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-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version2
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c252
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c103
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version2
4 files changed, 324 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version b/lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version
index ba5a3fee584..c87e1c60d46 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version
+++ b/lib/libssl/crypto/shlib_version
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
major=2
-minor=2
+minor=4
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index f835be8afc9..b7d2460754e 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -1,13 +1,3 @@
-
-/* This file has been explicitly broken by ryker for OpenBSD, July
- * 1, 1998. In spite of the title, there is no implementation of the
- * RSA algorithm left in this file. All these routines will return an
- * error and fail when called. They exist as stubs and can be
- * ressurected from the bit bucket by someone in the free world once
- * the RSA algorithm is no longer subject to patent problems. Eric
- * Young's original copyright is below.
- */
-
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
@@ -184,13 +174,62 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
+ BN_init(&f);
+ BN_init(&ret);
+
+ if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+ RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
- /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
- * when the RSA patent expires
- */
+ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
+ * length of the modulus */
+ j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
+ to[k]=0;
+ r=num;
err:
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(&ret);
@@ -212,12 +251,77 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
+ BN_init(&f);
+ BN_init(&ret);
+ ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+ num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+ if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+ if (flen > num)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* make data into a big number */
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
- /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
- * when the RSA patent expires
- */
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+ RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* do the decrypt */
+ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ p=buf;
+ j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
+ break;
+#ifndef NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
@@ -240,12 +344,56 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
+ BN_init(&f);
+ BN_init(&ret);
+ ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+ num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
- * when the RSA patent expires
- */
+ /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+ if (flen > num)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ /* do the decrypt */
+ if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+ {
+ if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+
+ p=buf;
+ i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
@@ -263,15 +411,59 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
{
BIGNUM r1,m1;
int ret=0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_init(&m1);
BN_init(&r1);
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
- * when the RSA patent expires
- */
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
+ {
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p,
+ ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q,
+ ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
+ /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+ * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
+ if (r0->neg)
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+ * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+ * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+ * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+ * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+ * they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
+ if (r0->neg)
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+
+ ret=1;
err:
BN_clear_free(&m1);
BN_clear_free(&r1);
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index b1ee5d8dce4..95e636d3f02 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -74,11 +74,108 @@ RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
ctx2=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
- /* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
- * when the RSA patent expires
- */
+ bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
+ bitsq=bits-bitsp;
+ rsa=RSA_new();
+ if (rsa == NULL) goto err;
+ /* set e */
+ rsa->e=BN_new();
+ if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err;
+
+#if 1
+ /* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG,
+ * unsigned long can be larger */
+ for (i=0; i<sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++)
+ {
+ if (e_value & (1<<i))
+ BN_set_bit(rsa->e,i);
+ }
+#else
+ if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err;
+#endif
+
+ /* generate p and q */
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
+ if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
+ if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
+ if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
+ BN_free(rsa->p);
+ }
+ if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
+ if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
+ if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0))
+ break;
+ if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
+ BN_free(rsa->q);
+ }
+ if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg);
+ if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
+ {
+ tmp=rsa->p;
+ rsa->p=rsa->q;
+ rsa->q=tmp;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate n */
+ rsa->n=BN_new();
+ if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* calculate d */
+ if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
+ if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+
+/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */
+/* for (;;)
+ {
+ if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(r3)) break;
+
+ if (1)
+ {
+ if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err;
+ continue;
+ }
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+*/
+ rsa->d=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->e,r0,ctx2); /* d */
+ if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err;
+
+ /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
+ rsa->dmp1=BN_new();
+ if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+ rsa->dmq1=BN_new();
+ if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+ rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2);
+ if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err;
+
+ ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version b/lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version
index ba5a3fee584..c87e1c60d46 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version
+++ b/lib/libssl/ssl/shlib_version
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
major=2
-minor=2
+minor=4
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-30 23:34:38 +0000