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-rw-r--r--bin/systrace/intercept.c33
-rw-r--r--bin/systrace/intercept.h4
-rw-r--r--bin/systrace/openbsd-syscalls.c15
-rw-r--r--sys/dev/systrace.c79
-rw-r--r--sys/dev/systrace.h33
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/exec_script.c15
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/kern_exec.c40
7 files changed, 171 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/bin/systrace/intercept.c b/bin/systrace/intercept.c
index 0423deb6d68..2f9db0716ea 100644
--- a/bin/systrace/intercept.c
+++ b/bin/systrace/intercept.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: intercept.c,v 1.46 2004/03/30 15:43:20 sturm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: intercept.c,v 1.47 2004/06/23 05:16:35 marius Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -829,17 +829,10 @@ intercept_syscall_result(int fd, pid_t pid, u_int16_t seqnr, int policynr,
icpid = intercept_getpid(pid);
if (!strcmp("execve", name)) {
-
- /* Commit the name of the new image */
- if (icpid->name)
- free(icpid->name);
- icpid->name = icpid->newname;
+ intercept_newimage(fd, pid, policynr,
+ emulation, icpid->newname, icpid);
+ free(icpid->newname);
icpid->newname = NULL;
-
- if (intercept_newimagecb != NULL)
- (*intercept_newimagecb)(fd, pid, policynr, emulation,
- icpid->name, intercept_newimagecbarg);
-
}
out:
@@ -847,6 +840,24 @@ intercept_syscall_result(int fd, pid_t pid, u_int16_t seqnr, int policynr,
intercept.answer(fd, pid, seqnr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
}
+void
+intercept_newimage(int fd, pid_t pid, int policynr,
+ const char *emulation, char *newname, struct intercept_pid *icpid)
+{
+ if (icpid == NULL)
+ icpid = intercept_getpid(pid);
+
+ if (icpid->name)
+ free(icpid->name);
+ if ((icpid->name = strdup(newname)) == NULL)
+ err(1, "%s:%d: strdup", __func__, __LINE__);
+
+ if (intercept_newimagecb != NULL)
+ (*intercept_newimagecb)(fd, pid, policynr, emulation,
+ icpid->name, intercept_newimagecbarg);
+}
+
+
int
intercept_newpolicy(int fd)
{
diff --git a/bin/systrace/intercept.h b/bin/systrace/intercept.h
index a1ccf6919b1..9bb9da7ecdd 100644
--- a/bin/systrace/intercept.h
+++ b/bin/systrace/intercept.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: intercept.h,v 1.19 2003/10/08 16:32:44 sturm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: intercept.h,v 1.20 2004/06/23 05:16:35 marius Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -196,6 +196,8 @@ void intercept_syscall_result(int, pid_t, u_int16_t, int, const char *, int,
const char *, void *, int, int, void *);
void intercept_ugid(struct intercept_pid *, uid_t, gid_t);
void intercept_setpid(struct intercept_pid *, uid_t, gid_t);
+void intercept_newimage(int, pid_t, int,
+ const char *, char *, struct intercept_pid *);
int intercept_isvalidsystemcall(char *, char *);
diff --git a/bin/systrace/openbsd-syscalls.c b/bin/systrace/openbsd-syscalls.c
index 6e275c2a245..d806b0784ce 100644
--- a/bin/systrace/openbsd-syscalls.c
+++ b/bin/systrace/openbsd-syscalls.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: openbsd-syscalls.c,v 1.23 2003/10/22 21:03:35 sturm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: openbsd-syscalls.c,v 1.24 2004/06/23 05:16:35 marius Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -621,6 +621,19 @@ obsd_read(int fd)
intercept_child_info(msg.msg_pid,
msg.msg_data.msg_child.new_pid);
break;
+#ifdef SYSTR_MSG_EXECVE
+ case SYSTR_MSG_EXECVE: {
+ struct str_msg_execve *msg_execve = &msg.msg_data.msg_execve;
+
+ intercept_newimage(fd, pid, msg.msg_policy, current->name,
+ msg_execve->path, NULL);
+
+ if (obsd_answer(fd, pid, seqnr, 0, 0, 0, NULL) == -1)
+ err(1, "%s:%d: answer", __func__, __LINE__);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
#ifdef SYSTR_MSG_POLICYFREE
