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the argv[0] would be normalized, and hence break scripts
that depend on how they were called.
this fixes an issue in the ports builds.
ok provos@ deraadt@; lots of testing during hackathon sturm@ naddy@
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- add an exec message so that whenever a set-uid/gid process
exec's a new image which we may control, the exec does not
go by unnoticed.
- take special care to check for P_SUGIDEXEC as well as
P_SUGID, corresponding to the same changes that were made in
the ptrace code a while ago
ok niels@, sturm@; thanks to naddy for testing
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itojun@ ok
fix a race condition between path resolution in userland
and the subsequent namei(): inform the kernel portion of
valid filenames and then disallow symlink lookups for
those filenames by means of a hook in namei().
with suggestions from provos@
also, add (currently unused) seqnr field to struct
systrace_replace, from provos@
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- escape fixes for special characters
markus, sturm ok. from provos
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previous rename; after discussion w/ niels
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with privilege elevation no suid or sgid binaries are necessary any
longer. Applications can be executed completely
unprivileged. Systrace raises the privileges for a single system call
depending on the configured policy.
Idea from discussions with Perry Metzger, Dug Song and Marcus Watts.
from provos
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from provos
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avoids problems where tsleep has been interrupted by a signal.
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attaching to a running process
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okay deraadt@
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