    __FUNCTION__, min, want, max);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
+	if (dh == NULL) {
+		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+		return (0);
+	} else {
+		/* Send first bignum */
+		buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+		
+		DH_free(dh);
+	}
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	u_char *p;
+	u_char *signature;
+	u_int siglen, datlen;
+	int keyid;
+	
+	debug3("%s", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	keyid = buffer_get_int(m);	
+	p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);	
+
+	if (datlen != 20)
+		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __FUNCTION__, datlen);
+
+	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __FUNCTION__, keyid);
+	if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	debug3("%s: signature %p(%d)", __FUNCTION__, signature, siglen);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
+
+	xfree(p);
+	xfree(signature);
+
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+
+	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+
+int
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *login;
+	struct passwd *pwent;
+	int allowed = 0;
+	
+	debug3("%s", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
+		fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	login = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+	pwent = getpwnamallow(login);
+
+	authctxt->user = xstrdup(login);
+	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? login : "unknown");
+	xfree(login);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	if (pwent == NULL) {
+		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	allowed = 1;
+	authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pwent);
+	authctxt->valid = 1;
+
+	buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+	buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+
+ out:
+	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __FUNCTION__, allowed);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+
+	/* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
+	if (!compat20)
+		monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+	else
+		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authserv(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+	authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+		xfree(authctxt->style);
+		authctxt->style = NULL;
+	}
+
+	debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
+	    __FUNCTION__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	static int call_count;
+	char *passwd;
+	int authenticated, plen;
+
+	passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
+	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
+	authenticated = authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+	memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+	xfree(passwd);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __FUNCTION__, authenticated);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+	call_count++;
+	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
+		auth_method = "none";
+	else
+		auth_method = "password";
+
+	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *name, *infotxt;
+	u_int numprompts;
+	u_int *echo_on;
+	char **prompts;
+	int res;
+
+	res = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
+	    &prompts, &echo_on);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, res);
+	if (res != -1)
+		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __FUNCTION__, res);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+
+	if (res != -1) {
+		xfree(name);
+		xfree(infotxt);
+		xfree(prompts);
+		xfree(echo_on);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *response;
+	int authok;
+
+	if (authctxt->as == 0)
+		fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
+	authctxt->as = NULL;
+	debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __FUNCTION__, response, authok);
+	xfree(response);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __FUNCTION__, authok);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+
+	auth_method = "bsdauth";
+
+	return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+int
+mm_answer_skeyquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct skey skey;
+	char challenge[1024];
+	int res;
+
+	res = skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, res);
+	if (res != -1)
+		buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __FUNCTION__, res);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *response;
+	int authok;
+
+	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+	authok = (authctxt->valid &&
+	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
+	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
+
+	xfree(response);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __FUNCTION__, authok);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
+
+	auth_method = "skey";
+
+	return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+void
+mm_append_debug(Buffer *m)
+{
+	if (auth_debug_init && buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
+		debug3("%s: Appending debug messages for child", __FUNCTION__);
+		buffer_append(m, buffer_ptr(&auth_debug),
+		    buffer_len(&auth_debug));
+		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	u_char *cuser, *chost, *blob;
+	u_int bloblen;
+	enum mm_keytype type = 0;
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+	
+	type = buffer_get_int(m);
+	cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+
+	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+
+	if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
+	    (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
+		fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __FUNCTION__, key);
+
+	if (key != NULL && authctxt->pw != NULL) {
+		switch(type) {
+		case MM_USERKEY:
+			allowed = user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+			break;
+		case MM_HOSTKEY:
+			allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+			    cuser, chost, key);
+			break;
+		case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
+			key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
+			allowed = auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+			    cuser, chost, key);
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+			break;
+		}
+		key_free(key);
+	}
+
+	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	if (allowed) {
+		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+		key_blob = blob;
+		key_bloblen = bloblen;
+		key_blobtype = type;
+		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
+		hostbased_chost = chost;
+	}
+
+	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+	    __FUNCTION__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "disallowed");
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+
+	mm_append_debug(m);
+
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+
+	if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	u_char *p;
+	u_int len;
+	int fail = 0;
+	int session_id2_len = 20 /*XXX should get from [net] */;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+	
+	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+		buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
+	} else {
+		xfree(buffer_get_string(&b, &len));
+		if (len != session_id2_len)
+			fail++;
+	}
+	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+		fail++;
