/* $OpenBSD: ike_main_mode.c,v 1.6 1999/02/26 03:41:46 niklas Exp $ */ /* $EOM: ike_main_mode.c,v 1.70 1999/02/25 11:39:03 niklas Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1998 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * This product includes software developed by Ericsson Radio Systems. * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems. */ #include #include #include #include #include "sysdep.h" #include "attribute.h" #include "conf.h" #include "constants.h" #include "crypto.h" #include "dh.h" #include "doi.h" #include "exchange.h" #include "hash.h" #include "ike_auth.h" #include "ike_main_mode.h" #include "ipsec.h" #include "ipsec_doi.h" #include "isakmp.h" #include "log.h" #include "math_group.h" #include "message.h" #include "prf.h" #include "sa.h" #include "transport.h" #include "util.h" static int attribute_unacceptable (u_int16_t, u_int8_t *, u_int16_t, void *); static int ike_main_mode_validate_prop (struct exchange *, struct sa *); static int initiator_send_SA (struct message *); static int initiator_recv_SA (struct message *); static int initiator_send_KE_NONCE (struct message *); static int initiator_recv_KE_NONCE (struct message *); static int initiator_send_ID_AUTH (struct message *); static int initiator_recv_ID_AUTH (struct message *); static int responder_recv_SA (struct message *); static int responder_send_SA (struct message *); static int responder_recv_KE_NONCE (struct message *); static int responder_send_KE_NONCE (struct message *); static int responder_recv_ID_AUTH (struct message *); static int responder_send_ID_AUTH (struct message *); static int recv_KE_NONCE (struct message *); static int recv_ID_AUTH (struct message *); static int send_KE_NONCE (struct message *, size_t); static int send_ID_AUTH (struct message *); static int post_exchange_KE_NONCE (struct message *); int (*ike_main_mode_initiator[]) (struct message *) = { initiator_send_SA, initiator_recv_SA, initiator_send_KE_NONCE, initiator_recv_KE_NONCE, initiator_send_ID_AUTH, initiator_recv_ID_AUTH }; int (*ike_main_mode_responder[]) (struct message *) = { responder_recv_SA, responder_send_SA, responder_recv_KE_NONCE, responder_send_KE_NONCE, responder_recv_ID_AUTH, responder_send_ID_AUTH }; /* Offer a set of transforms to the responder. */ static int initiator_send_SA (struct message *msg) { struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange; struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data; u_int8_t *proposal = 0, *sa_buf = 0, *attr; u_int8_t **transform = 0; size_t transforms_len = 0, proposal_len, sa_len; size_t *transform_len = 0; struct conf_list *conf, *life_conf; struct conf_list_node *xf, *life; int i, value, update_nextp; struct payload *p; struct proto *proto; /* Get the list of transforms. */ conf = conf_get_list (exchange->policy, "Transforms"); if (!conf) return -1; transform = calloc (conf->cnt, sizeof *transform); if (!transform) goto bail_out; transform_len = calloc (conf->cnt, sizeof *transform_len); if (!transform_len) goto bail_out; for (xf = TAILQ_FIRST (&conf->fields), i = 0; i < conf->cnt; i++, xf = TAILQ_NEXT (xf, link)) { /* XXX The sizing needs to be dynamic. */ transform[i] = malloc (ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_SA_ATTRS_OFF + 16 * ISAKMP_ATTR_VALUE_OFF); if (!transform[i]) goto bail_out; SET_ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_NO (transform[i], i); SET_ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_ID (transform[i], IPSEC_TRANSFORM_KEY_IKE); SET_ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_RESERVED (transform[i], 0); attr = transform[i] + ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_SA_ATTRS_OFF; if (attribute_set_constant (xf->field, "ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM", ike_encrypt_cst, IKE_ATTR_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, &attr)) goto bail_out; if (attribute_set_constant (xf->field, "HASH_ALGORITHM", ike_hash_cst, IKE_ATTR_HASH_ALGORITHM, &attr)) goto bail_out; if (attribute_set_constant (xf->field, "AUTHENTICATION_METHOD", ike_auth_cst, IKE_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, &attr)) goto bail_out; if (attribute_set_constant (xf->field, "GROUP_DESCRIPTION", ike_group_desc_cst, IKE_ATTR_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, &attr)) { /* * If no group description