Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
Instead of blindly skipping 14 characters, we can use the return
value of snprintf() to determine how much we should skip.
From Martin Vahlensieck with minor tweaks by me
|
|
This is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct and is what we're currently
negotiating, so there is really nothing more "new" about the cipher
than there is the key block or other parts of the handshake data.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
Move TLSv1.2 specific components over from SSL_HANDSHAKE.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
ok inoguchi
|
|
The CBC code path initializes rrec.padding_length in an indirect fashion
and later makes use of it for copying the MAC. This is confusing some
static analyzers as well as people investigating the whining. Avoid this
confusion and add a bit of robustness by clearing the stack variable up
front.
ok jsing
|
|
There are currently three different handshake structs that are in use -
the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct (as S3I(s)->hs), the SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 struct
(as S3I(s)->hs_tls13 or ctx->hs in the TLSv1.3 code) and the infamous
'tmp' embedded in SSL3_STATE_INTERNAL (as S3I(s)->tmp)).
This is the first step towards cleaning up the handshake structs so that
shared data is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct, with sub-structs for TLSv1.2
and TLSv1.3 specific information. Place SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 inside
SSL_HANDSHAKE and change ctx->hs to refer to the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct
instead of the SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 struct. This allows the TLSv1.3 code
to access the shared handshake data without needing the SSL struct.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
This makes the TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3 record layers more consistent and while
it is not currently necessary from a functionality perspective, it makes
for more readable and simpler code.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
A parent CBB retains a reference to a child CBB until CBB_flush() or
CBB_cleanup() is called. As such, the cert_exts CBB must be at function
scope.
Reported by Ilya Shipitsin.
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is the same as SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() but for an
SSL object instead of an SSL_CTX object. remi found this in a recent
librelp update, so we need to provide it. The function will be exposed
in an upcoming library bump.
ok inoguchi on an earlier version, input/ok jsing
|
|
Found the hard way by lists y42 org via an OCSP validation failure that
in turn caused pkg_add over TLS to fail. Detailed report by sthen.
ok sthen
|
|
getpagesize() will only return positive numbers (there is no negative
page size system) and it can not fail.
Should fix some compiler warnings seen in -portable projects.
OK otto@
|
|
|
|
This means that the DTLS_method() will now use DTLSv1.2 rather than DTLSv1.
Additional DTLSv1.2 related symbols and defines will be made publicly
visible in the near future.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
This teaches the version functions that handle protocol versions about
DTLSv1.2 and the SSL_OP_NO_DTLS* options. We effectively convert between
TLS and TLS protocol versions where necessary.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
x509v3_cache_extensions().
ok tb@
|
|
suggested by jsing
|
|
ok jsing
|
|
x509_internal.h defines caps on the number of name constraints and
other names (such as subjectAltNames) that we want to allocate per
cert chain. These limits are checked too late. In a particularly
silly cert that jan found on ugos.ugm.ac.id 443, we ended up
allocating six times 2048 x509_constraint_name structures before
deciding that these are more than 512.
Fix this by adding a names_max member to x509_constraints_names which
is set on allocation against which each addition of a name is checked.
cluebat/ok jsing
ok inoguchi on earlier version
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Now that we store our maximum TLS version at the start of the handshake,
we can check against that directly.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
|
|
This is a backport of the ncurses 5.9 20120707 patch.
Previously, getch() would return ERR if SIGWINCH was received but
the window didn't actually change size. This can happen, for
example, when the xterm font is changed. OK tb@
|
|
These are no longer used (and should not be used) internally.
|
|
Add handshake fields for our minimum TLS version, our maximum TLS version
and the TLS version negotiated during the handshake. Initialise our min/max
versions at the start of the handshake and leave these unchanged. The
negotiated TLS version is set in the client once we receive the ServerHello
and in the server at the point we select the highest shared version.
Provide an ssl_effective_version() function that returns the negotiated TLS
version if known, otherwise our maximum TLS version - this is effectively
what is stored in s->version currently.