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+		log("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+		    authctxt->user, p);
+		fail++;
+	}
+	xfree(p);
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+			fail++;
+	} else {
+		p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+		if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
+			fail++;
+		xfree(p);
+		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+			fail++;
+		buffer_skip_string(&b);
+	}
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);
+	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, u_char *cuser,
+    u_char *chost)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	u_char *p;
+	u_int len;
+	int fail = 0;
+	int session_id2_len = 20 /*XXX should get from [net] */;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+	
+	xfree(buffer_get_string(&b, &len));
+	if (len != session_id2_len)
+		fail++;
+	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+		fail++;
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+		log("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+		    authctxt->user, p);
+		fail++;
+	}
+	xfree(p);
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* service */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkalg */
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkblob */
+
+	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
+		p[len - 1] = '\0';
+	if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* verify client user */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+	int verified = 0;
+	int valid_data = 0;
+
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+
+	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+	   monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+	if (key == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	switch (key_blobtype) {
+	case MM_USERKEY:
+		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+		break;
+	case MM_HOSTKEY:
+		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
+		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+		break;
+	default:
+		valid_data = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!valid_data)
+		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+	    __FUNCTION__, key, verified ? "verified" : "unverified");
+
+	key_free(key);
+	xfree(blob);
+	xfree(signature);
+	xfree(data);
+
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+		
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+	auth_method = "publickey";
+
+	return (verified);
+}
+
+void
+mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+	 */
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+		fromlen = sizeof(from);
+		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+			(struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			fatal_cleanup();
+		}
+	}
+	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_session_close(Session *s)
+{
+	debug3("%s: session %d pid %d", __FUNCTION__, s->self, s->pid);
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d",  __FUNCTION__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+		fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup2, (void *)s);
+		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+	}
+	s->used = 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	extern struct monitor *monitor;
+	Session *s;
+	int res, fd0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	s = session_new();
+	if (s == NULL)
+		goto error;
+	s->authctxt = authctxt;
+	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+	s->pid = monitor->m_pid;
+	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+	if (res == 0)
+		goto error;
+	fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup2, (void *)s);
+	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+
+	buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+
+	mm_send_fd(socket, s->ptyfd);
+	mm_send_fd(socket, s->ttyfd);
+
+	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
+	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: dup2", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
+
+	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
+	close(0);
+
+	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
+	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
+	if (fd0 != 0)
+		error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __FUNCTION__, fd0);
+
+	/* slave is not needed */
+	close(s->ttyfd);
+	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
+	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
+	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+
+	debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d",  __FUNCTION__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+
+	return (0);
+
+ error:
+	if (s != NULL)
+		mm_session_close(s);
+	buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Session *s;
+	char *tty;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
+		mm_session_close(s);
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	xfree(tty);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sesskey(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	BIGNUM *p;
+	int rsafail;
+
+	/* Turn off permissions */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
+
+	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
+
+	rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
+
+	BN_clear_free(p);
+
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
+
+	/* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sessid(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
+		fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __FUNCTION__);
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
+
+	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	BIGNUM *client_n;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+        u_char *blob = NULL;
+        u_int blen = 0;
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	if (authctxt->valid) {
+		if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: BN_new", __FUNCTION__);
+		buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
+		allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
+		BN_clear_free(client_n);
+	}
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+
+	/* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	if (allowed && key != NULL) {
+		key->type = KEY_RSA;	/* cheat for key_to_blob */
+		if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+			fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __FUNCTION__);
+		buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
+
+		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+		key_blob = blob;
+		key_bloblen = blen;
+		key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
+		key_free(key);
+	}
+
+	mm_append_debug(m);
+
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key = NULL;
+        u_char *blob;
+        u_int blen;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __FUNCTION__);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__);
+	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+		fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __FUNCTION__);
+	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: received bad key", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	if (ssh1_challenge)
+		BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+	ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
+
