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The i2d API design is: call a function first with a pointer to NULL, get
the length, allocate a buffer, call the function passing the buffer in.
Both calls should be checked since ther are still internal allocations.
At the heart of ASN.1 encoding, this idiom is used and the second call
is assumed to succeed after the length was determined. This is far from
guaranteed. Check that the second call returns the same length and error
otherwise.
ok jsing
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If the BIO_write() in the ASN1_STATE_DATA_COPY state fails, incorrect
error handling will break out of the switch without changing the state,
and the infinite for loop will immediately try the same write again,
which is unlikely to succeed... Clearly this code intended to break out
of the loop instead.
Via OpenSSL 1.1 commit 723f616df81ea05f31407f7417f49eea89bb459a
ok millert
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If an ASN.1 BIT STRING a of length > 0 contains only zero bytes in a->data,
this old code would end up reading from a->data[-1]. This may or may not
crash. Luckily, anton observed two openssl-ruby regress test failures in
the last few days, which could eventually be traced back to this (after a
lot of painful digging due to coredumps not working properly).
ok jsing
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32-bit platforms; NFCI
ok tb@
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This is an obvious omission from the OpenSSL 1.1 and OpenSSL 3 API which
does not provide a way to access the tbs sigalg of a CRL. This is needed
in security/pivy.
From Alex Wilson
ok jsing
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i removed the arithmetics -> arithmetic changes, as i felt they
were not clearly correct
ok tb
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ok jsing
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Libcrypto currently has a mess of *_lcl.h, *_locl.h, and *_local.h names
used for internal headers. Move all these headers we inherited from
OpenSSL to *_local.h, reserving the name *_internal.h for our own code.
Similarly, move dtls_locl.h and ssl_locl.h to dtls_local and ssl_local.h.
constant_time_locl.h is moved to constant_time.h since it's special.
Adjust all .c files in libcrypto, libssl and regress.
The diff is mechanical with the exception of tls13_quic.c, where
#include <ssl_locl.h> was fixed manually.
discussed with jsing,
no objection bcook
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This rename was done before commit, but one instance was missed since it
was hidden behind #ifdef SMALL_TIME_T.
Spotted by Android CI.
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This is needed to print the 32-byte Ed25519 keys which aren't handled
as BNs.
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ok beck@ tb@
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This will be needed to deal with Curve25519 based keys.
ok beck@ tb@
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This is needed to print byte array based keys, such as Ed25519 and X25519.
ok beck@ tb@
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Rather than messing around with an OBJ_bsearch() for a table that contains
16 entries (and a stack find for any application added methods), simply do
a reverse linear scan. This maintains the application method first
behaviour, while removing a chunk of code.
While here rename some variables and do some style clean up.
ok tb@
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If the length of the bitstring is INT_MAX, adding 1 to it is undefined
behavior, so error out before doing so.
Based on BoringSSL eeb3333f by davidben
ok beck joshua
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OpenSSL dealt with time conversion using a classical julian
day scheme. BoringSSL got rid of it and uses only a julian
style calculation for seconds since the POSIX time epoch.
This changes libressl to use the seconds calculation exculusively
instead of a mix of the julian day based conversions and the
system time conversions to and from time_t to tm.
ok tb@ jsing@
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In r1.25 of tasn_enc.c a check was added to ensure that asn1_ex_i2c()
returned the same value on both calls, however in the ndef case the len
variable gets changed between calls. Keep a copy of the original value to
test against.
Issue reported by niklas, who encountered a test failure in rust-openssl.
ok miod@ tb@
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This removes c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(), {c2i,i2c}_ASN1_BIT_STRING() and
{c2i,i2c}_ASN1_INTEGER(). These are not part of the OpenSSL 1.1
API and should never have been exposed in the first place.
ok jsing
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Rename some variables and consistently goto error.
ok tb@
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Rather than recycling an existing ASN1_STRING and changing its type, free
it and allocate a replacement. This simplifies the code and potentially
avoids bugs resulting from reuse.
ok tb@
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Per X.690, some ASN.1 types must be primitive encoded, some must be
constructed and some may be either. Add this data to our types table
and check the encoding against this information when decoding.
ok tb@
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This avoids asn1_c2i_primitive() from needing knowledge about the internals
of ASN1_INTEGER and ASN1_ENUMERATED.
ok tb@
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CBIGNUM_it is supposed to be the "clear bignum" or "secure" bignum - that
is one which zeros its memory after use and ensures that the constant time
flags are set... in LibreSSL we always do both of these things for BIGNUMs,
so just use BIGNUM_it instead.
ok tb@
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CID 356353
ok jsing
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Needed for an upcoming change.
ok tb@
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When an ASN1_INTEGER is created it has NULL data until a value is set -
previously, an ASN1_INTEGER in this state encoded to an ASN.1 INTEGER with
a value of 0, rather than being treated as an error. While code should
really set values, the historical behaviour has not required this.
