/* $OpenBSD: x509.c,v 1.58 2001/06/22 16:21:43 provos Exp $ */ /* $EOM: x509.c,v 1.54 2001/01/16 18:42:16 ho Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * This product includes software developed by Ericsson Radio Systems. * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems. */ #ifdef USE_X509 #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_POLICY #include #include #endif /* USE_POLICY */ #include "sysdep.h" #include "cert.h" #include "conf.h" #include "dyn.h" #include "exchange.h" #include "hash.h" #include "ike_auth.h" #include "ipsec.h" #include "log.h" #include "math_mp.h" #include "policy.h" #include "sa.h" #include "util.h" #include "x509.h" /* * X509_STOREs do not support subjectAltNames, so we have to build * our own hash table. */ /* * XXX Actually this store is not really useful, we never use it as we have * our own hash table. It also gets collisons if we have several certificates * only differing in subjectAltName. */ static X509_STORE *x509_certs = 0; static X509_STORE *x509_cas = 0; /* Initial number of bits used as hash. */ #define INITIAL_BUCKET_BITS 6 struct x509_hash { LIST_ENTRY (x509_hash) link; X509 *cert; }; static LIST_HEAD (x509_list, x509_hash) *x509_tab = 0; /* Works both as a maximum index and a mask. */ static int bucket_mask; #ifdef USE_POLICY /* * Given an X509 certificate, create a KeyNote assertion where * Issuer/Subject -> Authorizer/Licensees. * XXX RSA-specific. */ int x509_generate_kn (int id, X509 *cert) { char *fmt = "Authorizer: \"rsa-hex:%s\"\nLicensees: \"rsa-hex:%s\"\n" "Conditions: %s >= \"%s\" && %s <= \"%s\";\n"; char *ikey, *skey, *buf, isname[256], subname[256]; char *fmt2 = "Authorizer: \"DN:%s\"\nLicensees: \"DN:%s\"\n" "Conditions: %s >= \"%s\" && %s <= \"%s\";\n"; X509_NAME *issuer, *subject; struct keynote_deckey dc; X509_STORE_CTX csc; X509_OBJECT obj; X509 *icert; RSA *key; time_t tt; char before[15], after[15]; ASN1_TIME *tm; char *timecomp, *timecomp2; int i; LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 90, "x509_generate_kn: generating KeyNote policy for certificate %p", cert)); issuer = LC (X509_get_issuer_name, (cert)); subject = LC (X509_get_subject_name, (cert)); /* Missing or self-signed, ignore cert but don't report failure. */ if (!issuer || !subject || !LC (X509_name_cmp, (issuer, subject))) return 1; if (!x509_cert_get_key (cert, &key)) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: failed to get public key from cert")); return 0; } dc.dec_algorithm = KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_RSA; dc.dec_key = key; ikey = LK (kn_encode_key, (&dc, INTERNAL_ENC_PKCS1, ENCODING_HEX, KEYNOTE_PUBLIC_KEY)); if (LKV (keynote_errno) == ERROR_MEMORY) { log_print ("x509_generate_kn: failed to get memory for public key"); LC (RSA_free, (key)); LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: cannot get subject key")); return 0; } if (!ikey) { LC (RSA_free, (key)); LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: cannot get subject key")); return 0; } LC (RSA_free, (key)); /* Now find issuer's certificate so we can get the public key. */ LC (X509_STORE_CTX_init, (&csc, x509_cas, cert, NULL)); if (LC (X509_STORE_get_by_subject, (&csc, X509_LU_X509, issuer, &obj)) != X509_LU_X509) { LC (X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, (&csc)); LC (X509_STORE_CTX_init, (&csc, x509_certs, cert, NULL)); if (LC (X509_STORE_get_by_subject, (&csc, X509_LU_X509, issuer, &obj)) != X509_LU_X509) { LC (X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, (&csc)); LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: no certificate found for issuer")); return 0; } } LC (X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, (&csc)); icert = obj.data.x509; if (icert == NULL) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: " "missing certificates, cannot construct X509 chain")); free (ikey); return 0; } if (!x509_cert_get_key (icert, &key)) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: failed to get public key from cert")); free (ikey); return 0; } LC (X509_OBJECT_free_contents, (&obj)); dc.dec_algorithm = KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_RSA; dc.dec_key = key; skey = LK (kn_encode_key, (&dc, INTERNAL_ENC_PKCS1, ENCODING_HEX, KEYNOTE_PUBLIC_KEY)); if (LKV (keynote_errno) == ERROR_MEMORY) { log_error ("x509_generate_kn: failed to get memory for public key"); free (ikey); LC (RSA_free, (key)); LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: cannot get issuer key")); return 0; } if (!skey) { free (ikey); LC (RSA_free, (key)); LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: cannot get issuer key")); return 0; } LC (RSA_free, (key)); buf = calloc (strlen (fmt) + strlen (ikey) + strlen (skey) + 56, sizeof (char)); if (!buf) { log_error ("x509_generate_kn: " "failed to allocate memory for KeyNote credential"); free (ikey); free (skey); return 0; } if (((tm = X509_get_notBefore (cert)) == NULL) || (tm->type != V_ASN1_UTCTIME && tm->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) { tt = time ((time_t) NULL); strftime (before, 14, "%G%m%d%H%M%S", localtime (&tt)); timecomp = "LocalTimeOfDay"; } else { if (tm->data[tm->length - 1] == 'Z') { timecomp = "GMTTimeOfDay"; i = tm->length - 2; } else { timecomp = "LocalTimeOfDay"; i = tm->length - 1; } for (; i >= 0; i--) { if (tm->data[i] < '0' || tm->data[i] > '9') { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid data in " "NotValidBefore time field")); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } } if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { if ((tm->length < 10) || (tm->length > 13)) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid length " "of NotValidBefore time field (%d)", tm->length)); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } /* Validity checks. */ if ((tm->data[2] != '0' && tm->data[2] != '1') || (tm->data[2] == '0' && tm->data[3] == '0') || (tm->data[2] == '1' && tm->data[3] > '2') || (tm->data[4] > '3') || (tm->data[4] == '0' && tm->data[5] == '0') || (tm->data[4] == '3' && tm->data[5] > '1') || (tm->data[6] > '2') || (tm->data[6] == '2' && tm->data[7] > '3') || (tm->data[8] > '5')) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid value in " "NotValidBefore time field")); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } /* Stupid UTC tricks. */ if (tm->data[0] < '5') sprintf (before, "20%s", tm->data); else sprintf (before, "19%s", tm->data); } else { /* V_ASN1_GENERICTIME */ if ((tm->length < 12) || (tm->length > 15)) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid length of " "NotValidBefore time field (%d)", tm->length)); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } /* Validity checks. */ if ((tm->data[4] != '0' && tm->data[4] != '1') || (tm->data[4] == '0' && tm->data[5] == '0') || (tm->data[4] == '1' && tm->data[5] > '2') || (tm->data[6] > '3') || (tm->data[6] == '0' && tm->data[7] == '0') || (tm->data[6] == '3' && tm->data[7] > '1') || (tm->data[8] > '2') || (tm->data[8] == '2' && tm->data[9] > '3') || (tm->data[10] > '5')) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid value in " "NotValidBefore time field")); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } sprintf (before, "%s", tm->data); } /* Fix missing seconds. */ if (tm->length < 12) { before[12] = '0'; before[13] = '0'; } /* This will overwrite trailing 'Z'. */ before[14] = '\0'; } tm = X509_get_notAfter (cert); if (tm == NULL && (tm->type != V_ASN1_UTCTIME && tm->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) { tt = time (0); strftime (after, 14, "%G%m%d%H%M%S", localtime (&tt)); timecomp2 = "LocalTimeOfDay"; } else { if (tm->data[tm->length - 1] == 'Z') { timecomp2 = "GMTTimeOfDay"; i = tm->length - 2; } else { timecomp2 = "LocalTimeOfDay"; i = tm->length - 1; } for (; i >= 0; i--) { if (tm->data[i] < '0' || tm->data[i] > '9') { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid data in " "NotValidAfter time field")); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } } if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { if ((tm->length < 10) || (tm->length > 13)) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid length of " "NotValidAfter time field (%d)", tm->length)); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } /* Validity checks. */ if ((tm->data[2] != '0' && tm->data[2] != '1') || (tm->data[2] == '0' && tm->data[3] == '0') || (tm->data[2] == '1' && tm->data[3] > '2') || (tm->data[4] > '3') || (tm->data[4] == '0' && tm->data[5] == '0') || (tm->data[4] == '3' && tm->data[5] > '1') || (tm->data[6] > '2') || (tm->data[6] == '2' && tm->data[7] > '3') || (tm->data[8] > '5')) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid value in " "NotValidAfter time field")); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } /* Stupid UTC tricks. */ if (tm->data[0] < '5') sprintf (after, "20%s", tm->data); else sprintf (after, "19%s", tm->data); } else { /* V_ASN1_GENERICTIME */ if ((tm->length < 12) || (tm->length > 15)) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid length of " "NotValidAfter time field (%d)", tm->length)); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } /* Validity checks. */ if ((tm->data[4] != '0' && tm->data[4] != '1') || (tm->data[4] == '0' && tm->data[5] == '0') || (tm->data[4] == '1' && tm->data[5] > '2') || (tm->data[6] > '3') || (tm->data[6] == '0' && tm->data[7] == '0') || (tm->data[6] == '3' && tm->data[7] > '1') || (tm->data[8] > '2') || (tm->data[8] == '2' && tm->data[9] > '3') || (tm->data[10] > '5')) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: invalid value in " "NotValidAfter time field")); free (ikey); free (skey); free (buf); return 0; } sprintf (after, "%s", tm->data); } /* Fix missing seconds. */ if (tm->length < 12) { after[12] = '0'; after[13] = '0'; } after[14] = '\0'; /* This will overwrite trailing 'Z' */ } sprintf (buf, fmt, skey, ikey, timecomp, before, timecomp2, after); free (ikey); free (skey); if (LK (kn_add_assertion, (id, buf, strlen (buf), ASSERT_FLAG_LOCAL)) == -1) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: failed to add new KeyNote credential")); free (buf); return 0; } /* We could print the assertion here, but log_print() truncates... */ LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 60, "x509_generate_kn: added credential")); free (buf); if (!LC (X509_NAME_oneline, (issuer, isname, 256))) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 50, "x509_generate_kn: X509_NAME_oneline (issuer, ...) failed")); return 0; } if (!LC (X509_NAME_oneline, (subject, subname, 256))) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 50, "x509_generate_kn: X509_NAME_oneline (subject, ...) failed")); return 0; } buf = malloc (strlen (fmt2) + strlen (isname) + strlen (subname) + 56); if (!buf) { log_error ("x509_generate_kn: malloc (%d) failed", strlen (fmt2) + strlen (isname) + strlen (subname) + 56); return 0; } sprintf (buf, fmt2, isname, subname, timecomp, before, timecomp2, after); if (LK (kn_add_assertion, (id, buf, strlen (buf), ASSERT_FLAG_LOCAL)) == -1) { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: failed to add new KeyNote credential")); free (buf); return 0; } LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 80, "x509_generate_kn: added credential:\n%s", buf)); free (buf); return 1; } #endif /* USE_POLICY */ u_int16_t x509_hash (u_int8_t *id, size_t len) { int i; u_int16_t bucket = 0; /* XXX We might resize if we are crossing a certain threshold. */ for (i = 4; i < (len & ~1); i += 2) { /* Doing it this way avoids alignment problems. */ bucket ^= (id[i] + 1) * (id[i + 1] + 257); } /* Hash in the last character of odd length IDs too. */ if (i < len) bucket ^= (id[i] + 1) * (id[i] + 257); bucket &= bucket_mask; return bucket; } void x509_hash_init () { struct x509_hash *certh; int i; bucket_mask = (1 << INITIAL_BUCKET_BITS) - 1; /* If reinitializing, free existing entries. */ if (x509_tab) { for (i = 0; i <= bucket_mask; i++) for (certh = LIST_FIRST (&x509_tab[i]); certh; certh = LIST_FIRST (&x509_tab[i])) { LIST_REMOVE (certh, link); free (certh); } free (x509_tab); } x509_tab = malloc ((bucket_mask + 1) * sizeof (struct x509_list)); if (!x509_tab) log_fatal ("x509_hash_init: malloc (%d) failed", (bucket_mask + 1) * sizeof (struct x509_list)); for (i = 0; i <= bucket_mask; i++) { LIST_INIT (&x509_tab[i]); } } /* Lookup a certificate by an ID blob. */ X509 * x509_hash_find (u_int8_t *id, size_t len) { struct x509_hash *cert; u_int8_t **cid; u_int32_t *clen; int n, i, id_found; for (cert = LIST_FIRST (&x509_tab[x509_hash (id, len)]); cert; cert = LIST_NEXT (cert, link)) { if (!x509_cert_get_subjects (cert->cert, &n, &cid, &clen)) continue; id_found = 0; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { LOG_DBG_BUF ((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, "cert_cmp", id, len)); LOG_DBG_BUF ((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, "cert_cmp", cid[i], clen[i])); /* XXX This identity predicate needs to be understood. */ if (clen[i] == len && id[0] == cid[i][0] && memcmp (id + 4, cid[i] + 4, len - 4) == 0) { id_found++; break; } } cert_free_subjects (n, cid, clen); if (!id_found) continue; LOG_DBG ((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, "x509_hash_find: return X509 %p", cert->cert)); return cert->cert; } LOG_DBG ((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, "x509_hash_find: no certificate matched query")); return 0; } int x509_hash_enter (X509 *cert) { u_int16_t bucket = 0; u_int8_t **id; u_int32_t *len; struct x509_hash *certh; int n, i; if (!x509_cert_get_subjects (cert, &n, &id, &len)) { log_print ("x509_hash_enter: cannot retrieve subjects"); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { certh = calloc (1, sizeof *certh); if (!certh) { cert_free_subjects (n, id, len); log_error ("x509_hash_enter: calloc (1, %d) failed", sizeof *certh); return 0; } certh->cert = cert; bucket = x509_hash (id[i], len[i]); LIST_INSERT_HEAD (&x509_tab[bucket], certh, link); LOG_DBG ((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, "x509_hash_enter: cert %p added to bucket %d", cert, bucket)); } cert_free_subjects (n, id, len); return 1; } /* X509 Certificate Handling functions. */ int x509_read_from_dir (X509_STORE *ctx, char *name, int hash) { DIR *dir; struct dirent *file; BIO *certh; X509 *cert; char fullname[PATH_MAX]; int off, size; if (strlen (name) >= sizeof fullname - 1) { log_print ("x509_read_from_dir: directory name too long"); return 0; } LOG_DBG ((LOG_CRYPTO, 40, "x509_read_from_dir: reading certs from %s", name)); dir = opendir (name); if (!dir) { log_error ("x509_read_from_dir: opendir (\"%s\") failed", name); return 0; } strncpy (fullname, name, sizeof fullname - 1); fullname[sizeof fullname - 1] = 0; off = strlen (fullname); size = sizeof fullname - off - 1; while ((file = readdir (dir)) != NULL) { strncpy (fullname + off, file->d_name, size); fullname[off + size] = 0; if (file->d_type != DT_UNKNOWN) { if (file->d_type != DT_REG && file->d_type != DT_LNK) continue; } else { struct stat sb; if (stat(fullname, &sb) == -1 || !(sb.st_mode & S_IFREG)) continue; } if (file->d_type != DT_REG && file->d_type != DT_LNK) continue; LOG_DBG ((LOG_CRYPTO, 60, "x509_read_from_dir: reading certificate %s", file->d_name)); certh = LC (BIO_new, (LC (BIO_s_file, ()))); if (!certh) { log_error ("x509_read_from_dir: BIO_new (BIO_s_file ()) failed"); continue; } if (LC (BIO_read_filename, (certh, fullname)) == -1) { LC (BIO_free, (certh)); log_error ("x509_read_from_dir: " "BIO_read_filename (certh, \"%s\") failed", fullname); continue; } #if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00904100L cert = LC (PEM_read_bio_X509, (certh, NULL, NULL, NULL)); #else cert = LC (PEM_read_bio_X509, (certh, NULL, NULL)); #endif LC (BIO_free, (certh)); if (cert == NULL) { log_print ("x509_read_from_dir: PEM_read_bio_X509 failed for %s", file->d_name); continue; } if (!LC (X509_STORE_add_cert, (ctx, cert))) { /* * This is actually expected if we have several certificates only * differing in subjectAltName, which is not an something that is * strange. Consider multi-homed machines. */ LOG_DBG ((LOG_CRYPTO, 50, "x509_read_from_dir: X509_STORE_add_cert failed for %s", file->d_name)); } if (hash) if (!x509_hash_enter (cert)) log_print ("x509_read_from_dir: x509_hash_enter (%s) failed", file->d_name); } closedir (dir); return 1; } /* Initialize