+	debug3("%s sending reply", __FUNCTION__);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
+
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key = NULL;
+        u_char *blob, *response;
+        u_int blen, len;
+        int success;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __FUNCTION__);
+	if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__);
+	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+		fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __FUNCTION__, key_blobtype);
+	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: received bad key", __FUNCTION__);
+	response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	if (len != 16)
+		fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __FUNCTION__);
+	success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
+
+	key_free(key);
+	xfree(response);
+
+	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
+
+	/* reset state */
+	BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+	ssh1_challenge = NULL;
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, success);
+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
+
+	return (success);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req)
+{
+	extern struct monitor *monitor;
+	int res, status;
+
+	debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	/* The child is terminating */
+	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
+
+	if (waitpid(monitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		exit(1);
+
+	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
+
+	/* Terminate process */
+	exit (res);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	if (compat20) {
+		set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+		set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+	} else {
+		u_char key[256];
+		packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
+		packet_set_encryption_key(key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH,
+		    child_state.ssh1cipher);
+	}
+
+	packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
+	xfree(child_state.keyout);
+	packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
+	xfree(child_state.keyin);
+
+	if (!compat20) {
+		packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
+		xfree(child_state.ivout);
+		packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
+		xfree(child_state.ivin);
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
+	    sizeof(incoming_stream));
+	memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
+	    sizeof(outgoing_stream));
+	
+	/* Update with new address */
+	mm_init_compression(monitor->m_zlib);
+
+	/* Network I/O buffers */
+	/* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
+	buffer_clear(&input);
+	buffer_append(&input, child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
+	memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
+	xfree(child_state.input);
+
+	buffer_clear(&output);
+	buffer_append(&output, child_state.output, child_state.olen);
+	memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
+	xfree(child_state.output);
+}
+
+Kex *
+mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
+{
+	Kex *kex;
+	void *blob;
+	u_int bloblen;
+
+	kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
+	memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
+	kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
+	kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
+	kex->server = 1;
+	kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+	kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+	buffer_init(&kex->my);
+	buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+	buffer_init(&kex->peer);
+	buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+	kex->done = 1;
+	kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
+	kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
+	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+
+	return (kex);
+}
+
+/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
+
+void
+mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob, *p;
+	u_int bloblen, plen;
+
+	debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+	if (!compat20) {
+		child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
+		child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
+		child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
+		    &child_state.ivoutlen);
+		child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
+		goto skip;
+	} else {
+		/* Get the Kex for rekeying */
+		*monitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
+	}
+
+	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __FUNCTION__);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+	
+	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
+	packet_set_seqnr(MODE_OUT, buffer_get_int(&m));
+	packet_set_seqnr(MODE_IN, buffer_get_int(&m));
+
+ skip:
+	/* Get the key context */
+	child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
+	child_state.keyin  = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
+
+	debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __FUNCTION__);
+	/* Get compression state */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+	if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
+		fatal("%s: bad request size", __FUNCTION__);
+	memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
+	xfree(p);
+
+	p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+	if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
+		fatal("%s: bad request size", __FUNCTION__);
+	memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* Network I/O buffers */
+	debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __FUNCTION__);
+	child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
+	child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+
+/* Allocation functions for zlib */
+void *
+mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
+{
+	void *address;
+
+	address = mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
+
+	return (address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+	mm_free(mm, address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+	outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+	outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+	outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
+
+	incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+	incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+	incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
+}
+
+/* XXX */
+
+#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
+	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) \
+		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
+} while (0)
+
+void
+monitor_socketpair(int *pair)
+{   
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: socketpair", __FUNCTION__);
+	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+}
+
+#define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
+
+struct monitor *
+monitor_init(void)
+{
+	struct monitor *mon;
+	int pair[2];
+
+	mon = xmalloc(sizeof(*mon));
+
+	monitor_socketpair(pair);
+
+	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+
+	/* Used to share zlib space across processes */
+	mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
+	mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
+
+	/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
+	mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
+