case SYSTR_MSG_POLICYFREE:
intercept_policy_free(msg.msg_policy);
diff --git a/sys/dev/systrace.c b/sys/dev/systrace.c
index 6faadffc21b..0d19bf5bb23 100644
--- a/sys/dev/systrace.c
+++ b/sys/dev/systrace.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: systrace.c,v 1.34 2003/10/21 05:24:40 jmc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: systrace.c,v 1.35 2004/06/23 05:16:35 marius Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ struct str_process {
uid_t saveuid;
gid_t setegid;
gid_t savegid;
-
+
struct str_message msg;
};
@@ -703,8 +703,9 @@ systrace_redirect(int code, struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
*/
if (fst->issuser) {
maycontrol = 1;
- issuser =1 ;
- } else if (!(p->p_flag & P_SUGID)) {
+ issuser = 1;
+ } else if (!ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) &&
+ !ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC)) {
maycontrol = fst->p_ruid == p->p_cred->p_ruid &&
fst->p_rgid == p->p_cred->p_rgid;
}
@@ -816,7 +817,7 @@ systrace_redirect(int code, struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
systrace_replacefree(strp);
- if (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) {
+ if (ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) || ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC)) {
if ((fst = strp->parent) == NULL || !fst->issuser) {
systrace_unlock();
return (error);
@@ -948,7 +949,6 @@ systrace_answer(struct str_process *strp, struct systrace_answer *ans)
SET(strp->flags, STR_PROC_SETEGID);
strp->setegid = ans->stra_setegid;
}
-
/* Clearing the flag indicates to the process that it woke up */
CLR(strp->flags, STR_PROC_WAITANSWER);
@@ -1162,14 +1162,15 @@ systrace_attach(struct fsystrace *fst, pid_t pid)
* gave us setuid/setgid privs (unless
* you're root), or...
*
- * [Note: once P_SUGID gets set in execve(), it stays
- * set until the process does another execve(). Hence
+ * [Note: once P_SUGID or P_SUGIDEXEC gets set in execve(),
+ * it stays set until the process does another execve(). Hence
* this prevents a setuid process which revokes its
* special privileges using setuid() from being
* traced. This is good security.]
*/
if ((proc->p_cred->p_ruid != p->p_cred->p_ruid ||
- ISSET(proc->p_flag, P_SUGID)) &&
+ ISSET(proc->p_flag, P_SUGID) ||
+ ISSET(proc->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC)) &&
(error = suser(p, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
@@ -1190,6 +1191,40 @@ systrace_attach(struct fsystrace *fst, pid_t pid)
return (error);
}
+void
+systrace_execve(char *path, struct proc *p)
+{
+ struct str_process *strp;
+ struct fsystrace *fst;
+ struct str_msg_execve *msg_execve;
+
+ do {
+ systrace_lock();
+ strp = p->p_systrace;
+ if (strp == NULL) {
+ systrace_unlock();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ msg_execve = &strp->msg.msg_data.msg_execve;
+ fst = strp->parent;
+ lockmgr(&fst->lock, LK_EXCLUSIVE, NULL, p);
+ systrace_unlock();
+
+ /*
+ * susers will get the execve call anyway. Also, if
+ * we're not allowed to control the process, escape.
+ */
+ if (fst->issuser ||
+ fst->p_ruid != p->p_cred->p_ruid ||
+ fst->p_rgid != p->p_cred->p_rgid) {
+ lockmgr(&fst->lock, LK_RELEASE, NULL, p);
+ return;
+ }
+ strlcpy(msg_execve->path, path, MAXPATHLEN);
+ } while (systrace_make_msg(strp, SYSTR_MSG_EXECVE) != 0);
+}
+
/* Prepare to replace arguments */
int
@@ -1295,7 +1330,6 @@ systrace_replace(struct str_process *strp, size_t argsize, register_t args[])
int
systrace_fname(struct str_process *strp, caddr_t kdata, size_t len)
{
-
if (strp->nfname >= SYSTR_MAXFNAME || len < 2)
return EINVAL;
@@ -1326,6 +1360,7 @@ systrace_namei(struct nameidata *ndp)
struct fsystrace *fst;
struct componentname *cnp = &ndp->ni_cnd;
size_t i;
+ int hamper = 0;
systrace_lock();
strp = cnp->cn_proc->p_systrace;
