Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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For some time now we've validated the hostname provided to the server in
the SNI extension. Per RFC 6066, an IP literal is invalid as a hostname -
the current code rejects IPv6 literals, but allows IPv4 literals through.
Improve this check to explicitly detect both IPv4 and IPv6 literals. Some
software has been historically known to include IP literals in SNI, so
rather than rejecting this outright (and failing with a decode error),
pretend that the SNI extension does not exist (such that we do not break
some older clients).
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok beck@ tb@
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As reported by Jeremy Harris, we inherited a strange behavior from
OpenSSL, in that we ignore the SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_FATAL return from the
ALPN callback. RFC 7301, 3.2 states: 'In the event that the server
supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server
SHALL respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.'
Honor this requirement and succeed only on SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_{OK,NOACK}
which is the current behavior of OpenSSL. The documentation change
is taken from OpenSSL 1.1.1 as well.
As pointed out by jsing, there is more to be fixed here:
- ensure that the same protocol is selected on session resumption
- should the callback be called even if no ALPN extension was sent?
- ensure for TLSv1.2 and earlier that the SNI has already been processed
ok beck jsing
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ok tb@
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Only use the minimum TLS version to when building a signature algorithms
extension for a ClientHello - in all other cases we should be using the
negotiated TLS version.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Rather that doing sigalg list selection at every call site, pass in the
appropriate TLS version and have ssl_sigalgs_build() perform the sigalg
list selection itself. This reduces code duplication, simplifies the
calling code and is the first step towards internalising the sigalg lists.
ok tb@
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Due to hysterical raisins there are three different types of defines for
alerts. SSL3_AD_* are from SSLv3, TLS1_AD_* are from TLSv1.0 onwards and
SSL_AD_* currently map to either an SSL3_AD_* or TLS1_AD_* define.
Currently, all three of these are used in various places - switch to using
just SSL_AD_* values internally, as a first step in cleaning this up.
ok tb@
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The default alert in the tlsext parsing code is a decode_error, so
there's no need for an error path that only sets that alert.
suggested by/ok jsing
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According to RFC 8422, we must send an illegal_parameter alert on
receiving an ECPF extension that doesn't include the uncompressed
format, not a decode_error.
Reported via GitHub issue #675.
ok jsing
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Consistently include local headers in the same location, using the same
grouping/sorting across all files.
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Where a file references to OPENSSL_NO_* conditions, ensure that we
explicitly include <openssl/opensslconf.h> before any references, rather
than relying on another header to pull this in.
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RFC 4.1.2 specifies the ways in which the extensions in the first and
the second ClientHello may differ. It basically says that extensions
not known to a server must not change. This in turn makes it impossible
to introduce new extensions that do change. It makes little sense to
enforce that extensions we don't know and care about aren't modified,
so make the hashing more lenient and restrict it to the extensions we
do care about. Arguably, enforcing no change in an unknown extension
is incompatible with the requirement that it be ignored.
ok bcook jsing
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This moves the finish_md and peer_finish_md from the 'tmp' struct to the
handshake struct, renaming to finished and peer_finished in the process.
This also allows the remaining S3I(s) references to be removed from the
TLSv1.3 client and server.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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There are currently three different handshake structs that are in use -
the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct (as S3I(s)->hs), the SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 struct
(as S3I(s)->hs_tls13 or ctx->hs in the TLSv1.3 code) and the infamous
'tmp' embedded in SSL3_STATE_INTERNAL (as S3I(s)->tmp)).
This is the first step towards cleaning up the handshake structs so that
shared data is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct, with sub-structs for TLSv1.2
and TLSv1.3 specific information. Place SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 inside
SSL_HANDSHAKE and change ctx->hs to refer to the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct
instead of the SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 struct. This allows the TLSv1.3 code
to access the shared handshake data without needing the SSL struct.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Add handshake fields for our minimum TLS version, our maximum TLS version
and the TLS version negotiated during the handshake. Initialise our min/max
versions at the start of the handshake and leave these unchanged. The
negotiated TLS version is set in the client once we receive the ServerHello
and in the server at the point we select the highest shared version.
Provide an ssl_effective_version() function that returns the negotiated TLS
version if known, otherwise our maximum TLS version - this is effectively
what is stored in s->version currently.