+	return mon;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
+{
+	int pair[2];
+
+	monitor_socketpair(pair);
+
+	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.h b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3dc05cad186
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MONITOR_H_
+#define _MONITOR_H_
+
+enum monitor_reqtype {
+	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
+	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD,
+	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MONITOR_ANS_PTY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SESSID,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE,
+	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
+};
+
+struct mm_master;
+struct monitor {
+	int			 m_recvfd;
+	int			 m_sendfd;
+	struct mm_master	*m_zback;
+	struct mm_master	*m_zlib;
+	struct Kex		**m_pkex;
+	int			 m_pid;
+};
+
+struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
+void monitor_sync(struct monitor *);
+
+struct Authctxt;
+struct Authctxt *monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *);
+void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *);
+
+struct mon_table;
+int monitor_read(struct monitor*, struct mon_table *, struct mon_table **);
+
+#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.c b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f796cee5391
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,906 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.1 2002/03/18 17:28:37 provos Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "zlib.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern int compat20;
+extern Newkeys *newkeys[];
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+extern struct monitor *monitor;
+extern Buffer input, output;
+
+void
+mm_request_send(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[5];
+	u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+
+	debug3("%s entering: type %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+	PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
+	buf[4] = (u_char) type;         /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
+	if (atomicio(write, socket, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
+		fatal("%s: write", __FUNCTION__);
+	if (atomicio(write, socket, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
+		fatal("%s: write", __FUNCTION__);
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[4];
+	ssize_t res;
+	u_int msg_len;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	res = atomicio(read, socket, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	if (res != sizeof(buf)) {
+		if (res == 0)
+			fatal_cleanup();
+		fatal("%s: read: %d", __FUNCTION__, res);
+	}
+	msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+		fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __FUNCTION__, msg_len);
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
+	res = atomicio(read, socket, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
+	if (res != msg_len)
+		fatal("%s: read: %d != msg_len", __FUNCTION__, res);
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive_expect(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char rtype;
+
+	debug3("%s entering: type %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+	mm_request_receive(socket, m);
+	rtype = buffer_get_char(m);
+	if (rtype != type)
+		fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __FUNCTION__,
+		    rtype, type);
+}
+
+DH *
+mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
+{
+	BIGNUM *p, *g;
+	int success = 0;
+	Buffer m;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, min);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, nbits);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, max);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __FUNCTION__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m);
+
+	success = buffer_get_char(&m);
+	if (success == 0)
+		fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __FUNCTION__);
+	if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) 
+		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __FUNCTION__);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g);
+
+	debug3("%s: remaining %d", __FUNCTION__, buffer_len(&m));
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (dh_new_group(g, p));
+}
+
+int
+mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Kex *kex = *monitor->m_pkex;
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key));
+	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __FUNCTION__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m);
+	*sigp  = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+mm_getpwnamallow(const char *login)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	u_int pwlen;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, login);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __FUNCTION__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m);
+
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &pwlen);
+	if (pwlen != sizeof(struct passwd))
+		fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __FUNCTION__);
+	pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (pw);
+}
+
+void
+pwfree(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	xfree(pw->pw_name);
+	xfree(pw->pw_passwd);
+	xfree(pw->pw_gecos);
+	xfree(pw->pw_class);
+	xfree(pw->pw_dir);
+	xfree(pw->pw_shell);
+	xfree(pw);
+}
+
+/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+/* Do the password authentication */
+int
+mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, password);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __FUNCTION__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
+
+	authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated", 
+	    __FUNCTION__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+{
+	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key));
+}
+
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host,
+    Key *key)
+{
+	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key));
+}
+
+int
+mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user,
+    char *host, Key *key)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */
+	ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key);
+	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+mm_send_debug(Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *msg;
+
+	while (buffer_len(m)) {
+		msg = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+		debug3("%s: Sending debug: %s", __FUNCTION__, msg);
+		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
+		xfree(msg);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int len;
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+	if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+		return (0);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, type);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : "");
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : "");
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __FUNCTION__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+	allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	/* Send potential debug messages */
+	mm_send_debug(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (allowed);
+}
+
+/* 
+ * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
+ * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
+ * for authentication.