exists, try looking for a user-defined * one. */ if (attribute_set_constant (xf->field, "GROUP_TYPE", ike_group_cst, IKE_ATTR_GROUP_TYPE, &attr)) goto bail_out; #if 0 if (attribute_set_bignum (xf->field, "GROUP_PRIME", IKE_ATTR_GROUP_PRIME, &attr)) goto bail_out; if (attribute_set_bignum (xf->field, "GROUP_GENERATOR_2", IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_2, &attr)) goto bail_out; if (attribute_set_bignum (xf->field, "GROUP_GENERATOR_2", IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_2, &attr)) goto bail_out; if (attribute_set_bignum (xf->field, "GROUP_CURVE_A", IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_A, &attr)) goto bail_out; if (attribute_set_bignum (xf->field, "GROUP_CURVE_B", IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_B, &attr)) goto bail_out; #endif } /* * Life durations are special, we should be able to specify * several, one per type. */ life_conf = conf_get_list (xf->field, "Life"); if (life_conf) { for (life = TAILQ_FIRST (&life_conf->fields); life; life = TAILQ_NEXT (life, link)) { attribute_set_constant (life->field, "LIFE_TYPE", ike_duration_cst, IKE_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE, &attr); /* XXX Does only handle 16-bit entities! */ value = conf_get_num (life->field, "LIFE_DURATION", 0); if (value) attr = attribute_set_basic (attr, IKE_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION, value); } } attribute_set_constant (xf->field, "PRF", ike_prf_cst, IKE_ATTR_PRF, &attr); value = conf_get_num (xf->field, "KEY_LENGTH", 0); if (value) attr = attribute_set_basic (attr, IKE_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH, value); value = conf_get_num (xf->field, "FIELD_SIZE", 0); if (value) attr = attribute_set_basic (attr, IKE_ATTR_FIELD_SIZE, value); value = conf_get_num (xf->field, "GROUP_ORDER", 0); if (value) attr = attribute_set_basic (attr, IKE_ATTR_GROUP_ORDER, value); /* Record the real transform size. */ transforms_len += transform_len[i] = attr - transform[i]; } proposal_len = ISAKMP_PROP_SPI_OFF; proposal = malloc (proposal_len); if (!proposal) goto bail_out; SET_ISAKMP_PROP_NO (proposal, 1); SET_ISAKMP_PROP_PROTO (proposal, ISAKMP_PROTO_ISAKMP); SET_ISAKMP_PROP_SPI_SZ (proposal, 0); SET_ISAKMP_PROP_NTRANSFORMS (proposal, conf->cnt); /* XXX I would like to see this factored out. */ proto = calloc (1, sizeof *proto); if (!proto) goto bail_out; proto->no = 1; proto->proto = ISAKMP_PROTO_ISAKMP; proto->sa = TAILQ_FIRST (&exchange->sa_list); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL (&TAILQ_FIRST (&exchange->sa_list)->protos, proto, link); sa_len = ISAKMP_SA_SIT_OFF + IPSEC_SIT_SIT_LEN; sa_buf = malloc (sa_len); if (!sa_buf) goto bail_out; SET_ISAKMP_SA_DOI (sa_buf, IPSEC_DOI_IPSEC); SET_IPSEC_SIT_SIT (sa_buf + ISAKMP_SA_SIT_OFF, IPSEC_SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY); /* * Add the payloads. As this is a SA, we need to recompute the * lengths of the payloads containing others. */ if (message_add_payload (msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA, sa_buf, sa_len, 1)) goto bail_out; SET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH (sa_buf, sa_len + proposal_len + transforms_len); sa_buf = 0; if (message_add_payload (msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_PROPOSAL, proposal, proposal_len, 0)) goto bail_out; SET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH (proposal, proposal_len + transforms_len); proposal = 0; update_nextp = 0; for (i = 0; i < conf->cnt; i++) { if (message_add_payload (msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_TRANSFORM, transform[i], transform_len[i], update_nextp)) goto bail_out; update_nextp = 1; transform[i] = 0; } /* Save SA payload body in ie->sa_i_b, length ie->sa_i_b_len. */ ie->sa_i_b_len = sa_len + proposal_len + transforms_len - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; ie->sa_i_b = malloc (ie->sa_i_b_len); if (!ie->sa_i_b) goto bail_out; memcpy (ie->sa_i_b, TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA])->p + ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, sa_len - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ); memcpy (ie->sa_i_b + sa_len - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_PROPOSAL])->p, proposal_len); transforms_len = 0; for (i = 0, p = TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_TRANSFORM]); i < conf->cnt; i++, p = TAILQ_NEXT (p, link)) { memcpy (ie->sa_i_b + sa_len + proposal_len + transforms_len - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, p->p, transform_len[i]); transforms_len += transform_len[i]; } return 0; bail_out: if (sa_buf) free (sa_buf); if (proposal) free (proposal); if (transform) { for (i = 0; i < conf->cnt; i++) if (transform[i]) free (transform[i]); free (transform); } if (transform_len) free (transform_len); if (conf) conf_free_list (conf); return -1; } /* Figure out what transform the responder chose. */ static int initiator_recv_SA (struct message *msg) { struct sa *sa; struct proto *proto; struct payload *sa_p = TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA]); struct payload *prop = TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_PROPOSAL]); struct payload *xf = TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_TRANSFORM]); /* * IKE requires that only one SA with only one proposal exists and since * we are getting an answer on our transform offer, only one transform. */ if (TAILQ_NEXT (sa_p, link) || TAILQ_NEXT (prop, link) || TAILQ_NEXT (xf, link)) { log_print ("initiator_recv_SA: " "multiple SA, proposal or transform payloads in main mode"); /* XXX Is there a better notification type? */ message_drop (msg, ISAKMP_NOTIFY_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED, 0, 0, 0); return -1; } sa = TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->exchange->sa_list); /* Build the protection suite in our SA. */ if (sa_add_transform (sa, xf, msg->exchange->initiator, &proto)) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } /* XXX Check that the chosen transform matches an offer. */ ipsec_decode_transform (msg, sa, TAILQ_FIRST (&sa->protos), xf->p); /* Mark the SA as handled. */ sa_p->flags |= PL_MARK; return 0; } /* Send our public DH value and a nonce to the responder. */ static int initiator_send_KE_NONCE (struct message *msg) { struct ipsec_exch *ie = msg->exchange->data; ie->g_x_len = dh_getlen (ie->group); /* XXX I want a better way to specify the nonce's size. */ return send_KE_NONCE (msg, 16); } /* Accept receptor's public DH value and nonce. */ static int initiator_recv_KE_NONCE (struct message *msg) { if (recv_KE_NONCE (msg)) return -1; return post_exchange_KE_NONCE (msg); } static int initiator_send_ID_AUTH (struct message *msg) { msg->exchange->flags |= EXCHANGE_FLAG_ENCRYPT; return send_ID_AUTH (msg); } static int initiator_recv_ID_AUTH (struct message *msg) { return recv_ID_AUTH (msg); } /* * Accept a set of transforms offered by the initiator and chose one we can * handle. */ static int responder_recv_SA (struct message *msg) { struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange; struct sa *sa = TAILQ_FIRST (&exchange->sa_list); struct payload *sa_p = TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA]); struct payload *prop = TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_PROPOSAL]); struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data; /* Mark the SA as handled. */ sa_p->flags |= PL_MARK; /* IKE requires that only one SA with only one proposal exists. */ if (TAILQ_NEXT (sa_p, link) || TAILQ_NEXT (prop, link)) { log_print ("responder_recv_SA: " "multiple SA or proposal payloads in main mode"); /* XXX Is there a better notification type? */ message_drop (msg, ISAKMP_NOTIFY_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED, 0, 0, 0); return -1; } /* Chose a transform from the SA. */ if (message_negotiate_sa (msg, ike_main_mode_validate_prop) || !TAILQ_FIRST (&sa->protos)) return -1; /* XXX Move into message_negotiate_sa? */ ipsec_decode_transform (msg, sa, TAILQ_FIRST (&sa->protos), TAILQ_FIRST (&sa->protos)->chosen->p); /* * Check that the mandatory attributes: encryption, hash, authentication * method and Diffie-Hellman group description, has been supplied. */ if (!exchange->crypto || !ie->hash || !ie->ike_auth || !ie->group) { message_drop (msg, ISAKMP_NOTIFY_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED, 0, 0, 0); return -1; } /* Save the body for later hash computation. */ ie->sa_i_b_len = GET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH (sa_p->p) - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; ie->sa_i_b = malloc (ie->sa_i_b_len); if (!ie->sa_i_b) { /* XXX How to log and notify peer? */ return -1; } memcpy (ie->sa_i_b, sa_p->p + ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, ie->sa_i_b_len); return 0; } /* Reply with the transform we chose. */ static int responder_send_SA (struct message *msg) { /* Add the SA payload with the transform that was chosen. */ return message_add_sa_payload (msg); } /* Accept initiator's public DH value and nonce. */ static int responder_recv_KE_NONCE (struct message *msg) { return recv_KE_NONCE (msg); } /* Send our public DH value and a nonce to the initiator. */ static int responder_send_KE_NONCE (struct message *msg) { /* XXX Should we really just use the initiator's nonce size? */ if (send_KE_NONCE (msg, msg->exchange->nonce_i_len)) return -1; /* * Calculate DH values & key material in parallel with the message going * on a roundtrip over the wire. */ message_register_post_send (msg, (void (*) (struct message *)) post_exchange_KE_NONCE); return 0; } /* Receive ID and HASH and check that the exchange has been consistent. */ static int responder_recv_ID_AUTH (struct message *msg) { return recv_ID_AUTH (msg); } static int responder_send_ID_AUTH (struct message *msg) { return send_ID_AUTH (msg); } /* Send our public DH value and a nonce to the peer. */ static int send_KE_NONCE (struct message *msg, size_t nonce_sz) { /* Public DH key. */ if (ipsec_gen_g_x (msg)) { /* XXX How to log and notify peer? */ return -1; } /* Generate a nonce, and add it to the message. */ if (exchange_gen_nonce (msg, nonce_sz)) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } /* Try to add certificates which are acceptable for the CERTREQs */ if (exchange_add_certs (msg)) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } return 0; } /* Receive our peer's public DH value and nonce. */ static int recv_KE_NONCE (struct message *msg) { /* Copy out the initiator's DH public value. */ if (ipsec_save_g_x (msg)) { /* XXX How to log and notify peer? */ return -1; } /* Copy out the initiator's nonce. */ if (exchange_save_nonce (msg)) { /* XXX How to log and notify peer? */ return -1; } /* Copy out the initiator's cert requests. */ if (exchange_save_certreq (msg)) { /* XXX How to log and notify peer? */ return -1; } return 0; } /* * Compute DH values and key material. This is done in a post-send function * as that means we can do parallel work in both the initiator and responder * thus speeding up exchanges. */ static int post_exchange_KE_NONCE (struct message *msg) { struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange; struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data; struct prf *prf; struct hash *hash = ie->hash; enum cryptoerr err; /* Compute Diffie-Hellman shared value. */ ie->g_xy = malloc (ie->g_x_len); if (!ie->g_xy) { /* XXX How to log and notify peer? */ return -1; } dh_create_shared (ie->group, ie->g_xy, exchange->initiator ? ie->g_xr : ie->g_xi); log_debug_buf (LOG_MISC, 80, "post_exchange_KE_NONCE: g^xy", ie->g_xy, ie->g_x_len); /* Compute the SKEYID depending on the authentication method. */ ie->skeyid = ie->ike_auth->gen_skeyid (exchange, &ie->skeyid_len); if (!ie->skeyid) { /* XXX Log and teardown? */ return -1; } log_debug_buf (LOG_MISC, 80, "post_exchange_KE_NONCE: SKEYID", ie->skeyid, ie->skeyid_len); /* SKEYID_d. */ ie->skeyid_d = malloc (ie->skeyid_len); if (!ie->skeyid_d) { /* XXX Log and teardown? */ return -1; } prf = prf_alloc (ie->prf_type, hash->type, ie->skeyid, ie->skeyid_len); if (!prf) { /* XXX Log and teardown? */ return -1; } prf->Init (prf->prfctx); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, ie->g_xy, ie->g_x_len); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, exchange->cookies, ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, "\0", 1); prf->Final (ie->skeyid_d, prf->prfctx); log_debug_buf (LOG_MISC, 80, "post_exchange_KE_NONCE: SKEYID_d", ie->skeyid_d, ie->skeyid_len); /* SKEYID_a. */ ie->skeyid_a = malloc (ie->skeyid_len); if (!ie->skeyid_a) { /* XXX Log & teardown? */ prf_free (prf); return -1; } prf->Init (prf->prfctx); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, ie->skeyid_d, ie->skeyid_len); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, ie->g_xy, ie->g_x_len); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, exchange->cookies, ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, "\1", 1); prf->Final (ie->skeyid_a, prf->prfctx); log_debug_buf (LOG_MISC, 