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-rw-r--r--libexec/login_skey/login_skey.817
-rw-r--r--libexec/login_skey/login_skey.c251
2 files changed, 150 insertions, 118 deletions
diff --git a/libexec/login_skey/login_skey.8 b/libexec/login_skey/login_skey.8
index 99bad3c980d..accd013690c 100644
--- a/libexec/login_skey/login_skey.8
+++ b/libexec/login_skey/login_skey.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: login_skey.8,v 1.7 2003/06/17 21:56:24 millert Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: login_skey.8,v 1.8 2004/08/05 13:37:06 millert Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2000, 2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
.\"
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
.\" Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
.\" Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
.\"
-.Dd July 14, 2002
+.Dd July 26, 2004
.Dt LOGIN_SKEY 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm login_skey
.Op Fl s Ar service
+.Op Fl v Ar fd=number
.Ar user
.Op Ar class
.Sh DESCRIPTION
@@ -53,12 +54,20 @@ The default protocol is
.Em login .
.Pp
The
+.Ar fd
+argument is used to specify the number of an open, locked file descriptor
+that references the user's S/Key entry.
+This is used to prevent simultaneous S/Key authorization attempts from
+using the same challenge.
+.Pp
+The
.Ar user
argument is the login name of the user to be authenticated.
.Pp
-The
+The optional
.Ar class
-argument is not used.
+argument is accepted for consistency with the other login scripts but
+is not used.
.Pp
.Nm
will look up
diff --git a/libexec/login_skey/login_skey.c b/libexec/login_skey/login_skey.c
index fe7f33cea75..cf878cacb2d 100644
--- a/libexec/login_skey/login_skey.c
+++ b/libexec/login_skey/login_skey.c
@@ -1,40 +1,23 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: login_skey.c,v 1.12 2004/03/10 21:30:27 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: login_skey.c,v 1.13 2004/08/05 13:37:06 millert Exp $ */
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Berkeley Software Design, Inc. All rights reserved.
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * This product includes software developed by Berkeley Software Design,
- * Inc.
- * 4. The name of Berkeley Software Design, Inc. may not be used to endorse
- * or promote products derived from this software without specific prior
- * written permission.
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY BERKELEY SOFTWARE DESIGN, INC. ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL BERKELEY SOFTWARE DESIGN, INC. BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * BSDI $From: login_skey.c,v 1.3 1996/09/04 05:24:56 prb Exp $
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-#include <sys/types.h>
+
#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
@@ -54,10 +37,14 @@
#include <login_cap.h>
#include <bsd_auth.h>
-#include <sha1.h>
#include <skey.h>
+#define MODE_LOGIN 0
+#define MODE_CHALLENGE 1
+#define MODE_RESPONSE 2
+
void quit(int);
+void send_fd(int);
void suspend(int);
volatile sig_atomic_t resumed;
@@ -67,14 +54,10 @@ int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
FILE *back = NULL;
- char *class = 0;
- char *username = 0;
- char skeyprompt[SKEY_MAX_CHALLENGE+17];
- char passbuf[SKEY_MAX_PW_LEN+1];
- int c, haskey;
- int mode = 0;
-
- skeyprompt[0] = '\0';
+ char *user = NULL, *cp, *ep;
+ char challenge[SKEY_MAX_CHALLENGE+17], response[SKEY_MAX_PW_LEN+1];
+ const char *errstr;
+ int ch, fd = -1, haskey = 0, mode = MODE_LOGIN;
(void)signal(SIGINT, quit);
(void)signal(SIGQUIT, quit);
@@ -84,109 +67,75 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
openlog(NULL, LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTH);
- while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "ds:v:")) != -1)
- switch (c) {
- case 'd': /* to remain undocumented */
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "ds:v:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'd':
back = stdout;
break;
- case 'v':
- break;
case 's': /* service */
if (strcmp(optarg, "login") == 0)
- mode = 0;
+ mode = MODE_LOGIN;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "challenge") == 0)
- mode = 1;
+ mode = MODE_CHALLENGE;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "response") == 0)
- mode = 2;
+ mode = MODE_RESPONSE;
else {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: invalid service", optarg);
exit(1);
}
break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (strncmp(optarg, "fd=", 3) == 0) {
+ fd = strtonum(optarg + 3, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "fd is %s: %s",
+ errstr, optarg + 3);
+ fd = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* silently ignore unsupported variables */
+ break;
default:
syslog(LOG_ERR, "usage error");
exit(1);
}
+ }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
- switch (argc - optind) {
- case 2:
- class = argv[optind + 1];
+ switch (argc) {
+ case 2: /* silently ignore class */
case 1:
- username = argv[optind];
+ user = *argv;
break;
default:
syslog(LOG_ERR, "usage error");
exit(1);
}
-
if (back == NULL && (back = fdopen(3, "r+")) == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "reopening back channel: %m");
exit(1);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Note: our skeychallenge2() will always fill in the challenge,
+ * even if it has to create a fake one.
