diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/dev/rnd.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/dev/rnd.c | 131 |
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 80 deletions
diff --git a/sys/dev/rnd.c b/sys/dev/rnd.c index cf4912c9cfb..4d7e24577ba 100644 --- a/sys/dev/rnd.c +++ b/sys/dev/rnd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rnd.c,v 1.13 1997/01/01 16:16:13 mickey Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rnd.c,v 1.14 1997/01/05 11:08:58 niklas Exp $ */ /* * random.c -- A strong random number generator @@ -129,24 +129,19 @@ * * void add_mouse_randomness(u_int32_t mouse_data); * void add_net_randomness(int isr); - * void add_tty_randomness(dev_t dev, int c); - * void add_blkdev_randomness(int irq); - * - * add_keyboard_randomness() uses the inter-keypress timing, as well as the - * scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool". + * void add_tty_randomness(int c); + * void add_disk_randomness(u_int32_t n); * * add_mouse_randomness() uses the mouse interrupt timing, as well as * the reported position of the mouse from the hardware. * - * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the inter-interrupt timing as random - * inputs to the entropy pool. Note that not all interrupts are good - * sources of randomness! For example, the timer interrupts is not a - * good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is to - * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker. Disk interrupts are - * a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more - * unpredictable. + * add_net_randomness() times the finishing time of net input. + * + * add_tty_randomness() uses the inter-keypress timing, as well as the + * character as random inputs into the "entropy pool". * - * add_blkdev_randomness() times the finishing time of block requests. + * add_disk_randomness() times the finishing time of disk requests as well + * as feeding both xfer size & time into the entropy pool. * * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the @@ -236,6 +231,7 @@ #include <sys/kernel.h> #include <sys/conf.h> #include <sys/device.h> +#include <sys/disk.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/malloc.h> #include <sys/proc.h> @@ -311,7 +307,7 @@ struct arc4_stream { /* tags for different random sources */ #define ENT_NET 0x100 -#define ENT_BLKDEV 0x200 +#define ENT_DISK 0x200 #define ENT_TTY 0x300 static struct random_bucket random_state; @@ -319,21 +315,22 @@ struct arc4_stream arc4random_state; static u_int32_t random_pool[POOLWORDS]; static struct timer_rand_state mouse_timer_state; static struct timer_rand_state extract_timer_state; -static struct timer_rand_state net_timer_state[32]; /* XXX */ -static struct timer_rand_state *blkdev_timer_state; -static struct timer_rand_state *tty_timer_state; -static int rnd_sleep = 0; +static struct timer_rand_state disk_timer_state; +static struct timer_rand_state net_timer_state; +static struct timer_rand_state tty_timer_state; +static int rnd_sleep = 0; #ifndef MIN #define MIN(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #endif -static inline void add_entropy_word - __P((struct random_bucket *r, const u_int32_t input)); -static void add_timer_randomness __P((struct random_bucket *r, - struct timer_rand_state *state, u_int num)); -static inline int extract_entropy - __P((struct random_bucket *r, char *buf, int nbytes)); +static __inline void add_entropy_word __P((struct random_bucket *, + const u_int32_t)); +void add_timer_randomness __P((struct random_bucket *, + struct timer_rand_state *, u_int)); +static __inline int extract_entropy __P((struct random_bucket *, char *, int)); +void arc4_init __P((struct arc4_stream *, u_char *, int)); +static __inline u_char arc4_getbyte __P((struct arc4_stream *)); /* Arcfour random stream generator. This code is derived from section * 17.1 of Applied Cryptography, second edition, which describes a @@ -353,7 +350,7 @@ static inline int extract_entropy * RC4 is a registered trademark of RSA Laboratories. */ -static void +void arc4_init (struct