/* $OpenBSD: d1_srvr.c,v 1.41 2014/10/31 14:51:01 jsing Exp $ */ /* * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver); static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s); const SSL_METHOD DTLSv1_server_method_data = { .version = DTLS1_VERSION, .ssl_new = dtls1_new, .ssl_clear = dtls1_clear, .ssl_free = dtls1_free, .ssl_accept = dtls1_accept, .ssl_connect = ssl_undefined_function, .ssl_read = ssl3_read, .ssl_peek = ssl3_peek, .ssl_write = ssl3_write, .ssl_shutdown = dtls1_shutdown, .ssl_renegotiate = ssl3_renegotiate, .ssl_renegotiate_check = ssl3_renegotiate_check, .ssl_get_message = dtls1_get_message, .ssl_read_bytes = dtls1_read_bytes, .ssl_write_bytes = dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, .ssl_dispatch_alert = dtls1_dispatch_alert, .ssl_ctrl = dtls1_ctrl, .ssl_ctx_ctrl = ssl3_ctx_ctrl, .ssl_pending = ssl3_pending, .num_ciphers = ssl3_num_ciphers, .get_cipher = dtls1_get_cipher, .get_ssl_method = dtls1_get_server_method, .get_timeout = dtls1_default_timeout, .ssl3_enc = &DTLSv1_enc_data, .ssl_version = ssl_undefined_void_function, .ssl_callback_ctrl = ssl3_callback_ctrl, .ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl = ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, }; const SSL_METHOD * DTLSv1_server_method(void) { return &DTLSv1_server_method_data; } static const SSL_METHOD * dtls1_get_server_method(int ver) { if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION) return (DTLSv1_server_method()); return (NULL); } int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) { void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; unsigned long alg_k; int ret = -1; int new_state, state, skip = 0; int listen; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; #endif ERR_clear_error(); errno = 0; if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; listen = s->d1->listen; /* init things to blank */ s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); s->d1->listen = listen; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake * mode and prevent stream identifier other * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL); #endif if (s->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); return (-1); } for (;;) { state = s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->renegotiate = 1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server = 1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { BUF_MEM *buf; if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { BUF_MEM_free(buf); ret = -1; goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } s->init_num = 0; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) * ...but not with SCTP :-) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) #endif if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { ret = -1; goto end; } ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, * we will just send a HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: s->shutdown = 0; dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_hello_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num = 0; ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: s->state = SSL_ST_OK; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: s->shutdown = 0; ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num = 0; /* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */ if (listen) { memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); } /* If we're just listening, stop here */ if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { ret = 2; s->d1->listen = 0; /* Set expected sequence numbers * to continue the handshake. */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; goto end; } break; case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK: if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = -1; goto end; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; break; case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK: ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); if (ret < 0) goto end; if (ret == 0) { if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = -1; goto end; } } s->state = s->d1->next_state; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: s->renegotiate = 2; dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, * will be ignored if no SCTP used. */ snprintf((char*)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); #endif if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; } else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH. */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* Only send if using a DH key exchange. */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } else skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: /* * Determine whether or not we need to request a * certificate. * * Do not request a certificate if: * * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset). * * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are * renegotiating. * * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application * insists on verification (against the specs, but * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3). */ if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || ((s->session->peer != NULL) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { /* no cert request */ skip = 1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif #else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif #endif s->init_num = 0; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */ if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; } ret = -1; goto end; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; } else { /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we * have not asked for it :-) */ ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->init_num = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, * will be ignored if no SCTP used. */ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num = 0; if (ret == 2) { /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when * the client sends its ECDH pub key in * a certificate, the CertificateVerify * message is not sent. */ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; } else { s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num = 0; /* We need to get hashes here so if there is * a client cert, it can be verified */ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0])); s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK; else #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->hit) s->state = SSL_ST_OK; else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret = dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } ret = dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (!s->hit) { /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, * will be ignored if no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret = -1; goto end; } dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: ret = dtls1_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) { s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, * will be ignored if no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); #endif } else { s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif } s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); /* remove buffering on output */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num = 0; if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ { s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; /* s->server=1; */ s->handshake_func = dtls1_accept; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); } ret = 1; /* done handshaking, next message is client hello */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; /* next message is server hello */ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state = s->state; s->state = state; cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); s->state = new_state; } } skip = 0; } end: /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ s->in_handshake--; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake * mode and prevent stream identifier other * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL); #endif if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); return (ret); } int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; /* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit * requests for it */ } /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) { unsigned int msg_len; unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p; if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) { buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF; if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } *(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len; memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; msg_len = p - msg; dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len); s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = p - buf; s->init_off = 0; } /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; unsigned int sl; unsigned long l; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version&0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length * session-id if we want it to be single use. * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. */ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) s->session->session_id_length = 0; sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } *(p++) = sl; memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); p += sl; /* put the cipher */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return -1; s2n(ssl3_cipher_get_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p); /* put the compression method */ *(p++) = 0; if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* do the header */ l = (p - d); d = buf; d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = p - buf; s->init_off = 0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *q; int j, num; unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned int u; DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char *p, *d; int al, i; unsigned long type; int n; CERT *cert; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4], kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; cert = s->cert; buf = s->init_buf; r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; n = 0; if (type & SSL_kDHE) { dhp = cert->dh_tmp; if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if (dhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } else { dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } r[0] = dh->p; r[1] = dh->g; r[2] = dh->pub_key; } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { const EC_GROUP *group; ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; if (ecdhp == NULL && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0, SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if (ecdhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH * keys over named (not generic) curves. For * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. */ if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id( EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key. * First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = malloc(encodedlen); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx = NULL; /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. * In this situation, we need four additional bytes * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams * structure. */ n = 4 + encodedlen; /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs */ r[0] = NULL; r[1] = NULL; r[2] = NULL; r[3] = NULL; } else { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); n += 2 + nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); } else { pkey = NULL; kn = 0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { s2n(nr[i], p); BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); p += nr[i]; } if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by * the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy((unsigned char*)p, (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* n is the length of the params, they start at * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space * at the end. */ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { q = md_buf; j = 0; for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); q += i; j += i; } if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); goto err; } s2n(u, p); n += u + 2; } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { /* lets do DSS */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_dss1(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_DSA); goto err; } s2n(i, p); n += i + 2; } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { /* let's do ECDSA */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_ECDSA); goto err; } s2n(i, p); n += i + 2; } else { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n); /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: free(encodedPoint); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (-1); } int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p, *d; int i, j, nl, off, n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned int msg_len; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { buf = s->init_buf; d = p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); d[0] = n; p += n; n++; off = n; p += 2; n += 2; sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl = 0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n + j + 2)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n]); if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { s2n(j, p); i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); n += 2 + j; nl += 2 + j; } else { d = p; i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); j -= 2; s2n(j, d); j += 2; n += j; nl += j; } } } /* else no CA names */ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + off]); s2n(nl, p); d = (unsigned char *)buf->data; *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; l2n3(n, d); s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, d); s->d1->handshake_write_seq++; /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG /* XXX: what to do about this? */ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; /* do the header */ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 0; s->init_num += 4; #endif /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return (-1); } int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) { unsigned long l; X509 *x; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (0); } l = dtls1_output_cert_chain(s, x); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; s->init_num = (int)l; s->init_off = 0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; int len, slen; unsigned int hlen, msg_len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is * too long */ if (slen > 0xFF00) return -1; /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) return -1; senc = malloc(slen); if (!senc) return -1; p = senc; i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present * it does all the work otherwise use generated values * from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { free(senc); return -1; } } else { arc4random_buf(iv, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); p += len; EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); p += len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data); /* Ticket length */ p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4; s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p); /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = len; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; s->init_off = 0; free(senc); /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); }