@@ -1334,18 +1369,22 @@ systrace_namei(struct nameidata *ndp)
lockmgr(&fst->lock, LK_EXCLUSIVE, NULL, curproc);
systrace_unlock();
- for (i = 0; i < strp->nfname; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < strp->nfname; i++)
if (strcmp(cnp->cn_pnbuf, strp->fname[i]) == 0) {
- /* ELOOP if namei() tries to readlink */
- ndp->ni_loopcnt = MAXSYMLINKS;
- cnp->cn_flags &= ~FOLLOW;
- cnp->cn_flags |= NOFOLLOW;
+ hamper = 1;
break;
}
- }
+
lockmgr(&fst->lock, LK_RELEASE, NULL, curproc);
} else
systrace_unlock();
+
+ if (hamper) {
+ /* ELOOP if namei() tries to readlink */
+ ndp->ni_loopcnt = MAXSYMLINKS;
+ cnp->cn_flags &= ~FOLLOW;
+ cnp->cn_flags |= NOFOLLOW;
+ }
}
struct str_process *
@@ -1554,7 +1593,11 @@ systrace_make_msg(struct str_process *strp, int type)
struct str_message *msg = &strp->msg;
struct fsystrace *fst = strp->parent;
struct proc *p = strp->proc;
- int st;
+ int st, pri;
+
+ pri = PWAIT|PCATCH;
+ if (type == SYSTR_MSG_EXECVE)
+ pri &= ~PCATCH;
msg->msg_seqnr = ++strp->seqnr;
msg->msg_type = type;
@@ -1578,7 +1621,7 @@ systrace_make_msg(struct str_process *strp, int type)
lockmgr(&fst->lock, LK_RELEASE, NULL, p);
while (1) {
- st = tsleep(strp, PWAIT | PCATCH, "systrmsg", 0);
+ st = tsleep(strp, pri, "systrmsg", 0);
if (st != 0)
return (ERESTART);
/* If we detach, then everything is permitted */
diff --git a/sys/dev/systrace.h b/sys/dev/systrace.h
index b7d7de9cff1..e221ec32b13 100644
--- a/sys/dev/systrace.h
+++ b/sys/dev/systrace.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: systrace.h,v 1.15 2003/10/08 16:30:01 sturm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: systrace.h,v 1.16 2004/06/23 05:16:35 marius Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ struct str_msg_ugid {
gid_t gid;
};
+struct str_msg_execve {
+ char path[MAXPATHLEN];
+};
+
#define SYSTR_MAX_POLICIES 64
#define SYSTR_MAXARGS 64
#define SYSTR_MAXFNAME 8
@@ -69,6 +73,7 @@ struct str_msg_child {
#define SYSTR_MSG_CHILD 4
#define SYSTR_MSG_UGID 5
#define SYSTR_MSG_POLICYFREE 6
+#define SYSTR_MSG_EXECVE 7
#define SYSTR_MSG_NOPROCESS(x) \
((x)->msg.msg_type == SYSTR_MSG_CHILD || \
@@ -84,6 +89,7 @@ struct str_message {
struct str_msg_ugid msg_ugid;
struct str_msg_ask msg_ask;
struct str_msg_child msg_child;
+ struct str_msg_execve msg_execve;
} msg_data;
};
@@ -146,17 +152,17 @@ struct systrace_replace {
int32_t strr_flags[SYSTR_MAXARGS];
};
-#define STRIOCCLONE _IOR('s', 100, int)
-#define SYSTR_CLONE STRIOCCLONE
-#define STRIOCATTACH _IOW('s', 101, pid_t)
-#define STRIOCDETACH _IOW('s', 102, pid_t)
-#define STRIOCANSWER _IOW('s', 103, struct systrace_answer)
-#define STRIOCIO _IOWR('s', 104, struct systrace_io)
-#define STRIOCPOLICY _IOWR('s', 105, struct systrace_policy)
-#define STRIOCGETCWD _IOW('s', 106, pid_t)
-#define STRIOCRESCWD _IO('s', 107)
-#define STRIOCREPORT _IOW('s', 108, pid_t)
-#define STRIOCREPLACE _IOW('s', 109, struct systrace_replace)
+#define STRIOCCLONE _IOR('s', 100, int)
+#define SYSTR_CLONE STRIOCCLONE
+#define STRIOCATTACH _IOW('s', 101, pid_t)
+#define STRIOCDETACH _IOW('s', 102, pid_t)
+#define STRIOCANSWER _IOW('s', 103, struct systrace_answer)
+#define STRIOCIO _IOWR('s', 104, struct systrace_io)
+#define STRIOCPOLICY _IOWR('s', 105, struct systrace_policy)
+#define STRIOCGETCWD _IOW('s', 106, pid_t)
+#define STRIOCRESCWD _IO('s', 107)
+#define STRIOCREPORT _IOW('s', 108, pid_t)
+#define STRIOCREPLACE _IOW('s', 109, struct systrace_replace)
#define SYSTR_POLICY_ASK 0
#define SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT 1
@@ -197,9 +203,10 @@ struct fsystrace {
/* Internal prototypes */
void systrace_namei(struct nameidata *);
-int systrace_redirect(int, struct proc *, void *, register_t *);
+int systrace_redirect(int, struct proc *, void *, register_t *);
void systrace_exit(struct proc *);
