/* $OpenBSD: cms_kari.c,v 1.16 2024/02/02 14:11:45 tb Exp $ */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_local.h" #include "asn1/asn1_local.h" /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm) { if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return 0; } if (palg) *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; if (pukm) *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm; return 1; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg); /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) * CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return NULL; } return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **pubalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) { CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return 0; } oik = ri->d.kari->originator; if (issuer) *issuer = NULL; if (sno) *sno = NULL; if (keyid) *keyid = NULL; if (pubalg) *pubalg = NULL; if (pubkey) *pubkey = NULL; if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { if (issuer) *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; if (sno) *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { if (keyid) *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier; } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) { if (pubalg) *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm; if (pubkey) *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey; } else return 0; return 1; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) { CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return -2; } oik = ri->d.kari->originator; if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); return -1; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp); int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm, CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { if (issuer) *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; if (sno) *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; if (keyid) *keyid = NULL; if (tm) *tm = NULL; if (other) *other = NULL; } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { if (keyid) *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier; if (tm) *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date; if (other) *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other; if (issuer) *issuer = NULL; if (sno) *sno = NULL; } else return 0; return 1; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id); int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, X509 *cert) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); else return -1; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); kari->pctx = NULL; if (!pk) return 1; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx)) goto err; kari->pctx = pctx; return 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 0; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey); EVP_CIPHER_CTX * CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) return ri->d.kari->ctx; return NULL; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx); /* * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK * or the encrypted CEK. */ static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc) { /* Key encryption key */ unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; size_t keklen; int rv = 0; unsigned char *out = NULL; int outlen; keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx); if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) return 0; /* Derive KEK */ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0) goto err; /* Set KEK in context */ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc)) goto err; /* obtain output length of ciphered key */ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen)) goto err; out = malloc(outlen); if (out == NULL) goto err; if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen)) goto err; *pout = out; *poutlen = (size_t)outlen; rv = 1; err: explicit_bzero(kek, keklen); if (!rv) free(out); (void)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx); /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); kari->pctx = NULL; return rv; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek) { int rv = 0; unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL; size_t enckeylen; size_t ceklen; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length; enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data; /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */ if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) goto err; /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */ if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0)) goto err; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; freezero(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = cek; ec->keylen = ceklen; cek = NULL; rv = 1; err: free(cek); return rv; } LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt); /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */ static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, EVP_PKEY *pk) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL; int rv = 0; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (!pctx) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0) goto err; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL); if (!pctx) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; kari->pctx = pctx; rv = 1; err: if (!rv) EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); EVP_PKEY_free(ekey); return rv; } /* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL; ri->d.kari = (CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo_it); if (!ri->d.kari) return 0; ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; kari = ri->d.kari; kari->version = 3; rek = (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_it); if (rek == NULL) return 0; if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) { ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)rek, &CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_it); return 0; } if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER; rek->rid->d.rKeyId = (CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier_it); if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL) return 0; if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip)) return 0; } else { rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL; if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip)) return 0; } /* Create ephemeral key */ if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk)) return 0; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk); rek->pkey = pk; return 1; } static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */ kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx); if (kekcipher) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) return 0; return 1; } /* * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES #if 0 /* * XXX - we do not currently support DES3 wrap and probably should just * drop this code. */ if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc) kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap(); else #endif #endif if (keylen <= 16) kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap(); else if (keylen <= 24) kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap(); else kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap(); return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL); } /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks; int i; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return 0; } kari = ri->d.kari; reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */ if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher)) return 0; /* * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value. */ if (kari->originator->type == -1) { CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator; oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY; oik->d.originatorKey = (CMS_OriginatorPublicKey *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_OriginatorPublicKey_it); if (!oik->d.originatorKey) return 0; } /* Initialise KDF algorithm */ if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) return 0; /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) { unsigned char *enckey; size_t enckeylen; rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i); if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0) return 0; if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kari, 1)) return 0; ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen); } return 1; }