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ssl_get_prev_session() can fail for various reasons some of which
may be internal_error others decode_error alerts. Propagate the
appropriate alert up to the caller so we can abort the handshake
by sending a fatal alert instead of rudely closing the pipe.
Currently only 28 of 292 test cases of tlsfuzzer's test-extension.py pass.
With this diff, 272 pass. The rest will require fixes elsewhere.
ok beck inoguchi jsing
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ok millert@ deraadt@
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This takes the same design/approach used in TLSv1.3 and provides an
opaque struct that is self contained and cannot reach back into other
layers. For now this just implements/replaces the writing of records
for DTLSv1/TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1/TLSv1.2. In doing so we stop copying the
plaintext into the same buffer that is used to transmit to the wire.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok jsing@ tb@
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Regarding RDTSC, the Intel ISA reference says (Vol 2B. 4-545):
> The RDTSC instruction is not a serializing instruction.
>
> It does not necessarily wait until all previous instructions
> have been executed before reading the counter.
>
> Similarly, subsequent instructions may begin execution before the
> read operation is performed.
>
> If software requires RDTSC to be executed only after all previous
> instructions have completed locally, it can either use RDTSCP (if
> the processor supports that instruction) or execute the sequence
> LFENCE;RDTSC.
To mitigate this problem, Linux and DragonFly use LFENCE. FreeBSD and
NetBSD take a more complex route: they selectively use MFENCE, LFENCE,
or CPUID depending on whether the CPU is AMD, Intel, VIA or something
else.
Let's start with just LFENCE. We only use the TSC as a timecounter on
SSE2 systems so there is no need to conditionally compile the LFENCE.
We can explore conditionally using MFENCE later.
Microbenchmarking on my machine (Core i7-8650) suggests a penalty of
about 7-10% over a "naked" RDTSC. This is acceptable. It's a bit of
a moot point though: the alternative is a considerably weaker
monotonicity guarantee when comparing timestamps between threads,
which is not acceptable.
It's worth noting that kernel timecounting is not *exactly* like
userspace timecounting. However, they are similar enough that we can
use userspace benchmarks to make conjectures about possible impacts on
kernel performance.
Concerns about kernel performance, in particular the network stack,
were the blocking issue for this patch. Regarding networking
performance, claudio@ says a 10% slower nanotime(9) or nanouptime(9)
is acceptable and that shaving off "tens of cycles" is a
micro-optimization. There are bigger optimizations to chase down
before such a difference would matter.
There is additional work to be done here. We could experiment with
conditionally using MFENCE. Also, the userspace TSC timecounter
doesn't have access to the adjustment skews available to the kernel
timecounter. pirofti@ has suggested a scheme involving RDTSCP and an
array of skews mapped into user memory. deraadt@ has suggested a
scheme where the skew would be kept in the TCB. However it is done,
access to the skews will improve monotonicity, which remains a problem
with the TSC.
First proposed by kettenis@ and pirofti@. With input from pirofti@,
deraadt@, guenther@, naddy@, kettenis@, and claudio@. Based on
similar changes in Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and DragonFlyBSD.
ok deraadt@ pirofti@ kettenis@ naddy@ claudio@
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spotted by Pedro Martelletto
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ok tb@ deraadt@
NB. major crank
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OK deraadt@ martijn@
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OK martijn@ mpi@
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Reported by Fabian Raetz <fabian.raetz@gmail.com>.
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When record protection is engaged, the plaintext must be followed by a
non-zero content type and optional zero padding. If the plaintext is zero
length or only consists of zero bytes then it is not a valid message,
since the content type is unspecified.
ok tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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The error path does the same as the currently duplicated code.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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of fixes and a few new APIs that we'd like to use in OpenSSH
ok deraadt@
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ok kettenis@
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If a peer sends a bogus record consisting of all-zero plaintext,
the content_len would be decremented to -1 and cause a crash in
freezero.
ok inoguchi jsing
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A certain VPN provider appears to have configured their servers to only
accept P-521 for TLSv1.3 key exchange. The particular VPN software in use
also does not currently allow for the TLSv1.3 key share groups to be
configured, which means that there is no way to easily use LibreSSL in
this situation.
Include P-521 in the list of curves that are supported by default in the
client, in order to increase interoperability.
Discussed at length with beck@, inoguchi@ and tb@.
ok tb@
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Previously we used CBB to build the record headers, but not the entire
record. Use CBB_init_fixed() upfront, then build the record header and
add space for the record content. However, in order to do this we need
to determine the length of the record upfront.
This simplifies the code, removes a number of manual bounds checks and
makes way for further improvements.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Triggered by jmc@ apparently misunderstanding the intention of the
text and fixing a grammatical error in a way that wasn't ideal,
so i guess he wouldn't have been the only one to find the previous
version hard to understand.
OK jmc@
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ok jsing@ tb@
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related mbufs. Each mbuf(9) passed to these queues stores the pointer to
corresponding pipex(4) session referenced as `m_pkthdr.ph_cookie'. When
session was destroyed its reference can still be in these queues so we
have use after free issue while pipexintr() dereference it.
I removed `pipexinq', `pipexoutq' and pipexintr(). This not only allows
us to avoid issue described above, but also removes unnecessary context
switch in packet processing. Also it makes code simpler.
ok mpi@ yasuoka@
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A client should only send a status_request as part of the CH.
