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Based on boringssl commit: 1df112448b41c3568477f3fcd3b8fc820ce80066
ok miod@ jsing@
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This causes a libssl major version bump as this affects the layout of some
internal-but-unfortunately-made-visible structs.
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DTLS (whatever that is) instead of for TLS too. ok jsing.
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that use these algorithms (and SEED was removed from libcrypto some time
ago).
ok doug@
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there are backwards compatible names/aliases for EDH.
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drafts are now RFCs. Also add the TLS extension type for ALPN and be
consistent with RFC reference formatting.
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This allows an SSL server to enable DHE ciphers with a single setting,
which results in an DH key being generated based on the server key length.
Partly based on OpenSSL.
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The only use for these is via SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA (which is effectively
a standards violation) and for RSA sign-only, should only be possible if
you are using an export cipher and have an RSA private key that is more
than 512 bits in size (however we no longer support export ciphers).
ok bcook@ miod@
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SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE replays.
Reported by Markus Stenberg <markus.stenberg at iki.fi> - thanks!
ok deraadt@
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Modified version of patch from Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov.
==28360== 98 bytes in 2 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 7 of 7
==28360== at 0x402AC54: realloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so)
==28360== by 0x40E2D2C: ASN1_STRING_set (asn1_lib.c:393)
==28360== by 0x40EC22C: asn1_ex_c2i (tasn_dec.c:959)
==28360== by 0x40EC632: asn1_d2i_ex_primitive (tasn_dec.c:824)
==28360== by 0x40ED2E6: ASN1_item_ex_d2i (tasn_dec.c:230)
==28360== by 0x40ED421: ASN1_item_d2i (tasn_dec.c:133)
==28360== by 0x40F0335: d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING (tasn_typ.c:75)
==28360== by 0x405FD6D: d2i_SSL_SESSION (ssl_asn1.c:367)
==28360== by 0x405DD6E: ssl3_send_newsession_ticket (s3_srvr.c:2743)
==28360== by 0x405EA48: ssl3_accept (s3_srvr.c:665)
==28360== by 0x4067C34: SSL_accept (ssl_lib.c:922)
==28360== by 0x404E97B: ssl23_get_client_hello (s23_srvr.c:573)
ok miod@ beck@
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arc4random provides high quality pseudo-random numbers, hence there is no
need to differentiate between "strong" and "pseudo". Furthermore, the
arc4random_buf() function is guaranteed to succeed, which avoids the need
to check for and handle failure, simplifying the code.
It is worth noting that a number of the replaced RAND_bytes() and
RAND_pseudo_bytes() calls were missing return value checks and these
functions can fail for a number of reasons (at least in OpenSSL -
thankfully they were converted to wrappers around arc4random_buf() some
time ago in LibreSSL).
ok beck@ deraadt@ miod@
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ok deraadt@
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intrinsic functions everywhere, and wrap these functions in an
#ifndef LIBRESSL_INTERNAL to make sure we don't bring their use back.
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SSLv3 has been long known to have weaknesses and the POODLE attack has
once again shown that it is effectively broken/insecure. As such, it is
time to stop enabling a protocol was deprecated almost 15 years ago.
If an application really wants to provide backwards compatibility, at the
cost of security, for now SSL_CTX_clear_option(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) can be
used to re-enable it on a per-application basis.
General agreement from many.
ok miod@
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a compression identifier. In the case of a server using ephemeral EC keys,
the supplied key is unlikely to have a public key where
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh() is called after SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE has been
set. This makes ECDHE ciphers work again for this use case.
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correct name for EECDH). The EDH and EECDH aliases remain for backwards
compatibility.
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libcrypto has not been started yet.
ok schwarze@ miod@
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ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext() and ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(), rather than
the current generic naming.
ok miod@
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hand rolling the same code.
ok miod@
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return the client format list if the client_formats flag is specified.
Use tls1_get_formatlist()/tls1_get_curvelist() in tls1_check_ec_key(),
simplifying the code.
ok miod@
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While there are no additional symbols, there is an additional command that
clients will potentially depend on.
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This allows an SSL server to enable ECDHE ciphers with a single setting,
which results in an EC key being generated using the first preference
shared curve.
Based on OpenSSL with inspiration from boringssl.
ok miod@
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ok tedu@, miod@
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The existing code reaches around into various internals of EC, which it
should not know anything about. Replace this with a set of functions that
that can correctly extract the necessary details and handle the
comparisions.
Based on a commit to OpenSSL, with some inspiration from boringssl.
ok miod@
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ok jsing@ miod@
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read the PEM-encoded certificate chain from memory instead of a file.
This idea is derived from an older implementation in relayd that was
needed to use the function with a privep'ed process in a chroot. Now
it is time to get it into LibreSSL to make the API more privsep-
friendly and to make it available for other programs and the ressl
library.
ok jsing@ miod@
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ok miod@
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Based on OpenSSL.
ok miod@
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for the server hello.
From OpenSSL.
ok miod@
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effectively built two "static" data structures - instead of doing this,
just use static data structures to start with.
From OpenSSL (part of a larger commit).
ok miod@
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ssl3_send_finished(). While this previously checked against a zero return
value (which could occur on failure), we may as well test against the
expected length, since we already know what that is.
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end up with a value of zero, primarily since ssl3_take_mac() fails to check
the return value from the final_finish_mac() call. This would then mean that
an SSL finished message with a zero-byte payload would successfully match
against the calculated finish MAC.
Avoid this by checking the length of peer_finish_md_len and the SSL
finished message payload, against the known length already stored in
the SSL3_ENC_METHOD finish_mac_length field (making use of a previously
unused field).
ok miod@ (a little while back)
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is off by default (instead of being enabled unconditionally).
The TLS padding extension was added as a workaround for a bug in F5 SSL
terminators, however appears to trigger bugs in IronPort SMTP appliances.
Now the SSL client gets to choose which of these devices it wants to
trigger bugs in...
Ported from OpenSSL.
Discussed with many.
ok miod@
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From Ming <gzchenym at 126.com>
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nor do we plan on supporting them.
ok guenther@
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ssl3_cipher_get_value() helper function, which returns the cipher suite
value for the given cipher.
ok miod@
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currently).
From Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov.
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ssl3_get_cipher_by_id().
ok bcook@
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memory and can return NULL.
ok miod@
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ssl3_get_cert_verify().
ok guenther@ jsing@
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ok guenther@ jsing@
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of writing "2". Add a define for the SSL3_CIPHER_VALUE_SIZE (rather than
using a less-readable hardcoded constant everywhere) and replace the
ssl3_put_char_by_bytes(NULL, NULL) calls with it.
ok bcook@ miod@
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up by their ID. For one, this avoids an ugly mess in ssl_sess.c, where the
cipher value is manually written into a buffer, just so the cipher can be
located using ssl3_get_cipher_by_char().
ok bcook@ miod@
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the cipher list. This reduces code size, saves data segment space and
prevents them from being turned back on at runtime by flipping a bit in
memory.
ok guenther@
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