Convert most of the internal code to use one of these three version fields,
which greatly simplifies code (especially in the TLS extension handling
code).
ok tb@
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ECC and OCSP can be used with DTLS, so remove bogus checks that currently
prevent it. These are long lasting remnants from the original OpenSSL code.
ok tb@
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Garbage collect the now unused SSL_IS_DTLS macro.
ok tb@
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ok tb@ jsing@
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.data.rel.ro and .rodata respectively.
ok tb@ jsing@
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ok jsing@ tb@
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A client should only send a status_request as part of the CH.
Pointed out by Michael Forney
ok inoguchi jsing
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The current code might cause a client to send a status_request
containing a CertificateStatusRequest with its certificate. This
makes no sense.
Pointed out by Michael Forney
ok inoguchi jsing
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According to RFC 8446, 4.4.2.1, a server may request that a client
present an OCSP response with its certificate by sending an empty
status_request extension as part of the certificate request. The
current code expects a full CertificateStatus structure, which is
only sent if the server sends an OCSP response with its certificate.
This causes interoperability issues with Go's TLS server and with
newer GnuTLS where we would abort the handshake with a decode_error
alert and length mismatch error.
Issue reported and diagnosed by Michael Forney
Problem also found by Mikolaj Kucharski and inoguchi.
ok inoguchi jsing
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Some TLS extensions need to be treated differently depending on the
handshake message they appear in. Over time, various workarounds and
hacks were used to deal with the unavailability of the message type
in these functions, but this is getting fragile and unwieldy. Having
the message type available will enable us to clean this code up and
will allow simple fixes for a number of bugs in our handling of the
status_request extension reported by Michael Forney.
This approach was suggested a while ago by jsing.
ok beck jsing
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Move is_server and msg_type right after the SSL object so that CBS
and CBB and alert come last. This brings these functions more in
line with other internal functions and separates state from data.
requested by jsing
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section 4.1.2 to ensure subsequent ClientHello messages after a
HelloRetryRequest messages must be unchanged from the initial
ClientHello.
ok tb@ jsing@
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ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
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ok jsing
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Correct SNI alerts to differentiate between illegal parameter
and an unknown name.
ok tb@`
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implies that we're dealing with a HRR in the extension handling code.
Explicitly check that we're in this situation by inspecting the flag in
the handshake context. Add missing error checks and send the appropriate
alerts. The hrr flag needs to be unset after parsing the client hello
retry to avoid breaking the server hello handling. All this is far from
ideal, but better than nothing.
The correct fix would likely be to make the message type available
but that would need to be part of a more extensive rearchitecture of
the extension handling.
Discussed at length with jsing
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noticed by dlg@ on www.openbsd.org with curl.
ok dlg@
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messages with oscp staples.
ok jsing@ tb@
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The OCSP response length is currently an integer, which is overloaded with
-1 meaning "unset". Use a size_t for the OCSP response length and infer
unset from the OCSP response being NULL. This makes code more readable,
simpler and less error prone.
ok beck@
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With TLSv1.3 we end up parsing extensions from more than just these two
messages. This can result in variables (like the selected alpn) being
freed when things still need them.
ok tb@
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ok jsing@, tb@, inoguchi@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Previously we would only select an X25519 key share from the client,
ignoring any others. Change this so that we will select the first of the
key shares that matches one of our supported groups.
ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi jsing
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It is currently possible for key_share to be NULL when a TLS client
receives a keyshare extension. However, for this to occur the client has
to be doing TLS 1.2 or earlier, which means that it was invalid for the
server to send the extension. As such, check for NULL and treat it as an
invalid extension.
Found by oss-fuzz (#20741 and #20745).
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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In a hello retry request the server will only send the selected group and
not actually provide a key exchange. In this case we need to store the
server selected group for further processing.
ok tb@
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Even if we're not processing/using the peer public key from the key share,
we still need to unpack it in order to parse the TLS extension correctly.
Resolves issues with TLSv1.3 clients talking to TLSv1.2 server.
ok tb@
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Pull out the key share handling code and provide a clean/self contained
interface. This will make it easier to support groups other than X25519.
ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
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in tls 1.3
Will be used in a follow on commit to enable tls1.3 client certificates
ok jsing@
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messages.
TLSv1.3 messages that include extensions need a length prefixed field with
zero bytes, rather than no data at all.
ok beck@ tb@
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ok beck@
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ok beck jsing
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