Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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date code was based on). It is now possible to specify 4 digit years.
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ok miod@
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they do this by sending to stdout. commands like: 'ftp -o - ftp://blah/foo>foo'
do not like having data added to the output stream.
since we only define these two functions in an environment where /dev/tty
exists, send output to /dev/tty to make sure it does not corrupt the output
stream of commands.
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with privilege elevation no suid or sgid binaries are necessary any
longer. Applications can be executed completely
unprivileged. Systrace raises the privileges for a single system call
depending on the configured policy.
Idea from discussions with Perry Metzger, Dug Song and Marcus Watts.
from provos
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from provos
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afrom provos
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costa@ ok.
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dhartmei@, henning@ ok
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with a non-zero euid, it will now exec "su -L -l". The only things
that need to do this are shells with a "login" builtin and the emulation
that su(1) now does is good enough for this purpose.
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repeatedly until the user authenticates or interrupts things.
This will be used to make login(1) no longer setuid.
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ok millert
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We should probably add support for specifying the century too...
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clears (frees) the corresponding value in the auth session.
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is the same as the private value) then just return 0 as there is
nothing to do.
This fixes a potentially nasty problem where the caller could grab
the username or style from the auth session via auth_getitem() and
then call auth_verify() with those values. auth_setitem() would
eventually get called which would make a private copy and free the
old values in the auth session. After all this, the stashed username
and/or style pointers would point to freed memory.
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the old values in the auth session will get freed and the new values
added.
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Fixes a portability warning from perl-5.8.0; espie@ OK
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grendel@zeitbombe.org
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between OpenBSD and FreeBSD ELF support.
Initially written by asmodai@freebsd.org.
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FreeBSD commit messages say:
Some BIOSs are using MTRR values that are only documented under NDA
to control the mapping of things like the ACPI and APM into memory.
The problem is that starting X changes these values, so if something
was using the bits of BIOS mapped into memory (say ACPI or APM),
then next time they access this memory the machine would hang.
This patch refuse to change MTRR values it doesn't understand,
unless a new "force" option is given. This means X doesn't change
them by accident but someone can override that if they really want
to.
PR: 28418
Tested by: Christopher Masto <chris at netmonger dot net>,
David Bushong <david at bushong dot net>,
Santos <casd at myrealbox dot com>
Make the MTRR code a bit more defensive - this should help people
trying to run X on some Athlon systems where the BIOS does odd things
(mines an ASUS A7A266, but it seems to also help on other systems).
Here's a description of the problem and my fix:
The problem with the old MTRR code is that it only expects
to find documented values in the bytes of MTRR registers.
To convert the MTRR byte into a FreeBSD "Memory Range Type"
(mrt) it uses the byte value and looks it up in an array.
If the value is not in range then the mrt value ends up
containing random junk.
This isn't an immediate problem. The mrt value is only used
later when rewriting the MTRR registers. When we finally
go to write a value back again, the function i686_mtrrtype()
searches for the junk value and returns -1 when it fails
to find it. This is converted to a byte (0xff) and written
back to the register, causing a GPF as 0xff is an illegal
value for a MTRR byte.
To work around this problem I've added a new mrt flag
MDF_UNKNOWN. We set this when we read a MTRR byte which
we do not understand. If we try to convert a MDF_UNKNOWN
back into a MTRR value, then the new function, i686_mrt2mtrr,
just returns the old value of the MTRR byte. This leaves
the memory range type unchanged.
I have seen one side effect of the fix, which is that ACPI calls
after X has been run seem to hang my machine. As running X would
previously panic the machine, this is still an improvement ;-)
PR: 28418, 25958
Tested by: jkh, Christopher Masto <chris at netmonger dot net>
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pointed by miod@
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It disabled in pciide.c
deraadt@ ok.
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<miod> well, my comments are "looks sane, works for me, ok to commit"
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gcc has the nice feature of optimizing various common constructs into
more optimal ones, inlining various calls, etc. The problem with that
is that it assumes that we have a proper libc backing us. We really
don't want to loose all those features by defining -ffreestanding and
right now there is no way to just disable some of them, so we have to
make the kernel more libc-like in some aspects to make it work with
newer gcc.
rename putchar to kputchar because it was nothing like libc putchar (and
only internal to this function). Implement dummy putchar and puts (not
prototyped outside this file).
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give us pages. PR_NOWAIT most likely means "hey, we're coming from an
interrupt, don't mess with stuff that doesn't have proper protection".
- pool_allocator_free is called in too many places so I don't feel
comfortable without that added protection from splvm (and besides,
pool_allocator_free is rarely called anyway, so the extra spl will be
unnoticeable). It shouldn't matter when fiddling with those flags, but
you never know.
- Remove a wakeup without a matching tsleep. It's a left-over from
some other code path that I've been investigating when reworking the
pool a while ago and it should have been removed before that commit.
deraadt@ ok
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