+ */
+
+int
+mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int len;
+	int verified = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+	if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+		return (0);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __FUNCTION__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+
+	verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (verified);
+}
+
+/* Export key state after authentication */
+Newkeys *
+mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	u_int len;
+	Newkeys *newkey = NULL;
+	Enc *enc;
+	Mac *mac;
+	Comp *comp;
+
+	debug3("%s: %p(%d)", __FUNCTION__, blob, blen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
+#endif
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
+
+	newkey = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkey));
+	enc = &newkey->enc;
+	mac = &newkey->mac;
+	comp = &newkey->comp;
+
+	/* Enc structure */
+	enc->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	buffer_get(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
+	enc->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	enc->block_size = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	enc->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->key_len);
+	enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+	if (len != enc->block_size)
+		fatal("%s: bad ivlen: expected %d != %d", __FUNCTION__,
+		    enc->block_size, len);
+
+	if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher)
+		fatal("%s: bad cipher name %s or pointer %p", __FUNCTION__,
+		    enc->name, enc->cipher);
+
+	/* Mac structure */
+	mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (mac->name == NULL || mac_init(mac, mac->name) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: can not init mac %s", __FUNCTION__, mac->name);
+	mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+	if (len > mac->key_len)
+		fatal("%s: bad mac key lenght: %d > %d", __FUNCTION__, len,
+		    mac->key_len);
+	mac->key_len = len;
+
+	/* Comp structure */
+	comp->type = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	comp->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	comp->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+
+	len = buffer_len(&b);
+	if (len != 0)
+		error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %d", len);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return (newkey);
+}
+
+int
+mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	int len;
+	u_char *buf;
+	Enc *enc;
+	Mac *mac;
+	Comp *comp;
+	Newkeys *newkey = newkeys[mode];
+
+	debug3("%s: converting %p", __FUNCTION__, newkey);
+
+	if (newkey == NULL) {
+		error("%s: newkey == NULL", __FUNCTION__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	enc = &newkey->enc;
+	mac = &newkey->mac;
+	comp = &newkey->comp;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	/* Enc structure */
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, enc->name);
+	/* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
+	buffer_append(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
+	buffer_put_int(&b, enc->enabled);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, enc->block_size);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len);
+	packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+
+	/* Mac structure */
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len);
+
+	/* Comp structure */
+	buffer_put_int(&b, comp->type);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, comp->enabled);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, comp->name);
+
+	len = buffer_len(&b);
+	buf = xmalloc(len);
+	memcpy(buf, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+	memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	if (blobp != NULL)
+		*blobp = buf;
+	return len;
+}
+
+void
+mm_send_kex(Buffer *m, Kex *kex)
+{
+	buffer_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
+	buffer_put_int(m, kex->we_need);
+	buffer_put_int(m, kex->hostkey_type);
+	buffer_put_int(m, kex->kex_type);
+	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
+	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer));
+	buffer_put_int(m, kex->flags);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string);
+}
+
+void
+mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob, *p;
+	u_int bloblen, plen;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+
+	if (!compat20) {
+		u_char iv[24];
+		int ivlen;
+
+		buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_protocol_flags());
+
+		buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_ssh1_cipher());
+
+		debug3("%s: Sending ssh1 IV", __FUNCTION__);
+		ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
+		packet_get_keyiv(MODE_OUT, iv, ivlen);
+		buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
+		ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
+		packet_get_keyiv(MODE_IN, iv, ivlen);
+		buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
+		goto skip;
+	} else {
+		/* Kex for rekeying */
+		mm_send_kex(&m, *monitor->m_pkex); 
+	}
+
+	debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p",
+	    __FUNCTION__, newkeys[MODE_OUT], newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+
+	/* Keys from Kex */
+	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
+		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
+		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_seqnr(MODE_OUT));
+	buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_seqnr(MODE_IN));
+
+	debug3("%s: New keys have been sent", __FUNCTION__);
+ skip:
+	/* More key context */
+	plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, NULL);
+	p = xmalloc(plen+1);
+	packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, p);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
+	xfree(p);
+
+	plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, NULL);
+	p = xmalloc(plen+1);
+	packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, p);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* Compression state */
+	debug3("%s: Sending compression state", __FUNCTION__);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, &outgoing_stream, sizeof(outgoing_stream));
+	buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream));
+
+	/* Network I/O buffers */
+	buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&input), buffer_len(&input));
+	buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&output), buffer_len(&output));