+ */
+ switch (mode) {
+ case MODE_LOGIN:
+ haskey = (skeychallenge2(fd, &skey, user, challenge) == 0);
+ strlcat(challenge, "\nS/Key Password: ", sizeof(challenge));
- if (mode == 2) {
- mode = 0;
- c = -1;
- /* XXX - redo these loops! */
- while (++c < sizeof(skeyprompt) &&
- read(3, &skeyprompt[c], 1) == 1) {
- if (skeyprompt[c] == '\0') {
- mode++;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (mode == 1) {
- c = -1;
- while (++c < sizeof(passbuf) &&
- read(3, &passbuf[c], 1) == 1) {
- if (passbuf[c] == '\0') {
- mode++;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- if (mode < 2) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "protocol error on back channel");
- exit(1);
- }
- /*
- * Sigh. S/Key really is a stateful protocol.
- * We must assume that a user will only try to
- * authenticate one at a time and that this call to
- * skeychallenge will produce the same results as
- * the call to skeychallenge when mode was 1.
- *
- * Furthermore, RFC2289 requires that an entry be
- * locked against a partial guess race which is
- * simply not possible if the calling program queries
- * the user for the passphrase itself. Oh well.
- */
- haskey = (skeychallenge(&skey, username, skeyprompt) == 0);
- } else {
- /*
- * Attempt an S/Key challenge.
- * The OpenBSD skeychallenge() will always fill in a
- * challenge, even if it has to cons one up.
- */
- haskey = (skeychallenge(&skey, username, skeyprompt) == 0);
- strlcat(skeyprompt, "\nS/Key Password: ", sizeof skeyprompt);
- if (mode == 1) {
- fprintf(back, BI_VALUE " challenge %s\n",
- auth_mkvalue(skeyprompt));
- fprintf(back, BI_CHALLENGE "\n");
- exit(0);
- }
-
- /* Time out getting passphrase after 2 minutes to avoid a DoS */
+ /* time out getting passphrase after 2 minutes to avoid a DoS */
if (haskey)
alarm(120);
resumed = 0;
- if (!readpassphrase(skeyprompt, passbuf, sizeof(passbuf), 0))
+ if (!readpassphrase(challenge, response, sizeof(response), 0))
exit(1);
- if (passbuf[0] == '\0')
+ if (response[0] == '\0')
readpassphrase("S/Key Password [echo on]: ",
- passbuf, sizeof(passbuf), RPP_ECHO_ON);
+ response, sizeof(response), RPP_ECHO_ON);
alarm(0);
if (resumed) {
/*
@@ -195,8 +144,60 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
* an attacker cannot do a partial guess of
* an S/Key response already in progress.
*/
- haskey = (skeylookup(&skey, username) == 0);
+ haskey = (skeylookup(&skey, user) == 0);
}
+ break;
+
+ case MODE_CHALLENGE:
+ haskey = (skeychallenge2(fd, &skey, user, challenge) == 0);
+ strlcat(challenge, "\nS/Key Password: ", sizeof(challenge));
+ fprintf(back, BI_VALUE " challenge %s\n",
+ auth_mkvalue(challenge));
+ fprintf(back, BI_CHALLENGE "\n");
+ fprintf(back, BI_FDPASS "\n");
+ fflush(back);
+ send_fd(fileno(back));
+ exit(0);
+
+ case MODE_RESPONSE:
+ /* read challenge */
+ mode = -1;
+ cp = challenge;
+ ep = challenge + sizeof(challenge);
+ while (cp < ep && read(fileno(back), cp, 1) == 1) {
+ if (*cp++ == '\0') {
+ mode = MODE_CHALLENGE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (mode != MODE_CHALLENGE) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR,
+ "protocol error: bad/missing challenge");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* read response */
+ cp = response;
+ ep = response + sizeof(response);
+ while (cp < ep && read(fileno(back), cp, 1) == 1) {
+ if (*cp++ == '\0') {
+ mode = MODE_RESPONSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (mode != MODE_RESPONSE) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR,
+ "protocol error: bad/missing response");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since the entry is locked we do not need to compare
+ * the passed in challenge to the S/Key database but
+ * maybe we should anyway?
+ */
+ haskey = (skeychallenge2(fd, &skey, user, challenge) == 0);
+ break;
}
/*
@@ -206,8 +207,8 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
- if (haskey && skeyverify(&skey, passbuf) == 0) {
- if (mode == 0) {
+ if (haskey && skeyverify(&skey, response) == 0) {
+ if (mode == MODE_LOGIN) {
if (skey.n <= 1)
printf("Warning! You MUST change your "
"S/Key password now!\n");
@@ -254,3 +255,25 @@ suspend(int signo)
resumed = 1;
errno = save_errno;
}
+
+void
+send_fd(int fd)
+{
+ struct msghdr msg;
+ struct cmsghdr *cmp;
+ char cmsgbuf[CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int))];
+
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ msg.msg_control = cmsgbuf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf);
+
+ cmp = (struct cmsghdr *)cmsgbuf;
+ cmp->cmsg_len = sizeof(cmsgbuf);
+ cmp->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+ cmp->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+
+ *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsgbuf) = fileno(skey.keyfile);
+
+ if (sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0) < 0)
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "sendmsg: %m");
+}