arc4_stream *as, u_char *data, int len) { int n; @@ -369,7 +366,7 @@ arc4_init (struct arc4_stream *as, u_char *data, int len) } } -static inline u_char +static __inline u_char arc4_getbyte (struct arc4_stream *as) { u_char si, sj; @@ -401,12 +398,6 @@ randomattach(void) random_state.add_ptr = 0; random_state.entropy_count = 0; random_state.pool = random_pool; - blkdev_timer_state = malloc(nblkdev*sizeof(*blkdev_timer_state), - M_DEVBUF, M_WAITOK); - bzero(blkdev_timer_state, nblkdev*sizeof(*blkdev_timer_state)); - tty_timer_state = malloc(nchrdev*sizeof(*tty_timer_state), - M_DEVBUF, M_WAITOK); - bzero(tty_timer_state, nchrdev*sizeof(*tty_timer_state)); extract_timer_state.dont_count_entropy = 1; for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) @@ -449,7 +440,7 @@ randomclose(dev, flag, mode, p) * scancodes, for example), the upper bits of the entropy pool don't * get affected. --- TYT, 10/11/95 */ -static inline void +static __inline void add_entropy_word(r, input) struct random_bucket *r; const u_int32_t input; @@ -492,7 +483,7 @@ add_entropy_word(r, input) * are used for a high-resolution timer. * */ -static void +void add_timer_randomness(r, state, num) struct random_bucket *r; struct timer_rand_state *state; @@ -501,15 +492,12 @@ add_timer_randomness(r, state, num) int delta, delta2; u_int nbits; u_long time; + struct timeval tv; - { - struct timeval tv; - microtime(&tv); - - time = tv.tv_usec ^ tv.tv_sec; - } + microtime(&tv); + time = tv.tv_usec ^ tv.tv_sec; - add_entropy_word(r, (u_int32_t) num); + add_entropy_word(r, (u_int32_t)num); add_entropy_word(r, time); /* @@ -559,55 +547,38 @@ void add_net_randomness(isr) int isr; { - if (isr >= sizeof(net_timer_state)/sizeof(*net_timer_state)) - return; - - add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &net_timer_state[isr], - ENT_NET + isr); + add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &net_timer_state, ENT_NET + isr); } void -add_blkdev_randomness(dev) - dev_t dev; +add_disk_randomness(n) + u_int32_t n; { - /* - * Happens before randomattach() has been run and then later - * when NODEV buffers get fed to biodone(). XXX Howcome? - * XXX don't count on mfs (major==255) - */ - if (dev == NODEV || major(dev) == 255 || blkdev_timer_state == NULL) - return; + u_int8_t c; -#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC - if (major(dev) >= nblkdev) - panic("add_blkdev_randomness(dev = 0x%x): bad device", dev); -#endif + /* Has randomattach run yet? */ + if (random_state.pool == NULL) + return; - add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &blkdev_timer_state[major(dev)], - ENT_BLKDEV + major(dev)); + c = n & 0xff; + n >>= 8; + c ^= n & 0xff; + n >>= 8; + c ^= n & 0xff; + n >>= 8; + c ^= n & 0xff; + add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &disk_timer_state, ENT_DISK + c); } void -add_tty_randomness(dev, c) - dev_t dev; +add_tty_randomness(c) int c; { - /* - * XXX does this routine ever get called before randomattach? - * Well, this is a safety belt against that condition. Should - * we check for NODEV too, like in the block device case? - */ - if (tty_timer_state == NULL) + /* Has randomattach run yet? */ + if (random_state.pool == NULL) return; -#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC - if (major(dev) >= nchrdev) - panic("add_tty_randomness(dev = 0x%x, c = %d): bad device", - dev, c); -#endif - - add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &tty_timer_state[major(dev)], - ENT_TTY + c); + add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &tty_timer_state, ENT_TTY + c); } #if POOLWORDS % 16 @@ -619,7 +590,7 @@ add_tty_randomness(dev, c) * bits of entropy are left in the pool, but it does not restrict the * number of bytes that are actually obtained. */ -static inline int +static __inline int extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes) struct random_bucket *r; char *buf; @@ -793,7 +764,7 @@ randomselect(dev, rw, p) return 0; } -static inline void +static __inline void arc4_stir (struct arc4_stream *as) { int rsec = random_state.entropy_count >> 3; |