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-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h6
-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c255
-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c6
3 files changed, 262 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h
index 86e5f8e20f7..638bad7cc66 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.46 2019/11/01 03:45:13 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.47 2019/11/01 15:13:05 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -627,8 +627,10 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH 143
#define RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER 137
#define RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS 145
+#define RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL 160
#define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 131
#define RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD 156
+#define RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS 161
#define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING 138
#define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE 141
#define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS 149
@@ -662,6 +664,8 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST 151
#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 118
#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST 152
+#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE 162
+#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE 163
#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM 153
#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER 154
#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE 155
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index d23848d0d5b..a7e042ef2c8 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa_ameth.c,v 1.21 2019/11/01 03:45:13 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa_ameth.c,v 1.22 2019/11/01 15:13:05 jsing Exp $ */
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 2006.
*/
@@ -62,13 +62,22 @@
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "evp_locl.h"
#include "rsa_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
+static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+#endif
+
static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg);
/* Set any parameters associated with pkey */
@@ -490,6 +499,29 @@ rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
if (arg1 == 0)
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ return rsa_cms_sign(arg2);
+ else if (arg1 == 1)
+ return rsa_cms_verify(arg2);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
+ if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
+ return -2;
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ return rsa_cms_encrypt(arg2);
+ else if (arg1 == 1)
+ return rsa_cms_decrypt(arg2);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
+ if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
+ return -2;
+ *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+ return 1;
+#endif
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
if (pkey->pkey.rsa->pss != NULL) {
@@ -735,11 +767,38 @@ rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
return 1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static int
+rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+ int nid, nid2;
+ X509_ALGOR *alg;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
+
+ CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm);
+ if (nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkctx, alg, NULL);
+ /* Only PSS allowed for PSS keys */
+ if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(pkctx)) {
+ RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
+ return 1;
+ /* Workaround for some implementation that use a signature OID */
+ if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, NULL, &nid2)) {
+ if (nid2 == NID_rsaEncryption)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature
* is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS.
*/
-
static int
rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
@@ -756,6 +815,35 @@ rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
return -1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static int
+rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+{
+ int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ X509_ALGOR *alg;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
+ ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
+
+ CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ if (pkctx) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* We don't support it */
+ if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
+ return 0;
+ os = rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
+ if (!os)
+ return 0;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
static int
rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
@@ -789,6 +877,167 @@ rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
return 2;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *
+rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+ RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep;
+
+ oaep = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(&RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_it, alg->parameter);
+ if (oaep == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (oaep->maskGenFunc != NULL) {
+ oaep->maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(oaep->maskGenFunc);
+ if (oaep->maskHash == NULL) {
+ RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return oaep;
+}
+
+static int
+rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
+ X509_ALGOR *cmsalg;
+ int nid;
+ int rv = -1;
+ unsigned char *label = NULL;
+ int labellen = 0;
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
+ RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep;
+
+ pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+ if (pkctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &cmsalg))
+ return -1;
+ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cmsalg->algorithm);
+ if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
+ return 1;
+ if (nid != NID_rsaesOaep) {
+ RSAerror(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Decode OAEP parameters */
+ oaep = rsa_oaep_decode(cmsalg);
+
+ if (oaep == NULL) {
+ RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ mgf1md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->maskHash);
+ if (mgf1md == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->hashFunc);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (oaep->pSourceFunc != NULL) {
+ X509_ALGOR *plab = oaep->pSourceFunc;
+
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(plab->algorithm) != NID_pSpecified) {
+ RSAerror(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (plab->parameter->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+ RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ label = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data;
+
+ /* Stop label being freed when OAEP parameters are freed */
+ /* XXX - this leaks label on error... */
+ plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data = NULL;
+ labellen = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->length;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, label, labellen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+ RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static int
+rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md, *mgf1md;
+ RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR *alg;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+ int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, rv = 0, labellen;
+ unsigned char *label;
+
+ if (CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &alg) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (pkctx) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Not supported */
+ if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
+ return 0;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, &md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ labellen = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, &label);
+ if (labellen < 0)
+ goto err;
+ oaep = RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_new();
+ if (oaep == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&oaep->hashFunc, md))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&oaep->maskGenFunc, mgf1md))
+ goto err;
+ if (labellen > 0) {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *los;
+ oaep->pSourceFunc = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (oaep->pSourceFunc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ los = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (los == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(los, label, labellen)) {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(los);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(oaep->pSourceFunc, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pSpecified),
+ V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, los);
+ }
+ /* create string with pss parameter encoding. */
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(oaep, &RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_it, &os))
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaesOaep), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
+ os = NULL;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(os);
+ return rv;
+}
+#endif
+
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] = {
{
.pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA,
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index 9924dac581e..46149370d8b 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa_err.c,v 1.19 2019/11/01 03:45:13 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa_err.c,v 1.20 2019/11/01 15:13:05 jsing Exp $ */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -101,9 +101,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST) , "invalid digest"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH) , "invalid digest length"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER) , "invalid header"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL) , "invalid label"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS) , "invalid keybits"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH), "invalid message length"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD) , "invalid mgf1 md"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS), "invalid oaep parameters"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING) , "invalid padding"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE) , "invalid padding mode"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS), "invalid pss parameters"},
@@ -137,6 +139,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST) , "unknown mask digest"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE) , "unknown padding type"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST) , "unknown pss digest"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE), "unsupported encryption type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE), "unsupported label source"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM), "unsupported mask algorithm"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER), "unsupported mask parameter"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE), "unsupported signature type"},
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-30 12:11:33 +0000