Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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No change in generated assembly.
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No change in generated assembly.
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The EVP cipher API uses size_t, however a number of the underlying
implementations use long in their API. This means that an input with
size > LONG_MAX will go negative.
Found by Coverity, hiding under a large pile of macros.
ok tb@
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Only change to generated assembly is due to line numbers.
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Only change in generated assembly is due to line numbers.
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Pull the init_key and ctrl (if present) functions up to the top. This
improves readability and allows for the removal of function prototypes.
No functional change.
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No change in generated assembly.
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No change in generated assembly.
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No change in generated assembly.
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This includes the wonderful BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop - a for loop in a macro.
No change in generated assembly.
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This simplifies memory management and makes it easier to see the leak
that were introduced in the previous commit. Sprinkle a few malloc
errors for consistency.
CID 278396
with/ok jsing
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Only change to generated assembly is due to the use of EVPerror().
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Also remove various comments noting that it cannot be used for certain
block ciphers (which kinda defeats the purpose of having a generic
implementation in the first place).
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Only change to generated assembly is due to EVPerror()'s use of line
numbers.
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No change in generated assembly.
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Only change to generated assembly is due to EVPerror()'s use of line
numbers.
CVS ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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No change to generated assembly.
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These macros make the ASN.1 macros seem sane - there are layers and layers
and layers here, which are hiding bugs.
No change to generated assembly.
Discussed with tb@
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Rename some variables and consistently goto error.
ok tb@
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Rather than recycling an existing ASN1_STRING and changing its type, free
it and allocate a replacement. This simplifies the code and potentially
avoids bugs resulting from reuse.
ok tb@
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Per X.690, some ASN.1 types must be primitive encoded, some must be
constructed and some may be either. Add this data to our types table
and check the encoding against this information when decoding.
ok tb@
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This avoids asn1_c2i_primitive() from needing knowledge about the internals
of ASN1_INTEGER and ASN1_ENUMERATED.
ok tb@
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OPENSSL_cleanup() cleans up and deallocates memory in use by the library.
There are a couple of use cases for this, primarily related to memory
leak testing. This will not be called automatically in LibreSSL, which
means that OpenSSL's OPENSSL_NO_INIT_ATEXIT is implied. If code wants to
clean up then they need to explicitly call this themselves.
ok tb@
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CBIGNUM_it is supposed to be the "clear bignum" or "secure" bignum - that
is one which zeros its memory after use and ensures that the constant time
flags are set... in LibreSSL we always do both of these things for BIGNUMs,
so just use BIGNUM_it instead.
ok tb@
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for the rounding functions.
Input from kettenis@,
OK miod@
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0-127, where immediate addressing can be used to load the system call number
in r0, rather than performing a memory load using pc-relative addressing.
No functional change, but rm(1) runs a couple cycles faster per file now.
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CID 24797
ok jsing
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(d_sbsize).
ok otto@ as part of larger diff
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ok daniel@ deraadt@ jca@
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EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() will unconditionally fail if the pkey's ameth
has no copy_params(). Obviously this is indistinguishable from actual
failure...
ok jsing
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DSA_size() and ECDSA_size() have a very special hack. They fudge up an
ASN1_INTEGER with a size which is typically > 100 bytes, backed by a
buffer of size 4. This was "fine", however, since they set buf[0] = 0xff,
where the craziness that was i2c_ASN1_INTEGER() only looks at the first
octet (one may then ask why a buffer of size 4 was necessary...).
This changed with the rewrite of i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(), which doesn't
respect this particular hack and rightly assumes that it is fed an
actual ASN1_INTEGER...
Instead, create an appropriate signature and use i2d to determine its
size.
Fixes an out-of-bounds read flagged by ASAN and oss-fuzz.
ok jsing
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sk_num() can return a negative value, in which case the upper bound is
SIZE_MAX, which results in a very long for loop.
CID 153997
ok jsing
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Switch from X509_get_pubkey() to X509_get0_pubkey() to avoid an unnecessary
EVP_PKEY_free(). Check the return values of X509_get0_pubkey() and
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(). If the former returns NULL, the latter will
dereference NULL.
CID 25020
ok jsing
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ok djm@
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Otherwise EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() leaks, as spotted by the ASAN CI.
ok jsing
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If rbio and wbio are the same, SSL_free() only frees one BIO, so the
BIO_up_ref() before SSL_set_bio() leads to a leak.
ok jsing
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CID 356353
ok jsing
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OK tb@
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Needed for an upcoming change.
ok tb@
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