our databases and load our own certificates. */ int x509_cert_init (void) { char *dirname; x509_hash_init (); /* Process CA certificates we will trust. */ dirname = conf_get_str ("X509-certificates", "CA-directory"); if (!dirname) { log_print ("x509_cert_init: no CA-directory"); return 0; } /* Free if already initialized. */ if (x509_cas) LC (X509_STORE_free, (x509_cas)); x509_cas = LC (X509_STORE_new, ()); if (!x509_cas) { log_print ("x509_cert_init: creating new X509_STORE failed"); return 0; } if (!x509_read_from_dir (x509_cas, dirname, 0)) { log_print ("x509_cert_init: x509_read_from_dir failed"); return 0; } /* Process client certificates we will accept. */ dirname = conf_get_str ("X509-certificates", "Cert-directory"); if (!dirname) { log_print ("x509_cert_init: no Cert-directory"); return 0; } /* Free if already initialized. */ if (x509_certs) LC (X509_STORE_free, (x509_certs)); x509_certs = LC (X509_STORE_new, ()); if (!x509_certs) { log_print ("x509_cert_init: creating new X509_STORE failed"); return 0; } if (!x509_read_from_dir (x509_certs, dirname, 1)) { log_print ("x509_cert_init: x509_read_from_dir failed"); return 0; } return 1; } void * x509_cert_get (u_int8_t *asn, u_int32_t len) { #ifndef USE_LIBCRYPTO /* * If we don't have a statically linked libcrypto, the dlopen must have * succeeded for X.509 to be usable. */ if (!libcrypto) return 0; #endif return x509_from_asn (asn, len); } int x509_cert_validate (void *scert) { X509_STORE_CTX csc; X509_NAME *issuer, *subject; X509 *cert = (X509 *)scert; EVP_PKEY *key; int res; /* * Validate the peer certificate by checking with the CA certificates we * trust. */ LC (X509_STORE_CTX_init, (&csc, x509_cas, cert, NULL)); res = LC (X509_verify_cert, (&csc)); LC (X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, (&csc)); /* Return if validation succeeded or self-signed certs are not accepted. */ if (res || !conf_get_str ("X509-certificates", "Accept-self-signed")) return res; issuer = LC (X509_get_issuer_name, (cert)); subject = LC (X509_get_subject_name, (cert)); if (!issuer || !subject || LC (X509_name_cmp, (issuer, subject))) return 0; key = LC (X509_get_pubkey, (cert)); if (!key) return 0; if (LC (X509_verify, (cert, key)) == -1) return 0; return 1; } int x509_cert_insert (int id, void *scert) { X509 *cert; int res; cert = LC (X509_dup, ((X509 *)scert)); if (!cert) { log_print ("x509_cert_insert: X509_dup failed"); return 0; } #ifdef USE_POLICY #ifdef USE_KEYNOTE if (x509_generate_kn (id, cert) == 0) #else if (libkeynote && x509_generate_kn (id, cert) == 0) #endif { LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 50, "x509_cert_insert: x509_generate_kn failed")); LC (X509_free, (cert)); return 0; } #endif /* USE_POLICY */ res = x509_hash_enter (cert); if (!res) LC (X509_free, (cert)); return res; } static struct x509_hash * x509_hash_lookup (X509 *cert) { int i; struct x509_hash *certh; for (i = 0; i <= bucket_mask; i++) for (certh = LIST_FIRST (&x509_tab[i]); certh; certh = LIST_NEXT (certh, link)) if (certh->cert == cert) return certh; return 0; } void x509_cert_free (void *cert) { struct x509_hash *certh = x509_hash_lookup ((X509 *)cert); if (certh) LIST_REMOVE (certh, link); LC (X509_free, ((X509 *)cert)); } /* Validate the BER Encoding of a RDNSequence in the CERT_REQ payload. */ int x509_certreq_validate (u_int8_t *asn, u_int32_t len) { int res = 1; #if 0 struct norm_type name = SEQOF ("issuer", RDNSequence); if (!asn_template_clone (&name, 1) || (asn = asn_decode_sequence (asn, len, &name)) == 0) { log_print ("x509_certreq_validate: can not decode 'acceptable CA' info"); res = 0; } asn_free (&name); #endif /* XXX - not supported directly in SSL - later. */ return res; } /* Decode the BER Encoding of a RDNSequence in the CERT_REQ payload. */ void * x509_certreq_decode (u_int8_t *asn, u_int32_t len) { #if 0 /* XXX This needs to be done later. */ struct norm_type aca = SEQOF ("aca", RDNSequence); struct norm_type *tmp; struct x509_aca naca, *ret; if (!asn_template_clone (&aca, 1) || (asn = asn_decode_sequence (asn, len, &aca)) == 0) { log_print ("x509_certreq_decode: can not decode 'acceptable CA' info"); goto fail; } memset (&naca, 0, sizeof (naca)); tmp = asn_decompose ("aca.RelativeDistinguishedName.AttributeValueAssertion", &aca); if (!tmp) goto fail; x509_get_attribval (tmp, &naca.name1); tmp = asn_decompose ("aca.RelativeDistinguishedName[1]" ".AttributeValueAssertion", &aca); if (tmp) x509_get_attribval (tmp, &naca.name2); asn_free (&aca); ret = malloc (sizeof (struct x509_aca)); if (ret) memcpy (ret, &naca, sizeof (struct x509_aca)); else { log_error ("x509_certreq_decode: malloc (%d) failed", sizeof (struct x509_aca)); x509_free_aca (&aca); } return ret; fail: asn_free (&aca); #endif return 0; } void x509_free_aca (void *blob) { struct x509_aca *aca = blob; if (aca->name1.type) free (aca->name1.type); if (aca->name1.val) free (aca->name1.val); if (aca->name2.type) free (aca->name2.type); if (aca->name2.val) free (aca->name2.val); } X509 * x509_from_asn (u_char *asn, u_int len) { BIO *certh; X509 *scert = 0; certh = LC (BIO_new, (LC (BIO_s_mem, ()))); if (!certh) { log_error ("x509_from_asn: BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ()) failed"); return 0; } if (LC (BIO_write, (certh, asn, len)) == -1) { log_error ("x509_from_asn: BIO_write failed\n"); goto end; } scert = LC (d2i_X509_bio, (certh, NULL)); if (!scert) { log_print ("x509_from_asn: d2i_X509_bio failed\n"); goto end; } end: LC (BIO_free, (certh)); return scert; } /* * Obtain a certificate from an acceptable CA. * XXX We don't check if the certificate we find is from an accepted CA. */ int x509_cert_obtain (u_int8_t *id, size_t id_len, void *data, u_int8_t **cert, u_int32_t *certlen) { struct x509_aca *aca = data; X509 *scert; if (aca) LOG_DBG ((LOG_CRYPTO, 60, "x509_cert_obtain: acceptable certificate authorities here")); /* We need our ID to find a certificate. */ if (!id) { log_print ("x509_cert_obtain: ID is missing"); return 0; } scert = x509_hash_find (id, id_len); if (!scert) return 0; x509_serialize (scert, cert, certlen); if (!*cert) return 0; return 1; } /* Returns a pointer to the subjectAltName information of X509 certificate. */ int x509_cert_subjectaltname (X509 *scert, u_int8_t **altname, u_int32_t *len) { X509_EXTENSION *subjectaltname; u_int8_t *sandata; int extpos; int santype, sanlen; extpos = LC (X509_get_ext_by_NID, (scert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1)); if (extpos == -1) { log_print ("x509_cert_subjectaltname: " "certificate does not contain subjectAltName"); return 0; } subjectaltname = LC (X509_get_ext, (scert, extpos)); if (!subjectaltname || !subjectaltname->value || !subjectaltname->value->data || subjectaltname->value->length < 4) { log_print ("x509_cert_subjectaltname: invalid subjectaltname extension"); return 0; } /* SSL does not handle unknown ASN stuff well, do it by hand. */ sandata = subjectaltname->value->data; santype = sandata[2] & 0x3f; sanlen = sandata[3]; sandata += 4; if (sanlen + 4 != subjectaltname->value->length) { log_print ("x509_cert_subjectaltname: subjectaltname invalid length"); return 0; } *len = sanlen; *altname = sandata; return santype; } int x509_cert_get_subjects (void *scert, int *cnt, u_int8_t ***id, u_int32_t **id_len) { X509 *cert = scert; X509_NAME *subject; int type; u_int8_t *altname; u_int32_t altlen; char *buf = 0; unsigned char *ubuf; int i; *id = 0; *id_len = 0; /* * XXX There can be a collection of subjectAltNames, but for now * I only return the subjectName and a single subjectAltName. */ *cnt = 2; *id = calloc (*cnt, sizeof **id); if (!*id) { log_print ("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%d) failed", *cnt * sizeof **id); goto fail; } *id_len = malloc (*cnt * sizeof **id_len); if (!*id_len) { log_print ("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%d) failed", *cnt * sizeof **id_len); goto fail; } /* Stash the subjectName into the first slot. */ subject = LC (X509_get_subject_name, (cert)); if (!subject) goto fail; (*id_len)[0] = ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + LC (i2d_X509_NAME, (subject, NULL)) - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; (*id)[0] = malloc ((*id_len)[0]); if (!