void systrace_fork(struct proc *, struct proc *);
+void systrace_execve(char *, struct proc *);
#endif /* _KERNEL */
#endif /* _SYSTRACE_H_ */
diff --git a/sys/kern/exec_script.c b/sys/kern/exec_script.c
index 4ad3847350a..e0af44c583d 100644
--- a/sys/kern/exec_script.c
+++ b/sys/kern/exec_script.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: exec_script.c,v 1.19 2004/05/14 04:00:33 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: exec_script.c,v 1.20 2004/06/23 05:16:35 marius Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: exec_script.c,v 1.13 1996/02/04 02:15:06 christos Exp $ */
/*
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@
#include <sys/exec_script.h>
+#include "systrace.h"
+
+#if NSYSTRACE > 0
+#include <dev/systrace.h>
+#endif
+
#if defined(SETUIDSCRIPTS) && !defined(FDSCRIPTS)
#define FDSCRIPTS /* Need this for safe set-id scripts. */
#endif
@@ -214,8 +220,13 @@ check_shell:
if ((epp->ep_flags & EXEC_HASFD) == 0) {
#endif
/* normally can't fail, but check for it if diagnostic */
- error = copyinstr(epp->ep_name, *tmpsap++, MAXPATHLEN,
+#if NSYSTRACE > 0
+ error = copystr(epp->ep_name, *tmpsap++, MAXPATHLEN,
(size_t *)0);
+#else
+ error = copyinstr(epp->ep_name, *tmpsap++, MAXPATHLEN,
+ (size_t *)0);
+#endif
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
if (error != 0)
panic("exec_script: copyinstr couldn't fail");
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_exec.c b/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
index 0075f15bf0f..c7fb1aad5d3 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.86 2004/06/11 12:57:36 mickey Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.87 2004/06/23 05:16:35 marius Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.75 1996/02/09 18:59:28 christos Exp $ */
/*-
@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@
#include <dev/rndvar.h>
+#include "systrace.h"
+
+#if NSYSTRACE > 0
+#include <dev/systrace.h>
+#endif
+
/*
* Map the shared signal code.
*/
@@ -255,6 +261,12 @@ sys_execve(p, v, retval)
struct vmspace *vm = p->p_vmspace;
char **tmpfap;
extern struct emul emul_native;
+#if NSYSTRACE > 0
+ int wassugid =
+ ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) || ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC);
+ char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ size_t pathbuflen;
+#endif
/*
* Cheap solution to complicated problems.
@@ -262,13 +274,25 @@ sys_execve(p, v, retval)
*/
p->p_flag |= P_INEXEC;
+#if NSYSTRACE > 0
+ error = copyinstr(SCARG(uap, path), pathbuf, MAXPATHLEN, &pathbuflen);
+ if (error != 0)
+ goto clrflag;
+
+ NDINIT(&nid, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE, pathbuf, p);
+#else
/* init the namei data to point the file user's program name */
NDINIT(&nid, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), p);
+#endif
/*
* initialize the fields of the exec package.
*/
+#if NSYSTRACE > 0
+ pack.ep_name = pathbuf;
+#else
pack.ep_name = (char *)SCARG(uap, path);
+#endif
pack.ep_hdr = malloc(exec_maxhdrsz, M_EXEC, M_WAITOK);
pack.ep_hdrlen = exec_maxhdrsz;
pack.ep_hdrvalid = 0;
@@ -622,7 +646,16 @@ sys_execve(p, v, retval)
if (KTRPOINT(p, KTR_EMUL))
ktremul(p, p->p_emul->e_name);
#endif
+
p->p_flag &= ~P_INEXEC;
+
+#if NSYSTRACE > 0
+ if (ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SYSTRACE) &&
+ wassugid && !ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) &&
+ !ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC))
+ systrace_execve(pathbuf, p);
+#endif
+
return (0);
bad:
@@ -642,8 +675,11 @@ bad:
pool_put(&namei_pool, nid.ni_cnd.cn_pnbuf);
uvm_km_free_wakeup(exec_map, (vaddr_t) argp, NCARGS);
-freehdr:
+ freehdr:
free(pack.ep_hdr, M_EXEC);
+#if NSYSTRACE > 0
+ clrflag:
+#endif
p->p_flag &= ~P_INEXEC;
return (error);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-25 22:01:46 +0000