80, "post_exchange_KE_NONCE: SKEYID_a", ie->skeyid_a, ie->skeyid_len); /* SKEYID_e. */ ie->skeyid_e = malloc (ie->skeyid_len); if (!ie->skeyid_e) { /* XXX Log and teardown? */ prf_free (prf); return -1; } prf->Init (prf->prfctx); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, ie->skeyid_a, ie->skeyid_len); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, ie->g_xy, ie->g_x_len); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, exchange->cookies, ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, "\2", 1); prf->Final (ie->skeyid_e, prf->prfctx); prf_free (prf); log_debug_buf (LOG_MISC, 80, "post_exchange_KE_NONCE: SKEYID_e", ie->skeyid_e, ie->skeyid_len); /* Key length determination. */ if (!exchange->key_length) exchange->key_length = exchange->crypto->keymax; /* Derive a longer key from skeyid_e */ if (ie->skeyid_len < exchange->key_length) { u_int16_t len, keylen; u_int8_t *key, *p; prf = prf_alloc (ie->prf_type, hash->type, ie->skeyid_e, ie->skeyid_len); if (!prf) { /* XXX - notify peer */ return -1; } /* Make keylen a multiple of prf->blocksize */ keylen = exchange->key_length; if (keylen % prf->blocksize) keylen += prf->blocksize - (keylen % prf->blocksize); if ((key = malloc (keylen)) == NULL) { /* XXX - notify peer */ return -1; } prf->Init (prf->prfctx); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, "\0", 1); prf->Final (key, prf->prfctx); for (len = prf->blocksize, p = key; len < exchange->key_length; len += prf->blocksize, p += prf->blocksize) { prf->Init (prf->prfctx); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, p, prf->blocksize); prf->Final (p + prf->blocksize, prf->prfctx); } prf_free (prf); /* Set up our keystate using the derived encryption key */ exchange->keystate = crypto_init (exchange->crypto, key, exchange->key_length, &err); free (key); } else /* Set up our keystate using the raw skeyid_e */ exchange->keystate = crypto_init (exchange->crypto, ie->skeyid_e, exchange->key_length, &err); /* Special handling for DES weak keys */ if (!exchange->keystate && err == EWEAKKEY && (exchange->key_length << 1) <= ie->skeyid_len) { log_print ("post_exchange_KE_NONCE: weak key, trying subseq. skeyid_e"); exchange->keystate = crypto_init (exchange->crypto, ie->skeyid_e + exchange->key_length, exchange->key_length, &err); } if (!exchange->keystate) { log_print ("post_exchange_KE_NONCE: " "exchange->crypto->init () failed: %d", err); /* * XXX We really need to know if problems are of transient nature * or fatal (like failed assertions etc.) */ return -1; } /* Setup IV. XXX Only for CBC transforms, no? */ hash->Init (hash->ctx); hash->Update (hash->ctx, ie->g_xi, ie->g_x_len); hash->Update (hash->ctx, ie->g_xr, ie->g_x_len); hash->Final (hash->digest, hash->ctx); crypto_init_iv (exchange->keystate, hash->digest, exchange->crypto->blocksize); return 0; } static int send_ID_AUTH (struct message *msg) { struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange; struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data; u_int8_t *buf; char header[80]; size_t sz; struct sockaddr *src; int src_len; int initiator = exchange->initiator; u_int8_t **id; size_t *id_len; /* Choose the right fields to fill-in. */ id = initiator ? &exchange->id_i : &exchange->id_r; id_len = initiator ? &exchange->id_i_len : &exchange->id_r_len; /* XXX This begs to be more dynamic. */ sz = ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + 4; buf = malloc (sz); if (!buf) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } msg->transport->vtbl->get_src (msg->transport, &src, &src_len); /* XXX Assumes IPv4. */ SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE (buf, IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR); SET_IPSEC_ID_PROTO (buf + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF, 0); SET_IPSEC_ID_PORT (buf + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF, 0); /* Already in network byteorder. */ memcpy (buf + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF, &((struct sockaddr_in *)src)->sin_addr.s_addr, sizeof (in_addr_t)); if (message_add_payload (msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_ID, buf, sz, 1)) { /* XXX Log? */ free (buf); return -1; } *id_len = sz - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; *id = malloc (*id_len); if (!