Convert most of the internal code to use one of these three version fields,
which greatly simplifies code (especially in the TLS extension handling
code).
ok tb@
|
|
are started before syslogd(8). This resulted in ugly sendsyslog(2)
dropped logs and the real message was lost.
Create a temporary stash for log messages within the kernel. It
has a limited size of 100 messages, and each message is truncated
to 8192 bytes. When the stash is exhausted, the well-known dropped
message is generated with a counter. After syslogd(8) has setup
everything, it sends a debug line through libc to flush the kernel
stash. Then syslogd receives all messages from the kernel before
the usual logs.
OK deraadt@ visa@
|
|
regions of a given size. In snaps for a while, committing since
no issues were reported and a wider audience is good. ok deraadt@
|
|
|
|
respect literal line breaks. This has the unwanted side effect of
rendering the authors section using a monospace font over at
man.openbsd.org. Instead use br macros to force line breaks.
With help from and ok jmc@
|
|
Discussed with claudio@
Feedback jmc@
|
|
|
|
Requested by tb@
|
|
Noted by tb@
|
|
Also add explicit checks against EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and
EVP_CIPHER_key_length().
Requested by tb@ during review.
ok tb@
|
|
This moves the check closer to where a leak could occur and checks all
pointers in the struct.
Suggested by tb@ during review.
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
ok tb@
|
|
This avoids the need to match specific DTLS version numbers.
|
|
If we're about to add a chain we have a trust path, so we have at least
one trusted certificate. This fixes a thinko from r1.31 and fixes the
openssl(1) cms verify test.
ok jsing (who had the same diff)
|
|
To integrate the new X.509 verifier, X509_verify_cert() was refactored.
The code building chains in the legacy verifier was split into a
separate function. The first bug is that its return value was treated
as a Boolean although it wasn't. Second, the return alone is not enough
to decide whether to carry on the validation or not.
Slightly rearrange things to restore the behavior of the legacy verifier
prior to this refactoring.
Issue found and test case provided by Anton Borowka and jan.
ok jan jsing
|
|
DTLS protocol version numbers are the 1's compliment of human readable TLS
version numbers, which means that newer versions decrease in value and
there is no direct mapping between TLS protocol version numbers and DTLS
protocol version numbers.
Rather than having to deal with this internally, only use TLS versions
internally and map between DTLS and TLS protocol versions when necessary.
Rename functions and variables to use 'tls_version' when they contain a
TLS version (and never a DTLS version).
ok tb@
|
|
ok tb@
|
|
In x509_verify_ctx_set_xsc_chain(), an ENOMEM case is currently passing
the last certificate and depth (which is no longer actually depth) to
x509_verify_cert_error(). Given we've hit an ENOMEM situation, neither
of these are useful so remove both.
ok tb@
|
|
write 8 bytes at the time by using a uint64_t pointer. For an
allocation a max of 4 such uint64_t's are written spread over the
allocation. For pages sized and larger, the first page is junked in
such a way.
- Delayed free of a small chunk checks the corresponiding way.
- Pages ending up in the cache are validated upon unmapping or re-use.
In snaps for a while
|
|
num_untrusted, but unfortunately it's public...
ok jsing tobhe
|
|
As should be obvious from the name and the comment in x509_vfy.h
int last_untrusted; /* index of last untrusted cert */
last_untrusted actually counts the number of untrusted certs at the
bottom of the chain.
Unfortunately, an earlier fix introducing x509_verify_set_xsc_chain()
assumed that last_untrusted actually meant the index of the last
untrusted cert in the chain, resulting in an off-by-one, which in turn
led to x509_vfy_check_chain_extension() skipping the check for the
EXFLAG_CRITICAL flag.
A second bug in x509_verify_set_xsc_chain() assumed that it is always
called with a trusted root, which is not necessarily the case anymore.
Address this with a temporary fix which will have to be revisited once
we will allow chains with more than one trusted cert.
Reported with a test case by tobhe.
ok jsing tobhe
|
|
This allows us to do ber-type checking inside ober_scanf_elements, which
will allow for stricter ASN.1 parsing in the future.
Manpage feedback and OK claudio@, jmc@
OK claudio@
|