diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 252 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 103 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version | 2 |
4 files changed, 324 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version b/lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version index ba5a3fee584..c87e1c60d46 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version +++ b/lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ major=2 -minor=2 +minor=4 diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c index f835be8afc9..b7d2460754e 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c @@ -1,13 +1,3 @@ - -/* This file has been explicitly broken by ryker for OpenBSD, July - * 1, 1998. In spite of the title, there is no implementation of the - * RSA algorithm left in this file. All these routines will return an - * error and fail when called. They exist as stubs and can be - * ressurected from the bit bucket by someone in the free world once - * the RSA algorithm is no longer subject to patent problems. Eric - * Young's original copyright is below. - */ - /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. @@ -184,13 +174,62 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - BN_init(&f); - BN_init(&ret); + BN_init(&f); + BN_init(&ret); + + if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; + num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; + + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) + RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) + if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; - /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return - * when the RSA patent expires - */ + if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || + ((rsa->p != NULL) && + (rsa->q != NULL) && + (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && + (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && + (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) + { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } + else + { + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) + if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; + + /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the + * length of the modulus */ + j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); + i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); + for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) + to[k]=0; + r=num; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(&ret); @@ -212,12 +251,77 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - BN_init(&f); - BN_init(&ret); + BN_init(&f); + BN_init(&ret); + ctx=BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) goto err; + + num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + + if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ + if (flen > num) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + /* make data into a big number */ + if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; - /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return - * when the RSA patent expires - */ + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) + RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) + if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; + + /* do the decrypt */ + if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || + ((rsa->p != NULL) && + (rsa->q != NULL) && + (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && + (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && + (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) + { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } + else + { + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) + goto err; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) + if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; + + p=buf; + j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); + break; +#ifndef NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); + break; + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); @@ -240,12 +344,56 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - BN_init(&f); - BN_init(&ret); + BN_init(&f); + BN_init(&ret); + ctx=BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) goto err; + + num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num); + if (buf == NULL) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } - /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return - * when the RSA patent expires - */ + /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ + if (flen > num) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; + /* do the decrypt */ + if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) + { + if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx)) + goto err; + } + + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; + + p=buf; + i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); + break; + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); @@ -263,15 +411,59 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) { BIGNUM r1,m1; int ret=0; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx; + if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_init(&m1); BN_init(&r1); - if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return - * when the RSA patent expires - */ + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) + { + if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) + { + if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p, + ctx)) + goto err; + } + if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) + { + if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q, + ctx)) + goto err; + } + } + + if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; + + if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; + + if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err; + /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does + * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ + if (r0->neg) + if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; + + if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; + if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of + * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still + * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following + * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. + * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because + * they ensure p > q [steve] + */ + if (r0->neg) + if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; + if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err; + + ret=1; err: BN_clear_free(&m1); BN_clear_free(&r1); diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index b1ee5d8dce4..95e636d3f02 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c @@ -74,11 +74,108 @@ RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value, if (ctx == NULL) goto err; ctx2=BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (r3 == NULL) goto err; - /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return - * when the RSA patent expires - */ + bitsp=(bits+1)/2; + bitsq=bits-bitsp; + rsa=RSA_new(); + if (rsa == NULL) goto err; + /* set e */ + rsa->e=BN_new(); + if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err; + +#if 1 + /* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG, + * unsigned long can be larger */ + for (i=0; i<sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++) + { + if (e_value & (1<<i)) + BN_set_bit(rsa->e,i); + } +#else + if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err; +#endif + + /* generate p and q */ + for (;;) + { + rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg); + if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err; + if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; + if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; + if (BN_is_one(r1)) break; + if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg); + BN_free(rsa->p); + } + if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg); + for (;;) + { + rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg); + if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err; + if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; + if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; + if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0)) + break; + if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg); + BN_free(rsa->q); + } + if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg); + if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0) + { + tmp=rsa->p; + rsa->p=rsa->q; + rsa->q=tmp; + } + + /* calculate n */ + rsa->n=BN_new(); + if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err; + if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + + /* calculate d */ + if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */ + if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */ + if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ + +/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */ +/* for (;;) + { + if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; + if (BN_is_one(r3)) break; + + if (1) + { + if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err; + continue; + } + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + goto err; + } +*/ + rsa->d=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->e,r0,ctx2); /* d */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err; + + /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ + rsa->dmp1=BN_new(); + if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err; + if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err; + + /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ + rsa->dmq1=BN_new(); + if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err; + if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err; + + /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ + rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2); + if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err; + + ok=1; err: if (ok == -1) { diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version b/lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version index ba5a3fee584..c87e1c60d46 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version +++ b/lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ major=2 -minor=2 +minor=4 |