Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Among other improvements:
* Use a uniform wording at the top of the DECSRIPTION for obsolete pages.
* Better explain how to use a non-standard configuration file.
* Remove obsolete functions from SEE ALSO.
Triggered by some suggestions from tb@.
Tweaks and OK tb@.
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Split some excessively long lists into useful sub-categories.
Add a new, very short subsection "Obsolete functions" at the end.
OK tb@ jmc@
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ok tb@, jsing@, sthen@
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The RFC does not require X25519 and it also allows clients to send an empty
key share when the want the server to select a group. The current behaviour
results in handshake failures where the client supports TLS 1.3 and sends a
TLS key share extension that does not contain X25519.
Issue reported by Hubert Kario via github.
ok tb@
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name (which means the client sent SNI during the initial handshake).
Issue reported by Renaud Allard.
ok tb@
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functions based on message type (clienthello/serverhello), to which side
is handling the processing.
No intended functional change.
ok beck@
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no need to check for it. Fixes COV-165788, identified with help from Alex
Bumstead.
ok jsing@
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Fixes COV-174858
ok tb@
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it is an encrypted extension. Include it in the server hello for now.
This will have to be revisited once TLSv1.3 gets there. Fixes SRTP
negotiation.
Problem found by two rust-openssl regress failures reported by mikeb.
with & ok beck
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The decrypted session ticket contains key material.
ok tb@
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allocating on stack.
While here also check the return values from EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and
HMAC_Init_ex().
ok tb@
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Rename mlen to hlen since it is a hmac (and this matches hctx and hmac).
Rename ctx to cctx since it is a cipher context and ctx is usually used to
mean SSL_CTX in this code.
ok tb@
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This removes various pointer arithmetic and manual length checks.
ok tb@
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This handles the ret = 2 case and makes the code more readable.
ok tb@
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Convert ssl_get_prev_session(), tls1_process_ticket() and
tls1_decrypt_ticket() to handle the session ID from the client hello
as a CBS. While here also swap the order of arguments for
tls1_decrypt_ticket() so that it is consistent with the other functions.
ok tb@
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There is not much point having a tlsext_tick_md macro that replaces
EVP_sha256() in two places, when the cipher is just hardcoded.
ok tb@
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We only have to find one extension, so do that first then proceed with
processing and decryption. This makes the code more readable and drops
two levels of indent.
ok tb@
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Separate the malloc() check and EVP_DecryptUpdate() - the malloc() failure
is fatal while a EVP_DecryptUpdate() is a decryption failure.
Also ensure that we clear the error stack in all cases where we are
indicating a failure to decrypt or decode the ticket - otherwise
SSL_error() while later return failure when it should not.
ok tb@
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Rather than returning from multiple places and trying to clean up as we go,
move to a single exit point and clean/free in one place. Also invert the
logic that handles NULL sessions - fail early, rather than having an
indented if test for success.
ok tb@
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In the case that X509_NAME_dup() succeeds, but sk_X509_NAME_push()
fails, name is leaked. The entire function is trying to be clever
and therefore hard to follow. Let's do it the stupid but safe way.
ok jsing
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SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3).
From Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl dot org>
via OpenSSL commit a4339ea3 Jan 3 22:38:03 2014 +0000
which is still under a free license.
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From Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx dot be>
via OpenSSL commit 57fd5170 May 13 11:24:11 2018 +0200
which is still under a free license.
While here, polish awkward wording and reduce duplication.
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the spec. To avoid the obvious loop in the RFC's state machine, we added
a CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY state which is a second ClientHello with special
rules. There is, however, no state to react to this second client hello.
This adds a matching SERVER_HELLO_RETRY state to the handshakes table.
This means in particular that the WITH_HRR state cannot be set in
tls13_server_hello_recv(), so remove this now dead check.
ok jsing
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under a free license, omitting functions we don't have and tweaked by me;
the functions were provided by jsing@ in ssl.h rev. 1.166.
While here, also document SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(3) because
it is closely related to companion functions are already documented
and the API is kind of incomplete without it.
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record_type member of the tls13_handshake_action struct.
ok jsing
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If the Server Hello received indicates that the server did not negotiate
TLS 1.3, fallback to the original TLS client implementation.
ok bcook@, tb@
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The original implementation allows for libcrypto to be compiled without a
given algorithm and libssl then detects that ciphers or digests are
unavailable so that it can disable the associated cipher suites.
This is unnecessary since we do not compile out algorithms.
ok beck@, tb@ (a while back)
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These allow for chains to be managed on a per-certificate basis rather than
as a single "extra certificates" list. Note that "chain" in this context
does not actually include the leaf certificate however, unlike
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_{file,mem}().
Thanks to sthen@ for running this through a bulk ports build.
ok beck@ tb@
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checking the curve.
ok jsing@ tb@
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- Be consistent with _len naming.
- Use size_t where possible/appropriate.
- Group the CBB code.
- Use EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE consistently, instead of "magic" values.
- Switch GOST to EVP_DigestSign*, making it similar to sigalgs.
ok tb@ a while back.
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These are no longer used now that we defer signature algorithm selection.
ok beck@
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ok beck@
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Previously the signature algorithm was selected when the TLS extension was
parsed (or the client received a certificate request), however the actual
certificate to be used is not known at this stage. This leads to various
problems, including the selection of a signature algorithm that cannot be
used with the certificate key size (as found by jeremy@ via ruby regress).
Instead, store the signature algorithms list and only select a signature
algorithm when we're ready to do signature generation.
Joint work with beck@.
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This means that any additional CA certificates end up on the per
certificate chain, rather than the single/shared extra_certs.
Also simplify this code and in particular, avoid setting the return value
to indicate success until we've actually succeeded.
ok beck@ tb@
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ok beck@ tb@
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We will now include the certificates in the chain in the certificate list,
or use the existing extra_certs if present. Failing that we fall back to
the automatic chain building if not disabled.
This also simplifies the code significantly.
ok beck@ tb@
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Note that this is not the full chain, as the leaf certificate currently
remains in the x509 member of CERT_PKEY. Unfortunately we've got to
contend with the fact that some OpenSSL *_chain_* APIs exclude the leaf
certificate while others include it...
ok beck@ tb@
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Otherwise matching a specific cipher is performed by matching against
its characteristics, which can result in multiple rather than a single
match.
Found by bluhm@'s regress tests.
ok bluhm@ tb@
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corefiles. Instead call OPENSSL_assert(), which has recently been trained
to do this in a safer (if more awkward to debug) way.
discussed with jsing and beck a while back
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Found by oss-fuzz, fixes issue #13797.
ok beck@ tb@
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* correct the description of "unknown"
(the previous are both from OpenSSL 1.1.1, still under a free license)
* add a comment saying that TLS1_get_version() and TLS1_get_client_version()
are intentionally undocumented (reasons provided by jsing@)
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Document them.
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