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-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c103
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index abd5c65e31b..3d4121ed2af 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.52 2016/11/06 10:37:38 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.53 2017/01/03 05:34:48 beck Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -775,32 +775,87 @@ check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return 1;
}
-static int
-check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
- return 1;
-#else
- int i, ok;
- X509 *x;
- int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+ size_t i;
- cb = ctx->verify_cb;
- /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
- return 1;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+ if (certs == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Look for exact match */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+ X509_up_ref(xtmp);
else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- return ok;
-#endif
+ xtmp = NULL;
+
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ return xtmp;
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ int ok;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+
+ cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+ /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
+ for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+
+ /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ /*
+ * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
+ * overridden.
+ */
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
+ * return success.
+ */
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+ X509 *mx;
+ if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+ mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+ if (mx) {
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+ X509_free(x);
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
+ * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int