(*id)[0]) { log_print ("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%d) failed", (*id_len)[0]); goto fail; } SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE ((*id)[0] - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_DN); ubuf = (*id)[0] + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; LC (i2d_X509_NAME, (subject, &ubuf)); /* Stash the subjectAltName into the second slot. */ type = x509_cert_subjectaltname (cert, &altname, &altlen); if (!type) goto fail; buf = malloc (altlen + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF); if (!buf) { log_print ("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%d) failed", altlen + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF); goto fail; } switch (type) { case X509v3_DNS_NAME: SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE (buf, IPSEC_ID_FQDN); break; case X509v3_RFC_NAME: SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE (buf, IPSEC_ID_USER_FQDN); break; case X509v3_IP_ADDR: /* * XXX I dislike the numeric constants, but I don't know what we * should use otherwise. */ switch (altlen) { case 4: SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE (buf, IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR); break; case 16: SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE (buf, IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR); break; default: log_print ("x509_cert_get_subject: " "invalid subjectAltName iPAdress length %d ", altlen); goto fail; } break; } SET_IPSEC_ID_PROTO (buf + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF, 0); SET_IPSEC_ID_PORT (buf + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF, 0); memcpy (buf + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF, altname, altlen); (*id_len)[1] = ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + altlen - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; (*id)[1] = malloc ((*id_len)[1]); if (!(*id)[1]) { log_print ("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%d) failed", (*id_len)[1]); goto fail; } memcpy ((*id)[1], buf + ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, (*id_len)[1]); free (buf); buf = 0; return 1; fail: for (i = 0; i < *cnt; i++) if ((*id)[i]) free ((*id)[i]); if (*id) free (*id); if (*id_len) free (*id_len); if (buf) free (buf); return 0; } int x509_cert_get_key (void *scert, void *keyp) { X509 *cert = scert; EVP_PKEY *key; key = LC (X509_get_pubkey, (cert)); /* Check if we got the right key type. */ if (key->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { log_print ("x509_cert_get_key: public key is not a RSA key"); LC (X509_free, (cert)); return 0; } *(RSA **)keyp = LC (RSAPublicKey_dup, (key->pkey.rsa)); return *(RSA **)keyp == NULL ? 0 : 1; } void * x509_cert_dup (void *scert) { return LC (X509_dup, (scert)); } void x509_serialize (void *scert, u_int8_t **data, u_int32_t *datalen) { u_int8_t *p; *datalen = LC (i2d_X509, ((X509 *) scert, NULL)); *data = p = malloc (*datalen); if (!p) { log_error ("x509_serialize: malloc (%d) failed", *datalen); return; } *datalen = LC (i2d_X509, ((X509 *)scert, &p)); } /* From cert to printable */ char * x509_printable (void *cert) { char *s; u_int8_t *data; u_int32_t datalen; int i; x509_serialize (cert, &data, &datalen); if (!data) return 0; s = malloc (datalen * 2); if (!s) { free (data); log_error ("x509_printable: malloc (%d) failed", datalen * 2); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < datalen; i++) sprintf (s + (2 * i), "%02x", data[i]); free (data); return s; } /* From printable to cert */ void * x509_from_printable (char *cert) { u_int8_t *buf; int plen, ret; void *foo; plen = (strlen (cert) + 1) / 2; buf = malloc (plen); if (!buf) { log_error ("x509_from_printable: malloc (%d) failed", plen); return 0; } ret = hex2raw (cert, buf, plen); if (ret == -1) { free (buf); log_print ("x509_from_printable: badly formatted cert"); return 0; } foo = x509_cert_get (buf, plen); free (buf); if (!foo) log_print ("x509_from_printable: could not retrieve certificate"); return foo; } #endif /* USE_X509 */