/* $OpenBSD: ssl_lib.c,v 1.121 2016/11/02 11:21:05 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif #include "bytestring.h" const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { /* * Evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a * library bug. */ .enc = (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, .mac = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, .setup_key_block = ssl_undefined_function, .generate_master_secret = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, .change_cipher_state = (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, .final_finish_mac = (int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, .finish_mac_length = 0, .cert_verify_mac = (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, .client_finished_label = NULL, .client_finished_label_len = 0, .server_finished_label = NULL, .server_finished_label_len = 0, .alert_value = (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, .export_keying_material = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context))ssl_undefined_function, .enc_flags = 0, }; int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { if (s->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); return (0); } if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = NULL; } s->error = 0; s->hit = 0; s->shutdown = 0; if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (0); } s->type = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT); s->version = s->method->version; s->client_version = s->version; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); s->first_packet = 0; /* * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method = s->ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) return (0); } else s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); } /* Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; ctx->method = meth; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list), &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return (0); } return (1); } SSL * SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return (NULL); } if (ctx->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return (NULL); } s = calloc(1, sizeof(SSL)); if (s == NULL) goto err; s->options = ctx->options; s->mode = ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having * duplicated it once. */ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (s->cert == NULL) goto err; } else s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead; s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!s->param) goto err; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx = ctx; s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->initial_ctx = ctx; s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL) { s->alpn_client_proto_list = malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) goto err; memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; } s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; s->method = ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; s->references = 1; s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; SSL_clear(s); CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); return (s); err: SSL_free(s); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return (0); } ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return (1); } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return (0); } ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return (1); } int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ctx->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return (1); } int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); ssl->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); return (1); } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len) { /* * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp * shows how we can "construct" a session to give us the desired * check - ie. to find if there's a session in the hash table * that would conflict with any new session built out of this * id/id_len and the ssl_version in use by this SSL. */ SSL_SESSION r, *p; if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id) return (0); r.ssl_version = ssl->version; r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return (p != NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { return (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose)); } int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { return (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose)); } int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { return (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust)); } int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { return (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust)); } int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm)); } int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm)); } void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); if (i > 0) return; if (s->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; } if (s->rbio != s->wbio) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); BIO_free_all(s->wbio); if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); /* add extra stuff */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); /* Make the next call work :-) */ if (s->session != NULL) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); /* Free up if allocated */ free(s->tlsext_hostname); SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); if (s->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); free(s->next_proto_negotiated); free(s->alpn_client_proto_list); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (s->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); #endif free(s); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ if (s->bbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio; s->bbio->next_bio = NULL; } } if (s->rbio != rbio && s->rbio != s->wbio) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if (s->wbio != wbio) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->rbio = rbio; s->wbio = wbio; } BIO * SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return (s->rbio); } BIO * SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return (s->wbio); } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return (SSL_get_rfd(s)); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_rbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return (ret); } int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_wbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return (ret); } int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio); } else SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s)); } else SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s)); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); } return (ret); } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); } return (ret); } int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return (s->verify_mode); } int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { return (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param)); } int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return (s->verify_callback); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->verify_mode); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param)); } int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return (ctx->default_verify_callback); } void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { s->verify_mode = mode; if (callback != NULL) s->verify_callback = callback; } void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) { s->read_ahead = yes; } int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return (s->read_ahead); } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { /* * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, * so we'd better not return -1.) */ return (s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } X509 * SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->peer; if (r == NULL) return (r); CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return (r); } STACK_OF(X509) * SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; /* * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own * certificate; * if we are a server, it does not. */ return (r); } /* * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) { CERT *tmp; /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f)); /* * What if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or * vice-versa. */ if (t->method != f->method) { t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ t->method=f->method; /* change method */ t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ } tmp = t->cert; if (f->cert != NULL) { CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); t->cert = f->cert; } else t->cert = NULL; if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp); SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length); } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (ssl->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); } int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) SSL_set_accept_state(s); /* Not properly initialized yet */ return (s->method->ssl_accept(s)); } int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) SSL_set_connect_state(s); /* Not properly initialized yet */ return (s->method->ssl_connect(s)); } long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return (s->method->get_timeout()); } int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return (-1); } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return (-1); } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return (0); } return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return (-1); } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return (-1); } return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { /* * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough, * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown). */ if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return (-1); } if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); else return (1); } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 0; return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) { /* * Becomes true when negotiation is requested; * false again once a handshake has finished. */ return (s->renegotiate != 0); } long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return (s->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = s->read_ahead; s->read_ahead = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: s->msg_callback_arg = parg; return (1); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return (s->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return (s->options&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (s->mode|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (s->mode &=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l = s->max_cert_list; s->max_cert_list = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu()) return (0); #endif if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { s->d1->mtu = larg; return (larg); } return (0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return (0); s->max_send_fragment = larg; return (1); case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: if (s->s3) return (s->s3->send_connection_binding); else return (0); default: return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg)); } } long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return (1); default: return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp)); } } struct lhash_st_SSL_SESSION * SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->sessions); } long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return (ctx->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; return (1); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (ctx->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l = ctx->max_cert_list; ctx->max_cert_list = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l = ctx->session_cache_size; ctx->session_cache_size = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: return (ctx->session_cache_size); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l = ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: return (ctx->session_cache_mode); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: return (ctx->stats.sess_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: return (ctx->stats.sess_miss); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return (ctx->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return (ctx->options&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (ctx->mode|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (ctx->mode&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return (0); ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; return (1); default: return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg)); } } long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return (1); default: return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp)); } } int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) { long l; l = a->id - b->id; if (l == 0L) return (0); else return ((l > 0) ? 1:-1); } int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp) { long l; l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id; if (l == 0L) return (0); else return ((l > 0) ? 1:-1); } /* * Return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference. */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { return (s->cipher_list); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { return (s->ctx->cipher_list); } } return (NULL); } /* * Return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id. */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { return (s->cipher_list_by_id); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); } } return (NULL); } /* The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers(). */ const char * SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) { SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s == NULL) return (NULL); sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) return (NULL); c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); if (c == NULL) return (NULL); return (c->name); } /* Specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX. */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str); /* * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been * updated. */ if (sk == NULL) return (0); else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return (0); } return (1); } /* Specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL. */ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, str); /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ if (sk == NULL) return (0); else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return (0); } return (1); } /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ char * SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len) { char *end; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *c; size_t curlen = 0; int i; if (s->session == NULL || s->session->ciphers == NULL || len < 2) return (NULL); sk = s->session->ciphers; if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) return (NULL); buf[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); end = buf + curlen; if (strlcat(buf, c->name, len) >= len || (curlen = strlcat(buf, ":", len)) >= len) { /* remove truncated cipher from list */ *end = '\0'; break; } } /* remove trailing colon */ if ((end = strrchr(buf, ':')) != NULL) *end = '\0'; return (buf); } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p) { int i; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; if (sk == NULL) return (0); q = p; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */ if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) continue; s2n(ssl3_cipher_get_value(c), p); } /* * If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise * add SCSV if not renegotiating. */ if (p != q && !s->renegotiate) s2n(SSL3_CK_SCSV & SSL3_CK_VALUE_MASK, p); return (p - q); } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, int num) { CBS cbs; const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL; unsigned long cipher_id; uint16_t cipher_value, max_version; if (s->s3) s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; /* * RFC 5246 section 7.4.1.2 defines the interval as [2,2^16-2]. */ if (num < 2 || num > 0x10000 - 2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return (NULL); } if ((sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } CBS_init(&cbs, p, num); while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) { if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &cipher_value)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); goto err; } cipher_id = SSL3_CK_ID | cipher_value; if (s->s3 != NULL && cipher_id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { /* * TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is fatal if * renegotiating. */ if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; continue; } if (cipher_id == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) { /* * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV indicates that the client * previously tried a higher protocol version. * Fail if the current version is an unexpected * downgrade. */ max_version = ssl_max_server_version(s); if (max_version == 0 || s->version < max_version) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto err; } continue; } if ((c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value)) != NULL) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } return (sk); err: sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return (NULL); } /* * Return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). */ const char * SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) { if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) return (NULL); return (s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname); } int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) return (TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); return (-1); } /* * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is * expected that this function is called from the callback set by * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. * * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. * * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: * * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection * or have a default application level protocol. * * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the * API that this fallback case was enacted. * * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol * a client should use. * * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. * * It returns either * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. */ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const unsigned char *result; int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; /* * For each protocol in server preference order, * see if we support it. */ for (i = 0; i < server_len; ) { for (j = 0; j < client_len; ) { if (server[i] == client[j] && memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { /* We found a match */ result = &server[i]; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; goto found; } j += client[j]; j++; } i += server[i]; i++; } /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ result = client; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; found: *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1; *outlen = result[0]; return (status); } /* * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. * * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols * provided by the callback. */ void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; if (!*data) { *len = 0; } else { *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; } } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to * it. * * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. * Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. * * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list to the specified * protocols, which must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, * 8-bit length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) { free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); if ((ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = malloc(protos_len)) == NULL) return (1); memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len); ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return (0); } /* * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list to the specified * protocols, which must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, * 8-bit length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos, unsigned int protos_len) { free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); if ((ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = malloc(protos_len)) == NULL) return (1); memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len); ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return (0); } /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function that is called during * ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the * client's list of offered protocols. */ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any). On return * it sets data to point to len bytes of protocol name (not including the * leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with* a negotiated * protocol then len will be zero. */ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = NULL; *len = 0; if (ssl->s3 != NULL) { *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } } int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context) { return (s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen, use_context)); } static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { unsigned long l; l = (unsigned long) ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0] )| ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)| ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)| ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L); return (l); } /* * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session * with a matching session ID. */ static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return (1); if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return (1); if (timingsafe_memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length) != 0) return (1); return (0); } /* * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via * ssl.h. */ static unsigned long ssl_session_LHASH_HASH(const void *arg) { const SSL_SESSION *a = arg; return ssl_session_hash(a); } static int ssl_session_LHASH_COMP(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) { const SSL_SESSION *a = arg1; const SSL_SESSION *b = arg2; return ssl_session_cmp(a, b); } SSL_CTX * SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; if (meth == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); return (NULL); } if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } ret = calloc(1, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; ret->method = meth; ret->cert_store = NULL; ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; ret->session_cache_head = NULL; ret->session_cache_tail = NULL; /* We take the system default */ ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout(); ret->new_session_cb = 0; ret->remove_session_cb = 0; ret->get_session_cb = 0; ret->generate_session_id = 0; memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats)); ret->references = 1; ret->quiet_shutdown = 0; ret->info_callback = NULL; ret->app_verify_callback = 0; ret->app_verify_arg = NULL; ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->read_ahead = 0; ret->msg_callback = 0; ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL; ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; ret->sid_ctx_length = 0; ret->default_verify_callback = NULL; if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->default_passwd_callback = 0; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL; ret->client_cert_cb = 0; ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0; ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0; ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!ret->param) goto err; if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); ret->extra_certs = NULL; ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ arc4random_buf(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); arc4random_buf(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16); arc4random_buf(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16); ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO #define eng_strx(x) #x #define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ { ENGINE *eng; eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); if (!eng) { ERR_clear_error(); ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str( OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); } if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) ERR_clear_error(); } #endif #endif /* * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely * deployed might change this. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; return (ret); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: SSL_CTX_free(ret); return (NULL); } void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); if (i > 0) return; if (a->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); /* * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed * after the sessions were flushed. * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) */ if (a->sessions != NULL) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); if (a->sessions != NULL) lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); if (a->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); if (a->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); if (a->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(a->cert); if (a->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); if (a->extra_certs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (a->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (a->client_cert_engine) ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); #endif free(a->alpn_client_proto_list); free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) { ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode = mode; ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dsa_sign; int have_ecc_cert, have_ecdh_tmp; unsigned long mask_k, mask_a; X509 *x = NULL; CERT_PKEY *cpk; if (c == NULL) return; dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || c->dh_tmp_auto != 0); have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); rsa_enc = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); rsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); dsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); have_ecc_cert = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); mask_k = 0; mask_a = 0; cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]); if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; } if (rsa_enc) mask_k|=SSL_kRSA; if (dh_tmp) mask_k|=SSL_kDHE; if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) mask_a|=SSL_aRSA; if (dsa_sign) mask_a|=SSL_aDSS; mask_a|=SSL_aNULL; /* * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension. */ if (have_ecc_cert) { x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags). */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); /* Key usage, if present, must allow signing. */ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0 || (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA; } if (have_ecdh_tmp) mask_k|=SSL_kECDHE; c->mask_k = mask_k; c->mask_a = mask_a; c->valid = 1; } int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) { const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; unsigned long alg_a; alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags). */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); /* Key usage, if present, must allow signing. */ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && ((x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); return (0); } } return (1); } CERT_PKEY * ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_a; CERT *c; int i; c = s->cert; ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { i = SSL_PKEY_ECC; } else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) { i = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; } else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL) i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; else i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { i = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; } else { /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (NULL); } return (c->pkeys + i); } X509 * ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (!cpk) return (NULL); return (cpk->x509); } EVP_PKEY * ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd) { unsigned long alg_a; CERT *c; int idx = -1; alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; c = s->cert; if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; if (idx == -1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (NULL); } if (pmd) *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest; return (c->pkeys[idx].privatekey); } DH * ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; int keylen; DH *dhp; if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2) { keylen = 1024; } else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { keylen = 1024; if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256) keylen = 3072; } else { if ((cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s)) == NULL) return (NULL); if (cpk->privatekey == NULL || cpk->privatekey->pkey.dh == NULL) return (NULL); keylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(cpk->privatekey); } if ((dhp = DH_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); dhp->g = BN_new(); if (dhp->g != NULL) BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2); if (keylen >= 8192) dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); else if (keylen >= 4096) dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL); else if (keylen >= 3072) dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); else if (keylen >= 2048) dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL); else if (keylen >= 1536) dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_1536(NULL); else dhp->p = get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL); if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) { DH_free(dhp); return (NULL); } return (dhp); } void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) { int i; /* * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session)) && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, time(NULL)); } } } const SSL_METHOD * SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) { return (s->method); } int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { int conn = -1; int ret = 1; if (s->method != meth) { if (s->handshake_func != NULL) conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); if (s->method->version == meth->version) s->method = meth; else { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method = meth; ret = s->method->ssl_new(s); } if (conn == 1) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect; else if (conn == 0) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept; } return (ret); } int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; BIO *bio; if (i > 0) return (SSL_ERROR_NONE); /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake * etc, where we do encode the error */ if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); else return (SSL_ERROR_SSL); } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) { bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); } else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { /* * This one doesn't make too much sense... We never * try to write to the rbio, and an application * program where rbio and wbio are separate couldn't * even know what it should wait for. However if we * ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) * and rbio and wbio *are* the same, this test works * around that bug; so it might be safer to keep it. */ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); } else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) { bio = SSL_get_wbio(s); if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); } else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { /* * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with * BIO_should_write(bio)) */ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); } else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); } if (i == 