*id) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } memcpy (*id, buf + ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, *id_len); snprintf (header, 80, "send_ID_AUTH: %s", constant_name (ipsec_id_cst, GET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE (buf))); log_debug_buf (LOG_MISC, 40, header, buf + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF, sz - ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF); if (ie->ike_auth->encode_hash (msg) == -1) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } /* * XXX Many people say the COMMIT flag is just junk, especially in Phase 1. */ #ifdef notyet if ((exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_COMMITTED) == 0) exchange->flags |= EXCHANGE_FLAG_I_COMMITTED; #endif return 0; } /* Receive ID and HASH and check that the exchange has been consistent. */ static int recv_ID_AUTH (struct message *msg) { struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange; struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data; struct payload *payload; struct prf *prf; struct hash *hash = ie->hash; char header[80]; size_t hashsize = hash->hashsize; int initiator = exchange->initiator; u_int8_t **hash_p, **id; size_t *id_len; /* Choose the right fields to fill in */ hash_p = initiator ? &ie->hash_r : &ie->hash_i; id = initiator ? &exchange->id_r : &exchange->id_i; id_len = initiator ? &exchange->id_r_len : &exchange->id_i_len; /* XXX Do I really have to save the ID in the SA? */ payload = TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_ID]); *id_len = GET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH (payload->p) - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; *id = malloc (*id_len); if (!*id) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } memcpy (*id, payload->p + ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, *id_len); snprintf (header, 80, "recv_ID_AUTH: %s", constant_name (ipsec_id_cst, GET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE (payload->p))); log_debug_buf (LOG_MISC, 40, header, payload->p + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF, *id_len + ISAKMP_GEN_SZ - ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF); payload->flags |= PL_MARK; /* The decoded hash will be in ie->hash_r or ie->hash_i */ if (ie->ike_auth->decode_hash (msg) == -1) { message_drop (msg, ISAKMP_NOTIFY_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED, 0, 0, 0); return -1; } /* Allocate the prf and start calculating his HASH. */ prf = prf_alloc (ie->prf_type, hash->type, ie->skeyid, ie->skeyid_len); if (!prf) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } prf->Init (prf->prfctx); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, initiator ? ie->g_xr : ie->g_xi, ie->g_x_len); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, initiator ? ie->g_xi : ie->g_xr, ie->g_x_len); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, exchange->cookies + (initiator ? ISAKMP_HDR_RCOOKIE_OFF : ISAKMP_HDR_ICOOKIE_OFF), ISAKMP_HDR_ICOOKIE_LEN); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, exchange->cookies + (initiator ? ISAKMP_HDR_ICOOKIE_OFF : ISAKMP_HDR_RCOOKIE_OFF), ISAKMP_HDR_ICOOKIE_LEN); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, ie->sa_i_b, ie->sa_i_b_len); prf->Update (prf->prfctx, *id, *id_len); prf->Final (hash->digest, prf->prfctx); prf_free (prf); snprintf (header, 80, "recv_ID_AUTH: computed HASH_%c", initiator ? 'R' : 'I'); log_debug_buf (LOG_MISC, 80, header, hash->digest, hashsize); /* Check that the hash we got matches the one we computed. */ if (memcmp (*hash_p, hash->digest, hashsize) != 0) { /* XXX Log? */ return -1; } return 0; } struct attr_node { LIST_ENTRY (attr_node) link; u_int16_t type; }; struct validation_state { struct conf_list_node *xf; LIST_HEAD (attr_head, attr_node) attrs; char *life; }; static int ike_main_mode_validate_prop (struct exchange *exchange, struct sa *sa) { struct conf_list *conf, *tags; struct conf_list_node *xf, *tag; struct proto *proto; struct validation_state vs; struct attr_node *node; /* Get the list of transforms. */ conf = conf_get_list (exchange->policy, "Transforms"); if (!conf) return 0; for (xf = TAILQ_FIRST (&conf->fields); xf; xf = TAILQ_NEXT (xf, link)) { for (proto = TAILQ_FIRST (&sa->protos); proto; proto = TAILQ_NEXT (proto, link)) { /* Mark all attributes in our policy as unseen. */ LIST_INIT (&vs.attrs); vs.xf = xf; vs.life = 0; if (attribute_map (proto->chosen->p + ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_SA_ATTRS_OFF, GET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH (proto->chosen->p) - ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_SA_ATTRS_OFF, attribute_unacceptable, &vs) == -1) goto try_next; /* Sweep over unseen tags in this section. */ tags = conf_get_tag_list (xf->field); for (tag = TAILQ_FIRST (&tags->fields); tag; tag = TAILQ_NEXT (tag, link)) for (node = LIST_FIRST (&vs.attrs); node; node = LIST_NEXT (node, link)) LIST_REMOVE (node, link); /* Are there leftover tags in this section? */ node = LIST_FIRST (&vs.attrs); if (node) { /* We have attributes in our policy we have not seen. */ while (node) { LIST_REMOVE (node, link); node = LIST_FIRST (&vs.attrs); } goto try_next; } } /* All protocols were OK, we succeeded. */ log_debug (LOG_MISC, 20, "ike_main_mode_validate_prop: success"); conf_free_list (conf); return 1; try_next: } log_debug (LOG_MISC, 20, "ike_main_mode_validate_prop: failure"); conf_free_list (conf); return 0; } static int attribute_unacceptable (u_int16_t type, u_int8_t *value, u_int16_t len, void *vvs) { struct validation_state *vs = vvs; struct conf_list_node *xf = vs->xf; struct conf_list *life_conf; struct conf_list_node *life; char *tag = constant_lookup (ike_attr_cst, type); char *str; struct constant_map *map; struct attr_node *node; int rv; if (!tag) { log_print ("attribute_unacceptable: attribute type %d not known", type); return 1; } switch (type) { case IKE_ATTR_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM: case IKE_ATTR_HASH_ALGORITHM: case IKE_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD: case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_DESCRIPTION: case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_TYPE: case IKE_ATTR_PRF: str = conf_get_str (xf->field, tag); if (!str) /* This attribute does not exist in this policy. */ return 1; map = constant_link_lookup (ike_attr_cst, type); if (!map) return 1; if (constant_value (map, str) == decode_16 (value)) { /* Mark this attribute as seen. */ node = malloc (sizeof *node); if (!node) { log_print ("attribute_unacceptable: malloc failed"); return 1; } node->type = type; LIST_INSERT_HEAD (&vs->attrs, node, link); return 0; } return 1; case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_PRIME: case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_1: case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_2: case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_A: case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_B: /* XXX Bignums not handled yet. */ return 1; case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE: case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION: rv = 1; life_conf = conf_get_list (xf->field, "Life"); if (!life_conf) /* Life attributes given, but not in our policy. */ goto bail_out; /* * Each lifetime type must match, otherwise we turn the proposal down. * In order to do this we need to find the specific section of our * policy's "Life" list and match its duration */ vs->life = 0; switch (type) { case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE: for (life = TAILQ_FIRST (&life_conf->fields); life; life = TAILQ_NEXT (life, link)) { str = conf_get_str (life->field, "LIFE_TYPE"); if (!str) /* XXX Log this? */ continue; /* * If this is the type we are looking at, save a pointer * to this section in vs->life. */ if (constant_value (ike_duration_cst, str) == decode_16 (value)) { vs->life = life->field; rv = 0; goto bail_out; } } /* XXX Log? */ break; case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION: if (!vs->life) { log_print ("attribute_unacceptable: " "LIFE_DURATION without LIFE_TYPE"); rv = 0; goto bail_out; } rv = conf_match_num (vs->life, "LIFE_DURATION", decode_16 (value)); break; } bail_out: if (life_conf) conf_free_list (life_conf); return rv; case IKE_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH: case IKE_ATTR_FIELD_SIZE: case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_ORDER: if (conf_match_num (xf->field, tag, decode_16 (value))) { /* Mark this attribute as seen. */ node = malloc (sizeof *node); if (!node) { log_print ("attribute_unacceptable: malloc failed"); return 1; } node->type = type; LIST_INSERT_HEAD (&vs->attrs, node, link); return 0; } return 1; } return 1; }