/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.15 2019/03/17 15:16:39 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include "bytestring.h" static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); /* * Force a WANT_READ return for certain error conditions where * we don't want to spin internally. */ static void ssl_force_want_read(SSL *s) { BIO * bio; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING; } /* * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase * packet by another n bytes. * The packet will be in the sub-array of S3I(s)->rbuf.buf specified * by s->internal->packet and s->internal->packet_length. * (If s->internal->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf * [plus s->internal->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) */ static int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) { int i, len, left; size_t align; unsigned char *pkt; SSL3_BUFFER *rb; if (n <= 0) return n; rb = &(S3I(s)->rbuf); if (rb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return -1; left = rb->left; align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); if (!extend) { /* start with empty packet ... */ if (left == 0) rb->offset = align; else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* check if next packet length is large * enough to justify payload alignment... */ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) { /* Note that even if packet is corrupted * and its length field is insane, we can * only be led to wrong decision about * whether memmove will occur or not. * Header values has no effect on memmove * arguments and therefore no buffer * overrun can be triggered. */ memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); rb->offset = align; } } s->internal->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; s->internal->packet_length = 0; /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ } /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets * because the read operation returns the whole packet * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (left > 0 && n > left) n = left; } /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ if (left >= n) { s->internal->packet_length += n; rb->left = left - n; rb->offset += n; return (n); } /* else we need to read more data */ len = s->internal->packet_length; pkt = rb->buf + align; /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', * 'left' extra ones at the end */ if (s->internal->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */ memmove(pkt, s->internal->packet, len + left); s->internal->packet = pkt; rb->offset = len + align; } if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if (!s->internal->read_ahead) { /* ignore max parameter */ max = n; } else { if (max < n) max = n; if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) max = rb->len - rb->offset; } while (left < n) { /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of S3I(s)->rbuf.buf * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to * len+max if possible) */ errno = 0; if (s->rbio != NULL) { s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING; i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); } else { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i <= 0) { rb->left = left; if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (len + left == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); } return (i); } left += i; /* * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as * opposed to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (n > left) n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ } } /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ rb->offset += n; rb->left = left - n; s->internal->packet_length += n; s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (n); } int ssl3_packet_read(SSL *s, int plen) { int n; n = ssl3_read_n(s, plen, S3I(s)->rbuf.len, 0); if (n <= 0) return n; if (s->internal->packet_length < plen) return s->internal->packet_length; return plen; } int ssl3_packet_extend(SSL *s, int plen) { int rlen, n; if (s->internal->packet_length >= plen) return plen; rlen = plen - s->internal->packet_length; n = ssl3_read_n(s, rlen, rlen, 1); if (n <= 0) return n; if (s->internal->packet_length < plen) return s->internal->packet_length; return plen; } /* Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { int al; int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned mac_size, orig_len; rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec); sess = s->session; again: /* check if we have the header */ if ((s->internal->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->internal->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { CBS header; uint16_t len, ssl_version; uint8_t type; n = ssl3_packet_read(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); if (n <= 0) return (n); s->internal->mac_packet = 1; s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; if (s->server && s->internal->first_packet) { if ((ret = ssl_server_legacy_first_packet(s)) != 1) return (ret); ret = -1; } CBS_init(&header, s->internal->packet, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type) || !CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version) || !CBS_get_u16(&header, &len)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); goto err; } rr->type = type; rr->length = len; /* Lets check version */ if (!s->internal->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (ssl_version & 0xFF00) && !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ s->version = ssl_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } if ((ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto err; } if (rr->length > S3I(s)->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* now s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ n = ssl3_packet_extend(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length); if (n <= 0) return (n); if (n != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length) return (n); s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* At this point, s->internal->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->internal->packet */ rr->input = &(s->internal->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* ok, we can now read from 's->internal->packet' data into 'rr' * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which * need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data = rr->input; enc_err = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); /* enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract * the MAC in constant time from within the record, * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. * */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = tls1_mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || timingsafe_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with * TLS 1.0, SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a * decryption failure is directly visible from the ciphertext * anyway, we should not reveal which kind of error * occurred -- this might become visible to an attacker * (e.g. via a logfile) */ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off = 0; /* * So at this point the following is true * * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->internal->packet_length = 0; if (rr->length == 0) { /* * CBC countermeasures for known IV weaknesses * can legitimately insert a single empty record, * so we allow ourselves to read once past a single * empty record without forcing want_read. */ if (s->internal->empty_record_count++ > SSL_MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_BEHAVING_BADLY); return -1; } if (s->internal->empty_record_count > 1) { ssl_force_want_read(s); return -1; } goto again; } else { s->internal->empty_record_count = 0; } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (ret); } /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { const unsigned char *buf = buf_; unsigned int tot, n, nw; int i; if (len < 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; tot = S3I(s)->wnum; S3I(s)->wnum = 0; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake) { i = s->internal->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } if (len < tot) len = tot; n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n > s->max_send_fragment) nw = s->max_send_fragment; else nw = n; i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); if (i <= 0) { S3I(s)->wnum = tot; return i; } if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* * Next chunk of data should get another prepended * empty fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV * weakness. */ S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done = 0; return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } } static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p, *plen; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; int prefix_len = 0; int eivlen; size_t align; SSL3_RECORD *wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(S3I(s)->wbuf); SSL_SESSION *sess; if (wb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) return -1; /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ if (wb->left != 0) return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (S3I(s)->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ /* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */ if (wb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) return -1; } if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; wr = &(S3I(s)->wrec); sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash) == NULL)) { clear = s->internal->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ mac_size = 0; } else { mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash); if (mac_size < 0) goto err; } /* * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls * itself. */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done) { /* * Countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later * together with the actual payload) */ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done = 1; } if (create_empty_fragment) { /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so * if we want to align the real payload, then we can * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ align = (size_t)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); p = wb->buf + align; wb->offset = align; } else if (prefix_len) { p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; } else { align = (size_t)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); p = wb->buf + align; wb->offset = align; } /* write the header */ *(p++) = type&0xff; wr->type = type; *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 */ if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B && !s->internal->renegotiate && s->version > TLS1_VERSION) *(p++) = 0x1; else *(p++) = s->version&0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet length */ plen = p; p += 2; /* Explicit IV length. */ eivlen = 0; if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; } } else if (s->internal->aead_write_ctx != NULL && s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record) { eivlen = s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len; } /* lets setup the record stuff. */ wr->data = p + eivlen; wr->length = (int)len; wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */ memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); wr->input = wr->data; /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ if (mac_size != 0) { if (tls1_mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) goto err; wr->length += mac_size; } wr->input = p; wr->data = p; if (eivlen) { /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; */ wr->length += eivlen; } /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1); /* record length after mac and block padding */ s2n(wr->length, plen); /* we should now have * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; if (create_empty_fragment) { /* we are in a recursive call; * just return the length, don't write out anything here */ return wr->length; } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect * bad write retries later */ S3I(s)->wpend_tot = len; S3I(s)->wpend_buf = buf; S3I(s)->wpend_type = type; S3I(s)->wpend_ret = len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); err: return -1; } /* if S3I(s)->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) { int i; SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(S3I(s)->wbuf); /* XXXX */ if ((S3I(s)->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((S3I(s)->wpend_buf != buf) && !(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || (S3I(s)->wpend_type != type)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); return (-1); } for (;;) { errno = 0; if (s->wbio != NULL) { s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), (unsigned int)wb->left); } else { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i == wb->left) { wb->left = 0; wb->offset += i; if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (S3I(s)->wpend_ret); } else if (i <= 0) { /* * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the * whole point in using a datagram service. */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) wb->left = 0; return (i); } wb->offset += i; wb->left -= i; } } /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; int al, i, j, ret, rrcount = 0; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; if (S3I(s)->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return (-1); if (len < 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ unsigned char *src = S3I(s)->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len; k++) S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } /* * Now S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!s->internal->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->internal->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } } start: /* * Do not process more than three consecutive records, otherwise the * peer can cause us to loop indefinitely. Instead, return with an * SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ so the caller can choose when to handle further * processing. In the future, the total number of non-handshake and * non-application data records per connection should probably also be * limited... */ if (rrcount++ >= 3) { ssl_force_want_read(s); return -1; } s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /* * S3I(s)->rrec.type - is the type of record * S3I(s)->rrec.data, - data * S3I(s)->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * S3I(s)->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec); /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret = ssl3_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); goto f_err; } /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away * (even in 'peek' mode) */ if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { rr->length = 0; s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ if (type == rr->type) { /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we * are doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (len <= 0) return (len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); if (!peek) { memset(&(rr->data[rr->off]), 0, n); rr->length -= n; rr->off += n; if (rr->length == 0) { s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->off = 0; if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && S3I(s)->rbuf.left == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); } } return (n); } /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ { /* * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' * storage, * fill that so that we can process the data * at a fixed place. */ unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof S3I(s)->handshake_fragment; dest = S3I(s)->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof S3I(s)->alert_fragment; dest = S3I(s)->alert_fragment; dest_len = &S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len; } if (dest_maxlen > 0) { /* available space in 'dest' */ n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; if (rr->length < n) n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ /* now move 'n' bytes: */ while (n-- > 0) { dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; } if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) goto start; /* fragment was too small */ } } /* S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; } if (s->internal->msg_callback) s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, S3I(s)->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !S3I(s)->renegotiate) { ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i = s->internal->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (S3I(s)->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ /* In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ ssl_force_want_read(s); return (-1); } } } } /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } /* Disallow client initiated renegotiation if configured. */ if (s->server && SSL_is_init_finished(s) && S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4 && S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO && (s->internal->options & SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION)) { al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION; goto f_err; } /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) */ if (s->server && SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !S3I(s)->send_connection_binding && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { /*S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ rr->length = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto start; } if (S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = S3I(s)->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = S3I(s)->alert_fragment[1]; S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->internal->msg_callback) s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, S3I(s)->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg); if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->internal->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { S3I(s)->warn_alert = alert_descr; if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with * a fatal alert because if application tried to * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and * expects it to succeed. * * In future we might have a renegotiation where we * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. */ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto f_err; } } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; S3I(s)->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerror(s, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d", alert_descr); s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); return (0); } else { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a shutdown */ s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; rr->length = 0; return (0); } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } /* Check that we should be receiving a Change Cipher Spec. */ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; rr->length = 0; if (s->internal->msg_callback) { s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg); } S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; else goto start; } /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->internal->in_handshake) { if (((S3I(s)->hs.state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { S3I(s)->hs.state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; s->internal->renegotiate = 1; s->internal->new_session = 1; } i = s->internal->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (S3I(s)->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ /* In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ ssl_force_want_read(s); return (-1); } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: /* * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->internal->in_handshake is set, but that * should not happen when type != rr->type */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, * but have application data. If the library was * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data * is set) and it makes sense to read application data * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), * we will indulge it. */ if (S3I(s)->in_read_app_data && (S3I(s)->total_renegotiations != 0) && (((S3I(s)->hs.state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && (S3I(s)->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && (S3I(s)->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) || ((S3I(s)->hs.state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && (S3I(s)->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && (S3I(s)->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) { S3I(s)->in_read_app_data = 2; return (-1); } else { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { int i; const char *sender; int slen; if (S3I(s)->hs.state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; else i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; if (S3I(s)->hs.key_block == NULL) { if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return (0); } s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher; if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) return (0); } if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s, i)) return (0); /* we have to record the message digest at * this point so we can get it before we read * the finished message */ if (S3I(s)->hs.state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { sender = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST; slen = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE; } else { sender = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST; slen = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE; } i = tls1_final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md); if (i == 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; return (1); } int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ desc = tls1_alert_code(desc); if (desc < 0) return -1; /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); S3I(s)->alert_dispatch = 1; S3I(s)->send_alert[0] = level; S3I(s)->send_alert[1] = desc; if (S3I(s)->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); /* else data is still being written out, we will get written * some time in the future */ return -1; } int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i, j; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; S3I(s)->alert_dispatch = 0; i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &S3I(s)->send_alert[0], 2, 0); if (i <= 0) { S3I(s)->alert_dispatch = 1; } else { /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, * we will not worry too much. */ if (S3I(s)->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->internal->msg_callback) s->internal->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, S3I(s)->send_alert, 2, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg); if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->internal->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (S3I(s)->send_alert[0]<<8)|S3I(s)->send_alert[1]; cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } } return (i); }