Pointed out by Michael Forney
ok inoguchi jsing
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The current code might cause a client to send a status_request
containing a CertificateStatusRequest with its certificate. This
makes no sense.
Pointed out by Michael Forney
ok inoguchi jsing
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According to RFC 8446, 4.4.2.1, a server may request that a client
present an OCSP response with its certificate by sending an empty
status_request extension as part of the certificate request. The
current code expects a full CertificateStatus structure, which is
only sent if the server sends an OCSP response with its certificate.
This causes interoperability issues with Go's TLS server and with
newer GnuTLS where we would abort the handshake with a decode_error
alert and length mismatch error.
Issue reported and diagnosed by Michael Forney
Problem also found by Mikolaj Kucharski and inoguchi.
ok inoguchi jsing
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changes with LLVM 10.
found by kettenis@
ok deraadt@
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pointed out by tb@, who also provided the diff.
maybe someone should/could add a Symbols.list here?
ok tb@ deraadt@
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the use of the sample keyword matches similar config in other
products.
NUM can be a number between 2 and 1048576, and is used to divide
0x100000000 into a threshold that is then compared against a randomly
generated number produced by a load of BPF_RND.
having sampling as part of the grammar means you can write things
like "icmp or sample 128". this lets you capture all icmp traffic
and a sample of the rest of the traffic.
ok jmatthew@ kn@ tb@
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this adds "rnd" and "random" as keywords in the grammar, and handles
them as an arithmetic operator. the decoder recognises the load,
so tcpdump can print it as 'ld #random'. most of the handling is
copied from the "len"/"length" keywoard handling that generates and
decodes a load of the actual wire length of the packet.
ok jmatthew@ tb@ kn@
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crank due to ABI change.
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Clang 10 warns about the expression sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t) as
cdata is an array of uint32_t and it expects that the intent of this is
to compute the number of array elements. Use BCRYPT_WORDS / 2 instead.
Same diff as millert's commit sys/lib/libsa/bcrypt_pbkdf.c -r1.2, which
was ok kettenis. deraadt confirms that this satisfies clang 10.
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The write path can return a failure in the AEAD path and there is no reason
not to check a return value.
Spotted by tb@ during another review.
ok tb@
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- Make the DTLS code much more consistent with the ssl3 code.
- Avoid assigning wr->input and wr->length just so they can be used as
arguments to memcpy().
- Remove the arc4random_buf() call for the explicit IV, since tls1_enc()
already does this for us.
ok tb@
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ssl3_create_record().
ok tb@
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ourselves.
Spotted by tb@ during a previous review.
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This will allow for further changes to be made with less complexity and
easier review.
In particular, decide if we need an empty fragment early on and only do
the alignment calculation once (rather than in two separate parts of the
function.
ok tb@ inoguchi@
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As abieber@ found the hard way, some python frameworks (twisted, synapse)
thought it a great idea to use the info callback mechanism (designed to
get state information about SSL objects) to modify state information such
as setting and verifying the SNI. The switch of TLS_method() to default
to TLSv1.3 broke these contraptions. Further bits of the info callback
mechanism will likely metastasize throughout the TLSv1.3 stack if we
need them, so we only do what's really necessary now.
Lots of debugging, crucial hint and testing by abieber
input & ok jsing
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32-bit values.
ok gkoehler@, drahn@
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Initialize __curbrk = &_end.
It's a 64-bit pointer, so use ld/std instead of lwz/stw.
ok drahn@
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Reminder that unveil does not kill from brynet and gsoares.
Wording tweaks from jmc; feedback from deraadt.
ok jmc@, millert@, solene@, "fine with me" deraadt@
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Both Perl's HTTP::Tiny and IO::Socket::SSL know about SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
and try to work around the fact that OpenSSL enabled it by default.
However, this can lead to the mode being disabled prior to the TLSv1.3
handshake and then enabled after the handshake has completed.
In order to handle this correctly we have to check the mode and inform the
record layer prior to every read.
Issue reported and test case provided by Nathanael Rensen
<nathanael@polymorpheus.com>.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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that change nothing whatsoever, except making the code harder to read;
OK tb@
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OK tb@
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use-after-free and double-free issues in calling programs.
The bug was introduced in SSLeay-0.6.0 released on June 21, 1996
and has been present since OpenBSD 2.4.
I found the bug while documenting the function.
The bug could bite in two ways that looked quite different from the
perspective of the calling code:
* If a stack was passed in that already contained some X509_INFO
objects and an error occurred, all the objects passed in would be
freed, but without removing the freed pointers from the stack,
so the calling code would probable continue to access the freed
pointers and eventually free them a second time.
* If the input BIO contained at least two valid PEM objects followed by
at least one PEM object causing an error, at least one freed pointer
would be put onto the stack, even though the function would return NULL
rather than the stack. But the calling code would still have a pointer
to the stack, so it would be likely to access the new bogus pointers
sooner or later.
Fix all this by remembering the size of the input stack on entry
and cutting it back to exactly that size when exiting due to an
error, but no further.
While here, do some related cleanup:
* Garbage collect the automatic variables "error" and "i"
which were only used at one single place each.
* Use NULL rather than 0 for pointers.
I like bugfixes that make the code four lines shorter, reduce the
number of variables by one, reduce the number of brace-blocks by
one, reduce the number if if-statements by one, and reduce the
number of else-clauses by one.
Tweaks and OK tb@.
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