diff options
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/s3_lib.c | 157 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/t1_lib.c | 135 |
3 files changed, 152 insertions, 145 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/s3_lib.c b/lib/libssl/s3_lib.c index d8b923afd4a..246aa6f23df 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/lib/libssl/s3_lib.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: s3_lib.c,v 1.80 2014/09/07 12:16:23 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: s3_lib.c,v 1.81 2014/09/30 15:40:09 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -149,11 +149,12 @@ */ #include <stdio.h> + +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> + #include "ssl_locl.h" -#include "../crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h" -#include <openssl/md5.h> -#include <openssl/dh.h> #define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(ssl3_ciphers) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)) @@ -2394,14 +2395,11 @@ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr) { - SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow; - int i, ii, ok; - unsigned int j; - int ec_ok, ec_nid; - unsigned char ec_search1 = 0, ec_search2 = 0; - CERT *cert; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow; + SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL; + int i, ii, ok; + CERT *cert; /* Let's see which ciphers we can support */ cert = s->cert; @@ -2439,141 +2437,18 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a); - if ( - /* - * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our - * certificate - */ - (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH) - /* and we have an ECC certificate */ - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL) - /* - * and the client specified a Supported Point Formats - * extension - */ - && ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && - (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)) - /* and our certificate's point is compressed */ - && ( - (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info != NULL) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key != NULL) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key != NULL) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data != NULL) - && ( - (*(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) - || (*(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED + 1) - ) - ) - ) { - ec_ok = 0; - /* - * If our certificate's curve is over a field type - * that the client does not support then do not allow - * this cipher suite to be negotiated - */ - if ( - (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group != NULL) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth != NULL) - && (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) - ) { - for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; j++) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime) { - ec_ok = 1; - break; - } - } - } else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { - for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; j++) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2) { - ec_ok = 1; - break; - } - } - } - ok = ok && ec_ok; - } - if ( /* * If we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our - * certificate + * certificate check it. */ - (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH) - /* and we have an ECC certificate */ - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL) - /* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */ - && ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)) - ) { - ec_ok = 0; - if ( - (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group != NULL) - ) { - ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group); - if ((ec_nid == 0) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth != NULL) - ) { - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { - ec_search1 = 0xFF; - ec_search2 = 0x01; - } else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { - ec_search1 = 0xFF; - ec_search2 = 0x02; - } - } else { - ec_search1 = 0x00; - ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid); - } - if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0)) { - for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; j++) { - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j] == ec_search1) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j + 1] == ec_search2)) { - ec_ok = 1; - break; - } - } - } - } - ok = ok && ec_ok; - } - if ( + if (alg_a & (SSL_aECDSA|SSL_aECDH)) + ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_server_key(s); /* - * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an - * ephemeral EC key + * If we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses + * an ephemeral EC key check it. */ - (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) - /* and we have an ephemeral EC key */ - && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL) - /* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */ - && ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)) - ) { - ec_ok = 0; - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group != NULL) { - ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group); - if ((ec_nid == 0) - && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth != NULL) - ) { - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { - ec_search1 = 0xFF; - ec_search2 = 0x01; - } else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { - ec_search1 = 0xFF; - ec_search2 = 0x02; - } - } else { - ec_search1 = 0x00; - ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid); - } - if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0)) { - for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; j++) { - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j] == ec_search1) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j + 1] == ec_search2)) { - ec_ok = 1; - break; - } - } - } - } - ok = ok && ec_ok; - } + if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) + ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s); if (!ok) continue; diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h b/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h index 3eee18cbd60..8ec4c69d5be 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssl_locl.h,v 1.69 2014/09/27 11:01:06 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssl_locl.h,v 1.70 2014/09/30 15:40:09 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -839,6 +839,9 @@ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s); int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize); int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); +int tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s); +int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s); + int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, diff --git a/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c index 20f576e796e..d40768560cb 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.58 2014/09/27 11:01:06 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.59 2014/09/30 15:40:09 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -110,11 +110,13 @@ */ #include <stdio.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> + #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/hmac.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> #include <openssl/ocsp.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> + #include "ssl_locl.h" static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, @@ -406,6 +408,134 @@ tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) return (0); } +/* For an EC key set TLS ID and required compression based on parameters. */ +static int +tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) +{ + const EC_GROUP *grp; + const EC_METHOD *meth; + int is_prime = 0; + int nid, id; + + if (ec == NULL) + return (0); + + if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* Determine if it is a prime field. */ + if ((grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)) == NULL) + return (0); + if ((meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp)) == NULL) + return (0); + if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) + is_prime = 1; + + /* Determine curve ID. */ + nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); + id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); + + /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve. */ + if (id != 0) { + curve_id[0] = 0; + curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; + } else { + curve_id[0] = 0xff; + curve_id[1] = is_prime ? 0x01 : 0x02; + } + + /* Specify the compression identifier. */ + if (comp_id != NULL) { + if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { + *comp_id = is_prime ? + TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime : + TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; + } else { + *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; + } + } + return (1); +} + +/* Check that an EC key is compatible with extensions. */ +static int +tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) +{ + const unsigned char *p; + size_t plen, i; + + /* + * Check point formats extension if present, otherwise everything + * is supported (see RFC4492). + */ + if (comp_id != NULL && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { + p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; + plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; + for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++) { + if (*comp_id == *p) + break; + } + if (i == plen) + return (0); + } + + /* + * Check curve list if present, otherwise everything is supported. + */ + if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) { + p = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; + plen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; + for (i = 0; i < plen; i += 2, p += 2) { + if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1]) + break; + } + if (i == plen) + return (0); + } + + return (1); +} + +/* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions. */ +int +tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s) +{ + CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC; + unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + int rv; + + if (cpk->x509 == NULL || cpk->privatekey == NULL) + return (0); + if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509)) == NULL) + return (0); + rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (rv != 1) + return (0); + + return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id); +} + +/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions. */ +int +tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s) +{ + EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; + unsigned char curve_id[2]; + + if (ec == NULL) { + if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) + return (1); + else + return (0); + } + if (tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec) != 1) + return (0); + + return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); +} + /* * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. @@ -2132,4 +2262,3 @@ tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); return 1; } - |