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manual page strictly. Return -2 if the strings are not strict numbers.
The numbers remain in the range of "int". Range checking for these parameters
is done later in the pkey_*_ctl() functions, or sometimes in functions much
further downstream... but not always!!!
ok millert miod mikeb
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OpenSSL 1.0.0.
ok miod@ (a little while back)
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Just kidding!
unifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS since we will never want to actually do that.
ok deraadt@
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ok beck
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(From Jonas Maebe)
OK from beck@
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collateral damage.
The syncronous nature of this mechanism has hampered performance for
symmetric crypto relative to brute-force cpu. The assymetric crypto
support never really materialized in drivers.
So abandon the complexity.
ok tedu beck mikeb
some disagrement from djm but if he wants to test /dev/crypto ciphers
he should do it without this this gigantic API in the way
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to avoid a possible NULL function call on ctx.final(). None of the callers
currently check the return value of calls to cert_verify_mac(), however
the function already returns 0 in another case and the MAC comparison will
later fail.
Issue reported by David Ramos.
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protect from future field reordering/removal.
No difference in generated assembly.
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using EVP_AEAD. Also provide an EVP_AEAD-only equivalent of
ssl_cipher_get_evp().
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magic numbers around.
ok deraadt@
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do some other clean up while here.
ok deraadt@
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check, so do not duplicate it here. Make the error handling consistent
by always using 'goto err' rather than returning in certain cases. Also
add a missing BIO_free(ssl) in BIO_new_ssl_connect().
ok deraadt@
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discussed with tedu, ok jsing
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switching cipher states using an EVP_CIPHER. This will facilitate the
addition of cipher state changes for EVP_AEAD. No functional change.
Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
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c30718b5e7480add42598158
Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random
perfectly, so do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and
replaced with "only do it badly if a flag is set". New flags
(SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME)
were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old scheme of "use time_t
for first 4 bytes of the random buffer".
Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen]
Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing
support & definition of them. The buflen < 4 check is also interesting,
because no entropy would be returned. No callers passed such small
buffers.
ok miod sthen
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Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
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While this is not strictly correct (since the presence of SSL3_CC_READ does
not guarantee the absence of SSL3_CC_WRITE), in practice only one of these
flags is set at a time and there is existing logic which already relies on
this behaviour.
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this is the only place where these variables are used.
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code. Additionally, these need to be cleaned in the export case.
Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
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Rather than doing a complex dance to figure out if we should reuse the
cipher context and clean it later on, just free it and allocate a new one.
This simplifies the code path, especially in the write case where special
handling is required for DTLS.
Also, calling EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() for a newly created cipher context is
unnecessary, since EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() already does this (not to mention
that it was already missing from the write case).
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and others to the regress framework. These remaining ones just
muddle us up when re-reading code repeatedly.
ok jsing
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ok miod
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before calling it.
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so do not bother checking before calling.
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implicit NULL checks, so there is no point ensuring that the pointer is
non-NULL before calling them.
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hackathon, just saying 'ass ember' was enough to start giggles.
Unfortunately far more offensive stuff remains in here...
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DTLS fragments. A stream of 'Hello Request' messages will result in
infinite recursion, eventually crashing the DTLS client or server.
Fixes CVE-2014-0221, from OpenSSL.
Reported to OpenSSL by Imre Rad.
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Fixes CVE-2014-3470, from OpenSSL.
ok deraadt@
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DTLS fragments.
Fix for CVE-2014-0195, from OpenSSL.
Reported to OpenSSL by Juri Aedla.
ok deraadt@ beck@
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is unchecked, which would result in a later null pointer dereference.
While here, RSA_free, DH_free and EC_KEY_free all have implicit NULL
checks, so avoid repeating them here.
ok beck@
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secret. This is an additional safeguard against early ChangeCipherSpec
handling.
From OpenSSL.
ok deraadt@
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Without this an early ChangeCipherSpec message would result in session
keys being generated, along with the Finished hash for the handshake,
using an empty master secret.
For a detailed analysis see:
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/05/earlyccs.html
This is a fix for CVE-2014-0224, from OpenSSL.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by KIKUCHI Masashi. Unfortunately the
recent OpenSSL commit was the first we were made aware of the issue.
ok deraadt@ sthen@
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free()ing it, rather than in conditional code.
Also do not bother setting server_opaque_prf_input (server, not client) to
NULL in conditional code 10 lines after explicitely free()ing it and setting
it to NULL (were the developers afraid of zombie pointers?)
ok guenther@
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