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+	debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *p;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __FUNCTION__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m);
+
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	if (success == 0) {
+		debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __FUNCTION__);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
+	xfree(p);
+
+	*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(monitor->m_recvfd);
+	*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(monitor->m_recvfd);
+
+	/* Success */
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+mm_session_pty_cleanup2(void *session)
+{
+	Session *s = session;
+	Buffer m;
+
+	if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+		return;
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	
+	/* closed dup'ed master */
+	if (close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
+		error("close(s->ptymaster): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* unlink pty from session */
+	s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+/* Request process termination */
+
+void
+mm_terminate(void)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
+{
+	int rsafail;
+	Buffer m;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m);
+
+	rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (rsafail);
+}
+
+void
+mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
+    char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	*name       = xstrdup("");
+	*infotxt    = xstrdup("");
+	*numprompts = 1;
+	*prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*));
+	*echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
+	(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int res;
+	char *challenge;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
+	    &m);
+	res = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	if (res == -1) {
+		debug3("%s: no challenge", __FUNCTION__);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
+	challenge  = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
+	(*prompts)[0] = challenge;
+
+	debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __FUNCTION__, challenge);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int authok;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __FUNCTION__);
+	if (numresponses != 1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
+
+	authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int len, res;
+	char *p, *challenge;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
+	    &m);
+	res = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	if (res == -1) {
+		debug3("%s: no challenge", __FUNCTION__);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
+	challenge  = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __FUNCTION__, challenge);
+
+	mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
+
+	len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(SKEY_PROMPT) + 1;
+	p = xmalloc(len);
+	strlcpy(p, challenge, len);
+	strlcat(p, SKEY_PROMPT, len);
+	(*prompts)[0] = p;
+	xfree(challenge);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int authok;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __FUNCTION__);
+	if (numresponses != 1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
+
+	authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+void
+mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16])
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int i;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	Key *key;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+	allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	if (allowed && rkey != NULL) {
+		blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen);
+		if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __FUNCTION__);
+		*rkey = key;
+		xfree(blob);
+	}
+	mm_send_debug(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (allowed);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *
+mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	key->type = KEY_RSA;    /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
+	if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+		fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __FUNCTION__);
+	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
+
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (challenge);
+}
+
+int
+mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	key->type = KEY_RSA;    /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
+	if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+		fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __FUNCTION__);
+	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m);
+
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (success);
+}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.h b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..24b224bd8fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
+#define _MM_WRAP_H_
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+extern int use_privsep;
+#define PRIVSEP(x)	(use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
+
+enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY};
+
+struct monitor;
+struct mm_master;
+struct passwd;
+struct Authctxt;
+DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
+int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
+BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+
+void mm_terminate(void);
+int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);
+void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(void *);
+
+/* SSHv1 interfaces */
+void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *);
+int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+
+/* Key export functions */
+struct Newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
+int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *);
+void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *);
+void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*);
+
+/* bsdauth */
+int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+/* skey */
+int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+/* zlib allocation hooks */
+
+void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
+void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *, void *);
+void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);
+
+/* Utility functions */
+
+void pwfree(struct passwd *);
+#endif /* _MM_H_ */