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"looks ok" markus@
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- discard all EAPOL-Key frames with an unknown descriptor version.
- when receiving message 3/4 of the 4-way handshake, do not install
the PTK if the INSTALL bit is not set. this fixes 4-way handshake
with APs using group keys only.
- similarly, do not mark the 802.1X port as valid if the SECURE bit
is not set (it will be marked as valid after group key handshake).
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add some RSNA authenticator state machine bits.
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message 2/4 of the 4-way handshake because the authenticator must
derive the PTK first (the MIC is computed using the KCK).
Move calls to ieee80211_eapol_key_check_mic() - and as a consequence
ieee80211_eapol_key_decrypt() - directly in the
ieee80211_recv_{group,4way}_msg*() functions.
Unconstify the first parameter since checking the MIC modifies the
frame. Remove ni->ni_ptk_ok field while i'm here.
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information element in a management frame.
the authenticator has to make a copy of the RSN/WPA1 IE from
(Re)Association requests so that it can be compared with the
one included in message 2/4 of the 4-way handshake.
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of a management or data frame (check if the i_qos, i_ht or i_addr4
are present).
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message 4 based on the EAPOL-Key frame secure bit.
the only thing that differentiate these messages is the presence of
the RSN/WPA1 IE in the EAPOL-Key frame data field.
only message 2/4 contains this IE.
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Tx/Rx MIC for TKIP.
- add two functions to map a PTK and a GTK to an IEEE 802.11 key and
use them in ieee80211_input.c instead of duplicating the same code.
properly set Tx/Rx MIC in the IEEE 802.11 key in the case of TKIP.
- add ic_psk to struct ieee80211com to store the pre-shared key.
- fix setting of the SECURE bit in outgoing EAPOL-Key frames.
- when receiving msg 2 of the 4-way handshake, deauthenticate the
station if the RSN IE does not match that of the (Re)Association
request.
- before parsing an RSN or WPA IE, check that there's enough room for
the version field (2 bytes) which is mandatory.
- various tweaks while i'm here.
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from damien
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ok damien@, put it ok deraadt@
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a station is using WPA1 or RSN descriptors.
make sure that a station that advertises WPA1 capability in an IE
uses the WPA1 EAPOL-Key descriptor type and not the RSN one.
fix construction of EAPOL-Key frames for WPA1.
i can now successfuly complete a 4-way and group-key handshake
with both a WPA1 and a WPA2 access point.
add some TKIP encapsulation code (no SW crypto yet).
ok deraadt@
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(for instance if they don't support HW crypto).
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passing the frame to the handlers.
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i only converted ieee80211_recv_rsn_group_msg1() in my previous commit.
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can handle multiple ciphers (the key to use is determined automatically
by these functions based on the frame's destination address).
add ieee80211_ccmp_encrypt() and ieee80211_ccmp_decrypt().
those two functions only do encapsulation/decapsulation of CCMP frames
for now (they don't do SW crypto). they will help to test things with
drivers that can do HW crypto.
add a ni_pairwise_key field to struct ieee80211_node to actually install
the pairwise transient key.
install the GTK in ic_nw_keys[].
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change ieee80211_recv_eapol() so that it is called without the
ethernet header striped.
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RSN uses a GTK KDE while WPA1 stores the GTK in the EAPOL-Key frame
data field (encrypted) and uses some bits in the info field.
split ieee80211_recv_group_msg1() in two separate functions.
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4-way handshake to ieee80211_send_4way_msg2().
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fix a test for ni_replaycnt_ok while i'm here.
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when using WPA-PSK).
add a ni_replaycnt_ok flag to struct ieee80211_node to mark the replay
counter as valid. the replay counter is marked valid only when message
3 of the 4-way handshake is received since message 1 contains no MIC.
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so use that too and remove a check in ieee80211_recv_eapol().
WPA1 stores the group key id into bits 4-5 of the EAPOL-Key frame info
field and uses bit 6 to indicate if the key is Rx/Tx or Rx only.
remove a check in ieee80211_eapol_key_decrypt() because WPA1 encrypts
the payload of message 1 of the group-key handshake without setting the
encrypted bit in the info field.
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it is set in message 3.
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the 4-way and group-key handshake.
the state machine is still missing though so this is not used
anywhere yet.
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add a parameter to ieee80211_decap() to handle different 802.11
header sizes.
cleanup and clarify ieee80211_classify().
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structure until the frame has been fully validated.
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the rx buffer.
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some cleanup while i'm here.
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deauth associating stations with bad RSN IEs.
cleanup parsing of vendor-specific IEs.
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it has been #if 0'd since 3.9 and we have never supported this mode (no
ifconfig option etc...).
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the spec says that "APs ignore the Privacy subfield within received
Association and Reassociation Request managements frames".
if the IEEE80211_CAPINFO_ESS bit is not set, reply with the correct status
code (IEEE80211_STATUS_CAPINFO instead of IEEE80211_STATUS_BASIC_RATE).
indent things a bit while i'm here.
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a default ieee80211_set_tim() function that drivers can override
by setting ic_set_tim.
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pointed out by claudio@
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to parse both WPA1 and RSN (WPA2) IEs.
rename ieee80211_parse_edca_params_common() into
ieee80211_parse_edca_params_body() while i'm here.
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for consistency.
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unfortunately, most APs that advertise themselves as being
802.11e capable still use the Microsoft OUI instead of the
standard IEEE 802.11 information element.
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add myself to the copyright list.
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- ieee80211_recv_probe_resp
- ieee80211_recv_probe_req
- ieee80211_recv_auth
- ieee80211_recv_assoc_req
- ieee80211_recv_assoc_resp
- ieee80211_recv_deauth
- ieee80211_recv_disassoc
"reads ok" jsg@ claudio@ mglocker@
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function that uses it.
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use u_int{8,16,32}_t everywhere.
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ok jsg@
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Choose the BSD license so that future enhancements will be BSD-only.
ok jsg@ reyk@ deraadt@
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dual/multi mode chipset operation.
ok jsg@
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