0) { if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { int ret = 1; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); return (-1); } s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { ret = s->handshake_func(s); } return (ret); } /* * For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so * one of these calls will reset it */ void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 1; s->shutdown = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 0; s->shutdown = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } const char * ssl_version_string(int ver) { switch (ver) { case DTLS1_VERSION: return (SSL_TXT_DTLS1); case TLS1_VERSION: return (SSL_TXT_TLSV1); case TLS1_1_VERSION: return (SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1); case TLS1_2_VERSION: return (SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2); default: return ("unknown"); } } const char * SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { return ssl_version_string(s->version); } uint16_t ssl_max_server_version(SSL *s) { uint16_t max_version; /* * The SSL method will be changed during version negotiation, as such * we want to use the SSL method from the context. */ max_version = s->ctx->method->version; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) return (DTLS1_VERSION); if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) == 0 && max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) return (TLS1_2_VERSION); if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) == 0 && max_version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) return (TLS1_1_VERSION); if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) == 0 && max_version >= TLS1_VERSION) return (TLS1_VERSION); return (0); } SSL * SSL_dup(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; X509_NAME *xn; SSL *ret; int i; if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return (NULL); ret->version = s->version; ret->type = s->type; ret->method = s->method; if (s->session != NULL) { /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s); } else { /* * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- * they should not both point to the same object, * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */ ret->method->ssl_free(ret); ret->method = s->method; ret->method->ssl_new(ret); if (s->cert != NULL) { if (ret->cert != NULL) { ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); } ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; } SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); } ret->options = s->options; ret->mode = s->mode; SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s)); ret->debug = s->debug; /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; /* setup rbio, and wbio */ if (s->rbio != NULL) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio)) goto err; } if (s->wbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio)) goto err; } else ret->wbio = ret->rbio; } ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; ret->server = s->server; ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate; ret->new_session = s->new_session; ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; ret->shutdown = s->shutdown; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */ ret->state=s->state; ret->rstate = s->rstate; /* * Would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, * ret->init_off */ ret->init_num = 0; ret->hit = s->hit; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) goto err; } if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) == NULL) goto err; } /* Dup the client_CA list */ if (s->client_CA != NULL) { if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err; ret->client_CA = sk; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) { X509_NAME_free(xn); goto err; } } } if (0) { err: if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return (ret); } void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; if (s->aead_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_read_ctx->ctx); free(s->aead_read_ctx); s->aead_read_ctx = NULL; } if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_write_ctx->ctx); free(s->aead_write_ctx); s->aead_write_ctx = NULL; } } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ X509 * SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return (s->cert->key->x509); else return (NULL); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ EVP_PKEY * SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return (s->cert->key->privatekey); else return (NULL); } const SSL_CIPHER * SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return (s->session->cipher); return (NULL); } const void * SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { return (NULL); } const void * SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { return (NULL); } int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) { BIO *bbio; if (s->bbio == NULL) { bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bbio == NULL) return (0); s->bbio = bbio; } else { bbio = s->bbio; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); } (void)BIO_reset(bbio); /* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } if (push) { if (s->wbio != bbio) s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); } else { if (s->wbio == bbio) s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio); } return (1); } void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { if (s == NULL) return; if (s->bbio == NULL) return; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { /* remove buffering */ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; } void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return (s->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return (s->shutdown); } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return (s->version); } SSL_CTX * SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->ctx); } SSL_CTX * SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) { CERT *ocert = ssl->cert; if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return (ssl->ctx); if (ctx == NULL) ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (ocert != NULL) { int i; /* Copy negotiated digests from original certificate. */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) ssl->cert->pkeys[i].digest = ocert->pkeys[i].digest; ssl_cert_free(ocert); } CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; return (ssl->ctx); } int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath) { return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath)); } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_mem(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *buf, int len) { return (X509_STORE_load_mem(ctx->cert_store, buf, len)); } void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { ssl->info_callback = cb; } void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) { return (ssl->info_callback); } int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->state); } void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { ssl->state = state; } void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) { ssl->verify_result = arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->verify_result); } int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func)); } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void * SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func)); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void * SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } int ssl_ok(SSL *s) { return (1); } X509_STORE * SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->cert_store); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); ctx->cert_store = store; } int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return (s->rwstate); } void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh); } void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); } void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) { if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); *hash = NULL; } void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) { s->debug = debug; } int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s) { return (s->hit); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);