Found the hard way by sthen@ with acme-client.
ok tb@
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This gives us cleaner and safer code, although it is worth noting that we
now generate the encoding even when called with NULL as the output pointer
(and then discard it, returning just the length).
Resolves oss-fuzz #49963.
ok tb@
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In asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(), asn1_ex_i2c() returning -1 is used to indicate
that the object is optional and should be skipped, while -2 is used to
indicate that indefinite length encoding should be used. Any other negative
value was treated as success, resulting in the out pointer being walked
backwards. Avoid this by treating any negative value (aside from -1 and -2)
as a failure, propagating it up the stack.
Additionally, check the return value of the second asn1_ex_i2c() call to
ensure that it matches the value returned by the first call. This makes
sure that the length of the encoded object is correct, plus it detects the
case where a failure occurs during the second call.
Discussed with tb@ (who also flagged the negative value issue).
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X509_NAME_print() is documented to print things at a given indentation
level. Unfortunately, this never worked since someone got some logic
wrong. Part of the wrong logic was removed in a dead code removal in
OpenSSL commit 92ada7cc, but the variable l was left behind, which leads
to compiler warnings on some platforms. End its sad life pointlessly
and incorrectly measuring column width and remove it.
ok jsing
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The current X509_print_ex() tries too hard pretty printing negative
serialNumbers (which shouldn't occur in the first place). In particular,
negating LONG_MAX leads to signed overflow. Ditch the code dealing with
negative serialNumbers representable as long and fall back to the long
form printing. This simplifies the code and fixes
oss-fuzz #49944
with/ok jsing
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Avoid signed integer overflow by casting an int64_t to uint64_t before
negating. Same fix was applied in a_int.c -r1.44, but was forgotten to
be applied to a_enum.c.
ok jsing
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The version field of an X.509 Certificate is an enum
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
Printing the version as l + 1 only really makes sense with 0 <= l <= 2.
Otherwise print a naked l while also indicating that it is an unknown
version.
ok jsing
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The current code simply shoves the unvalidated ASN.1 bytes into a BIGNUM on
the hope that other things will detect issues (such as negative values
being flipped to positive). Instead of doing this, decode and validate the
ASN.1 data using ASN1_INTEGER, then convert it to a BIGNUM. Similarly, for
encoding convert from BIGNUM to ASN1_INTEGER and use ASN1_INTEGER encoding.
ok tb@
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Also tidy up bn_new() while here.
ok tb@
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Avoid undefined behaviour/integer overflow by casting an int64_t to
uint64_t before negating.
Fixes oss-fuzz #49043
ok tb@
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This script is not used at all and files are edited by hand instead.
Thus remove misleading comments incl. the obsolete script/config.
Feedback OK jsing tb
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This is the documented behavior which got lost in the recent rewrite.
Mismatch of documentation and reality pointed out by schwarze
ok jsing
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These are mostly security-level related, but there are also ASN1_TIME
and ASN_INTEGER functions here, as well as some missing accessors.
ok jsing
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Rather than having yet another (broken) ASN.1 INTEGER content builder and
parser, use {c2i,i2c}_ASN1_INTEGER().
ok beck@
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While we're here enforce valid days for months and leap years.
Inspired by same in boringssl.
ok jsing@
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Avoid undefined behaviour by negating the unsigned value, before casting
to int64_t, rather than casting to int64_t then negating.
Fixes oss-fuzz #48499
ok tb@
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the world seems to be using.
Symbols.list changes and exposure to wait for minor bump
ok jsing@ jca@
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This also provides a pkey_security_bits member to the PKEY ASN.1 methods
and a corresponding setter EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits().
ok beck jsing
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Apparently at some point a LONG_it was misaligned - provide and use
long_{get,set}() so that we always memcpy() rather than doing it some times
but not others. While here provide long_clear() rather than abusing and
reusing long_free().
ok tb@
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