Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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ssh_config.5: format the kexalgorithms in a more consistent (prettier!) way
ok djm
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host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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have multiple items, and .Pa for path names;
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addresses combinations. It hasn't worked for ages and we have supported
the more commen "[addr]:port" format for a long time. ok jmc@ markus@
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hacks we had in place to make it work with old groff;
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use with
LPORT=`ssh -S muxsocket -R0:localhost:25 -O forward somehost`
feedback and ok djm@
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they are present; feedback and ok jmc@
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format section and rework it a bit; requested by jmc@
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are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user
in authorized_keys).
Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to
known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host
authentication.
feedback and ok markus@
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OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
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ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-11/v2-20/pkcs-11v2-20.pdf
ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1) use dlopen(3) directly to talk to a PKCS#11
provider (shared library) while ssh-agent(1) delegates PKCS#11 to
a forked a ssh-pkcs11-helper process.
PKCS#11 is currently a compile time option.
feedback and ok djm@; inspired by patches from Alon Bar-Lev
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port forward on the server. This allows, for example, using ssh as
a ProxyCommand to route connections via intermediate servers.
bz #1618, man page help from jmc@, ok markus@
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with "route exec" or "nc -V" as a proxycommand. "route exec" also ensures
that trafic such as DNS lookups stays withing the specified routingdomain.
For example (from reyk):
# route -T 2 exec /usr/sbin/sshd
or inherited from the parent process
$ route -T 2 exec sh
$ ssh 10.1.2.3
ok deraadt@ markus@ stevesk@ reyk@
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consistent with other options.
NOTE: if you currently use RDomain in the ssh client or server config,
or ssh/sshd -o, you must update to use RoutingDomain.
ok markus@ djm@
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ok markus@
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few remaining ".Tn UNIX" macros with ".Ux" ones.
pointed out by ratchov@, thanks!
ok jmc@
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ok jmc@
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as we do for "MACs": this stops us getting out of sync when the lists
change;
fixes documentation/6102, submitted by Peter J. Philipp
alternative fix proposed by djm
ok markus
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ok espie, jmc
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Useful for daemonised ssh connection (ssh -f). Patch originally from
and ok'd by markus@
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enabled, delay the fork until after replies for any -R forwards have
been seen. Allows for robust detection of -R forward failure when
using -f (similar to bz#92); ok dtucker@
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CheckHostIP to an own config option named VisualHostKey.
While there, fix the behaviour that ssh would draw a random art picture
on every newly seen host even when the option was not enabled.
prodded by deraadt@, discussions,
help and ok markus@ djm@ dtucker@
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original scientific paper inspiring that technique.
Much help with English and nroff by jmc@, thanks.
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of a typo in rcs.c;
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ok jmc
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some commandline parsing warnings go unconditionally to stdout).
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GSSAPIDelegateCredentials=yes. This is symmetric with -k (disable GSSAPI)
and is useful for hosts with /home on Kerberised NFS; bz #1312
patch from Markus.Kuhn AT cl.cam.ac.uk; ok dtucker@ markus@
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specify umac-64@openssh.com). Provides about 20% end-to-end speedup
compared to hmac-md5. Represents a different approach to message
authentication to that of HMAC that may be beneficial if HMAC based on one
of its underlying hash algorithms is found to be vulnerable to a new attack.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4418.txt
in conjunction with and OK djm@
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