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Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin/sudo/auth/dce.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/sudo/auth/dce.c | 214 |
1 files changed, 214 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/sudo/auth/dce.c b/usr.bin/sudo/auth/dce.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..012467b4836 --- /dev/null +++ b/usr.bin/sudo/auth/dce.c @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com> + * All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed by Jeff Earickson + * of Colby College, Waterville, ME <jaearick@colby.edu> + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor + * may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written + * permission from the author. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * The code below basically comes from the examples supplied on + * the OSF DCE 1.0.3 manpages for the sec_login routines, with + * enough additional polishing to make the routine work with the + * rest of sudo. + * + * This code is known to work on HP 700 and 800 series systems + * running HP-UX 9.X and 10.X, with either HP's version 1.2.1 of DCE. + * (aka, OSF DCE 1.0.3) or with HP's version 1.4 of DCE (aka, OSF + * DCE 1.1). + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#ifdef STDC_HEADERS +#include <stdlib.h> +#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */ +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include <unistd.h> +#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H +#include <string.h> +#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H +#include <strings.h> +#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */ +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <pwd.h> + +#include <dce/rpc.h> +#include <dce/sec_login.h> +#include <dce/dce_error.h> /* required to call dce_error_inq_text routine */ + +#include "sudo.h" +#include "sudo_auth.h" + +#ifndef lint +static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: dce.c,v 1.7 1999/08/31 09:39:17 millert Exp $"; +#endif /* lint */ + +static int check_dce_status __P((error_status_t, char *)); + +int +dce_verify(pw, plain_pw, auth) + struct passwd *pw; + char *plain_pw; + sudo_auth *auth; +{ + struct passwd temp_pw; + sec_passwd_rec_t password_rec; + sec_login_handle_t login_context; + boolean32 reset_passwd; + sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src; + error_status_t status; + + /* + * Create the local context of the DCE principal necessary + * to perform authenticated network operations. The network + * identity set up by this operation cannot be used until it + * is validated via sec_login_validate_identity(). + */ + if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned_char_p_t) pw->pw_name, + sec_login_no_flags, &login_context, &status)) { + + if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_setup_identity(1):")) + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + + password_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain; + password_rec.key.tagged_union.plain = (idl_char *) plain_pw; + password_rec.pepper = NULL; + password_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none; + + /* Validate the login context with the password */ + if (sec_login_validate_identity(login_context, &password_rec, + &reset_passwd, &auth_src, &status)) { + + if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_validate_identity(1):")) + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + + /* + * Certify that the DCE Security Server used to set + * up and validate a login context is legitimate. Makes + * sure that we didn't get spoofed by another DCE server. + */ + if (!sec_login_certify_identity(login_context, &status)) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, "Whoa! Bogus authentication server!\n"); + (void) check_dce_status(status,"sec_login_certify_identity(1):"); + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + } + if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_certify_identity(2):")) + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + + /* + * Sets the network credentials to those specified + * by the now validated login context. + */ + sec_login_set_context(login_context, &status); + if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_set_context:")) + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + + /* + * Oops, your credentials were no good. Possibly + * caused by clock times out of adjustment between + * DCE client and DCE security server... + */ + if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "You have no network credentials.\n"); + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + } + /* Check if the password has aged and is thus no good */ + if (reset_passwd) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "Your DCE password needs resetting.\n"); + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + } + + /* + * We should be a valid user by this point. Pull the + * user's password structure from the DCE security + * server just to make sure. If we get it with no + * problems, then we really are legitimate... + */ + sec_login_get_pwent(login_context, (sec_login_passwd_t) &temp_pw, + &status); + if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_get_pwent:")) + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + + /* + * If we get to here, then the pwent above properly fetched + * the password structure from the DCE registry, so the user + * must be valid. We don't really care what the user's + * registry password is, just that the user could be + * validated. In fact, if we tried to compare the local + * password to the DCE entry at this point, the operation + * would fail if the hidden password feature is turned on, + * because the password field would contain an asterisk. + * Also go ahead and destroy the user's DCE login context + * before we leave here (and don't bother checking the + * status), in order to clean up credentials files in + * /opt/dcelocal/var/security/creds. By doing this, we are + * assuming that the user will not need DCE authentication + * later in the program, only local authentication. If this + * is not true, then the login_context will have to be + * returned to the calling program, and the context purged + * somewhere later in the program. + */ + sec_login_purge_context(&login_context, &status); + return(AUTH_SUCCESS); + } else { + if(check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_validate_identity(2):")) + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + sec_login_purge_context(&login_context, &status); + if(check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_purge_context:")) + return(AUTH_FAILURE); + } + } + (void) check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_setup_identity(2):"); + return(AUTH_FAILURE); +} + +/* Returns 0 for DCE "ok" status, 1 otherwise */ +static int +check_dce_status(input_status, comment) + error_status_t input_status; + char *comment; +{ + int error_stat; + unsigned char error_string[dce_c_error_string_len]; + + if (input_status == rpc_s_ok) + return(0); + dce_error_inq_text(input_status, error_string, &error_stat); + (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s %s\n", comment, error_string); + return(1); +} |